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Abstract  
The threat of terrorism, and in particular the threat of terrorists using 
biological weapons, has grown since the early 1990s, over the decade the 
assessment and perception of threat escalated despite an absence of biological 
weapons use.  
This research explores policy responses to the threat from bioterrorism in 
the UK between 1990 and 2005. A case study approach is used to examine the 
emergence and rise of the bioterrorism threat, and the institutional 
arrangement in place to confront that threat. The dissertation further 
investigates the construction of the threat narrative. The policy area of 
bioterrorism is obscured by secrecy. Therefore, this dissertation looks towards 
policy responses to pandemic influenza, and uses responses to pandemic 
influenza as a heuristic device to illustrate the difficulties of risk assessment 
and the accompanying institutional complexity.  
The study posits that traditional, academic risk assessment 
methodologies do not appear to have as large an influence as the narratives. 
Furthermore, the prevailing conceptualisation of the bioterrorism threat is the 
product of the confluence of three threat narratives. These narratives have 
become entangled and subsequently embedded in the institutional response. 
Moreover, a number of events have influenced and shaped the threat 
narrative of bioterrorism. First, a change in perception (sarin, 1995); then a 
jolt to the political and institutional structures (September 11, 2001); and 
finally, further bombings and plots have augmented the threat narrative 
(Madrid & London).  
This study is positioned at the intersection of policy studies and risk 
assessment, contributing to an understanding of the formation of institutional 
threat perceptions. 
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1 Introduction 
The two past decades have seen a significant devotion of policy attention 
to the problem of biological weapons (BW) in the hands of non-state actors. 
The threat of bioterrorism has become a pervasive topic in political debate, 
the media, and academic discourse. A number of reasons have been put 
forward to account for the increased focus on bioterrorism in the UK and 
elsewhere, amongst them are: the uncovering of the covert Soviet BW 
programme and the possibility of proliferation of knowledge and materials out 
of this programme into the hands of states and non-state entities in the early 
90s; the terrorist use of chemical agents in Japan by the Aum Shinrikyo cult in 
1994-5;1  the events of 9/11 and the ensuing ‘anthrax letters’ in the United 
States in 2001. Further adding to concerns over terrorists using non-
conventional means, is the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism and “home-
grown terrorism” in the UK – the attacks of July 7, 2005 in London and various 
plots which allegedly involved chemical, radiological or biological substances. 
                                                     
1
 Later, it was discovered that the Aum cult had attempted to cultivate and use biological 
agents. These attempts, including the attempted procurement of botulinum toxin and 
the spraying of Bacillus anthracis slurry were however, unsuccessful. See: Wheelis, M.& 
others (2006) Deadly Cultures - Biological Weapons since 1945. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press; and Leitenberg, M. 
(2005) Assessing the Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism threat. US Army War College 
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Threat assessments and expert advice are important to the policy 
formation process as a way of informing policy decisions. The focus of this 
research is on the key institutional actors involved in the policy formulation 
and threat assessment process, and how different narratives shape policy.  
This research does not attempt to assess the level or the validity of the threat.   
A (fortunately) sparse historical record of real life incidents of 
bioterrorism poses a particular challenge for the assessment of the threat. 
However, a balanced and measured policy response is necessary so that, 
among other things, the socially beneficial uses and peaceful applications 
produced by scientific research are not unduly disrupted or restricted. 
An assumption made throughout this dissertation is that specific 
understandings, framings, or conceptualisations, of the bioterrorism threat 
inform the policy response. That is understandings, perceptions and 
conceptualisations of policy makers – those actors within a policy network who 
make and shape policy decisions, not the ‘public’. The policy makers’ 
impression of the threat from bioterrorism is informed and shaped by advice 
given to them from various sources – from expert sources, experience, 
intelligence, to popular media, and preconceptions.   
The bioterrorism threat can be understood as a compound of terrorism 
and biological weapons. Both of these complicated and diffuse categories are 
represented in an over-simplified narrative in policy discourse. Both have a 
long history in the UK. The UK maintained a significant interest in biological 
weapons, in one form or another, from the 1930s to the present day – starting 
with defensive preparations, escalating to offensive research and 
3 
developments, and eventually subsiding back into a defensive position.2 The 
UK had an equally significant history of terrorism, going back to colonial times: 
Irish republican bombing campaigns on the mainland from the 1930s, rising to 
prominence in the 1960s and 70s, and continuing until the late 1990s; as well 
as the Lockerbie bombing in 1988.  
The following chapters explore how this bioterrorism threat narrative has 
evolved and subsequently shaped the policy response by gradually becoming 
embedded in institutions. The concept of policy narratives is used as a 
heuristic device  within a case study approach to chart how the threat of 
bioterrorism has been constructed, how it is assessed, and how responses to 
the threat have evolved over time – from the late 1980s to 2005. However, the 
story of bioterrorism, its assessment, and to a certain extent, the responses to 
it have been veiled in secrecy complicating the investigation. Thus, a second 
case study, on pandemic influenza, has been included. The threat from 
pandemic influenza is used to illustrate a variety of aspects pertaining to the 
difficulty of risk assessment and the accompanying institutional complexity to 
highlight some wider issues which play a role in the construction of the 
bioterrorism threat narrative. Moreover, the pandemic influenza case lends 
itself as an illustrative device because preparedness for natural outbreaks of 
infectious disease bears some similarity to preparations against unnatural 
                                                     
2
 Formal consideration of the threat of biological (bacteriological) warfare was initiated in 
1936, although intelligence reports on foreign biological capabilities appeared 
sporadically in the 1920s indicating some concern. See: Balmer, B. (2001) Britain and 
Biological Warfare: Expert Advice and Science Policy, 1930-65. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan; & Gradon, B. & G. S. Pearson (1999) British biological warfare and biological 
defence, 1925-45. In: Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Development and Use 
from the Middle Ages to 1945, eds. Geissler, E. & J. E. van Courtland Moon, Stockholm: 
SIPRI (OUP) 
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outbreaks of disease, and can place a state in a better position to respond to 
man-made events.  
The deliberate spread of pathogenic material by non-state actors, 
bioterrorism, has been posited before3, but serious and sustained policy 
attention to it emerged only in the late 1980s. The specific focus in this 
dissertation is on processes and debates in the UK. The following chapters will 
gradually build up a picture of the factors which have contributed to the 
emergence of the bioterrorism threat in the UK.  
The bioterrorism threat is conceptualised here in the following way: 
Several distinct and separate narratives came together in the late 1980s. These 
narratives are overly simplified and corrupted abstractions of complex 
phenomena – ‘technological progress’, ‘terrorism’, and ‘WMD’. Their 
confluence resulted in the threat of bioterrorism being framed in a specific 
way. This amalgam of narratives has been reinforced by a number of events 
which have caused institutional responses. These institutional responses in 
turn have augmented the threat narrative. The now prevailing 
conceptualisation of the bioterrorism threat which has been constructed from 
these three narratives stands to become further entrenched with continued 
                                                     
3
 The threat of terrorist use has been invoked, for example, during House of Commons 
debates of the Biological Weapons Bill in 1973. Conservative MP David Price, for 
example, explicitly mentions “terrorist who wishes to poison the water supply…[which] 
is by no means fictional today if one considers the activities of terrorist groups around 
the world.” He continues and refers to “the annexe to the World Health Organisation 
publication ‘Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons’ under the heading 
‘Sabotage of Water Supplies’. One does not have to be a super-Power or even a nation 
State to do that.” Hansard (1973) Biological Weapons Bill. 21 November 1973, vol. 864, 
col. 1503-1504W: Hansard (Commons).  Several allegations of attempted acquisitions 
and alleged use prior to the 1980s are outlined in: Tucker, J. B. (2000) Toxic terror: 
assessing the terrorist use of chemical and biological weapons. Cambridge, Ma. and 
London: MIT Press; chapters 3,4 & 5 in particular.  
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events of terrorism, as well as inevitable scientific and technological advances. 
Bioterrorism has thus been constructed, or evolved into an intractable 
problem.  
The study is based on interviews as well as archival and documentary 
research, which is guided by two research questions: Who are the main actors 
in the policy making process with regard to bioterrorism? How are threats of 
bioterrorism assessed in the UK?   
A finding of this research is that traditional, academic risk assessment 
methodologies do not appear to have as large an influence as the narratives 
that have been identified. 
 
6 
2 Methodology 
Introduction 
The choice of methods should reflect their appropriateness for the 
research questions. This dissertation investigates the influences upon current 
UK bioterrorism policies, especially the role of narratives, threat assessment 
and the mechanisms of policy formation. This chapter addresses the research 
questions, the methodological framework, and the methods used to gather 
empirical material and procedural details of the research in order to answer 
the research questions.  
The central concern of this dissertation is how policy is made in the face 
of high uncertainty. In particular, this research looks at the case of policy 
formation and risk management in the UK.  
A case study approach is used to investigate the policy formation process 
and the role of narratives in shaping the approach taken by the UK 
Government to manage highly uncertain risks. The particular case used here is 
that of bioterrorism. However, bioterrorism threat assessments are veiled in 
secrecy – this curtails access to information in many instances, rendering 
research difficult. The case of pandemic influenza is used to illustrate the 
difficulties of risk assessment and the accompanying institutional complexity 
7 
to illuminate the case of bioterrorism. The pandemic flu case thus serves as a 
heuristic device to illuminate the British approaches to bioterrorism policy. 
Choice of the cases 
Both cases, bioterrorism and pandemic influenza, overlap substantially, 
despite being idiosyncratic. The cases share key features which makes the 
pandemic influenza case suitable to be used to illuminate the case of British 
bioterrorism policy and illustrate certain aspects of it.  
The threat of disease is at the heart of both cases; both cases have the 
potential to cause a high level of morbidity, mortality and economic 
disruption; both are framed as security issues; and both cases are complex and 
the policy discourse is lead by “expert knowledge”. Both cases are also 
characterised by an abundance of uncertainty about the likelihood of 
occurrence and severity of the impact, although the policy discourse focuses 
on high impact scenarios. There is, however, a notable difference between the 
two cases. The case of pandemic influenza represents a threat which is, or 
should be, much better understood than that of bioterrorism. Three notable 
influenza pandemics occurred in the twentieth century 1918, 1957, and 1968; 
whereas there is no history of any significant or large scale bioterrorism 
event.4  The response to the threat of terrorist using unconventional weapons 
has received considerable attention, scrutiny and criticism in the US, whereas 
the political response to the threat in the UK remains less well understood 
outside of the policy community. The US remains a dominant global actor in 
responses to terrorism. Furthermore, political processes in US tend to be more 
                                                     
4
 Questions over scale and significance are difficult to judge, and are subjective and 
contingent on the measure of impact. The anthrax letters of 2001, for instance, had a 
significant political impact although casualty numbers were relatively low.  
8 
transparent, open to scrutiny than those in the UK. A decision was made to 
study the UK because it is less studied than the US.  
The UK is a major actor in the international regime which prohibits 
biological weapons. It is a depository of the 1972 Biological Weapons 
Convention, along with the US and Russia and has taken a leading role in key 
aspects of the effort to effectively prohibit biological weapons.5 
The political system and the approach taken to confront the challenge of 
bioterrorism are significantly different in different countries, indicating that 
the institutional set-up, and overall framing of the problem play an important 
role.   
Research Questions   
Two research questions are posed to investigate the policy response to 
the threat of bioterrorism in the UK. The research questions are used to 
explore the policy community – policy makers and shapers – and policy 
process. The focus is on the policy community (found in institutions) and policy 
processes, rather than the role of the media or public perception of risk or 
threat. Below, each research question is outlined and briefly discussed. 
                                                     
5
 UK proposals to strengthen the ban on biological methods of warfare in 1968 started 
negotiations of the Biological Weapons Convention. In 1969 it was the UK that tabled 
the first draft convention. Sims, N. R. A. (2001) The evolution of biological disarmament 
(SIPRI CBW Studies No.19). Oxford: Oxford University Press.  Since then the UK has 
played a leading role in biological arms control, Robinson describes the UK as a 
standard-bearer in various aspects of international efforts to control biological and 
chemical weapons. House of Commons - Foreign Affairs Committee (2000) Eight Report: 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (Session 1999-2000 HC 407). London: The Stationery Office 
(2 August 2000), Appendix 29: Memorandum submitted by Professor J P Perry Robinson, 
University of Sussex. 
9 
First research question: 
The first step in this investigation is the identification of the main, or key, 
actors who are involved in the policy making process. Thus, the first research 
question serves a descriptive purpose.  
Who are the main actors in the policy making process with regard to 
bioterrorism? 
The qualifier in this question – the main actors – hints at the assumption 
that not all actors who are involved in the process are equally important. 
Mahoney states that not all pieces of evidence count equally. Some actors are 
instrumental in the process, and are what Mahoney calls ‘smoking guns’; 
others are less important members of the policy network.6  In answering this 
first research question the policy network or institutional arrangement will be 
explored, and key actors identified. The identification of the main actors 
involved in the policy making process is the critical first step to understand 
how policy is made in the UK with regard to deliberate release of pathogenic 
material. 
In the case of bioterrorism there is a particular problem. Parts of the 
policy network reside within the ‘intelligence machinery’, where secrecy on 
grounds of national security is commonplace. Furthermore, parts of the 
response capability are also kept opaque for similar reasons. The problem of 
secrecy and security will be revisited below in greater detail. Answering the 
first research question enables the second question to be explored. 
                                                     
6
 Mahoney, J. (2007) Qualitative Methodology and Comparative Politics. Comparative 
Political Studies, 40(2), 122-144 
10 
Second research question: 
The second research question explores how the threats of bioterrorism 
and pandemic influenza are assessed and how that assessment influences 
policy decisions in the UK.  
How are threats of bioterrorism assessed in the UK? 
Two closely linked features of the policy formation process are explored. 
The first feature this question investigates is the model of policy formation; 
the second feature is the model of assessment. These are two distinct but 
related features. First, the model of policy formation is the way in which the 
policy network links together – how decisions and assessments are passed on 
from one actor in the network to another – it can thus be understood as the 
mechanism of policy formation. The second feature is exploring through which 
means the threat assessment is being done, that means what conceptual tools 
are being used to assess the threat. This part of the research question is most 
affected by concerns over secrecy. However, it should be pointed out that the 
objective is to gain an insight into the ‘mode of assessment’ rather than what 
the assessment concludes. The ‘mode of assessment’ is the mechanical, or 
structural, feature of the assessment, how the assessment is done; whereas 
the result(s), or the product, of an assessment (what the assessment 
concludes) is likely to be sensitive information, and thus inaccessible for 
academic scrutiny.  
This question is subservient to the first question as it can not be 
answered adequately, nor understood, in isolation from the previous question, 
but must be embedded in the bigger picture of the policy formation 
framework. 
11 
Although there is an initial need for a sequential approach to the 
research questions – answering the second research question relies on the 
first question being answered – the overall approach is, however, iterative, 
rather than sequential. The next section looks at the methodological 
framework and the approach taken in this study. 
Case Study Approach 
The case study methodology is the preferred research strategy when 
asking ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions.7  The case study method represents a 
diverse set of research strategies with a lot of variation in the design and use. 
The diversity of the case study approach is due to its application to a variety of 
disciplines and situations.8   
A case study method has advantages over more formal modelling and 
statistical tests when studying complex systems, such as the policy making and 
formulation process, which involve different structural components, path 
dependencies, a variety of actors with strategic interactions and relatively 
unstructured and infrequent phenomena with unique characteristics.9  A case 
study is an appropriate approach when asking questions about “a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real life context especially when the 
                                                     
7
 Yin, R. K. (1994) Case study research: design and methods. Thousand Oaks: Sage 
8
 Authors who have drawn attention to various uses of case studies in social science include: 
Bennett, A. & C. Elman (2007) Case Study Methodology in the International Relations 
Subfield. Comparative Political Studies, 40(2), 170-195; George, A. L. & A. Bennett (2004) 
Case Study and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center 
for Science and International Affairs; Yin, R. K. (1994) Case study research: design and 
methods. Thousand Oaks: Sage; & Platt, J. (1988) What can case studies do? Studies in 
Qualitative Methodology, 1, 1-23 
9
 Bennett, A. & C. Elman (2007) Case Study Methodology in the International Relations 
Subfield. Comparative Political Studies, 40(2), 170-195 
12 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”.10  This 
section explains the specific research strategy adopted in this study. 
There are a number of competing definitions of case studies. To avoid 
methodological confusion I follow the definition developed by Gerring, who 
defines a case study as:  
an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of 
understanding a larger class of (similar) units
11
  
where a unit is a 
spatially bounded phenomenon, for example a nation-
state, revolution, political party [...] at a single point in 
time or over some delimited period of time.
12
   
Gerring’s definition is complicated; however, it serves a purpose in 
reducing much of the ambiguity in case study research, which arises from the 
diversity of different approaches, and what Moaz refers to as the impression 
that case studies “are a synonym for freeform research where everything 
goes”.13   
The approach used here, within the case study, is “process tracing”. 
Following George and Bennett, process tracing is a method for looking at 
causal mechanisms or to explain outcomes. In short, it is the use of narratives 
                                                     
10
 Yin, R. K. (1994) Case study research: design and methods. Thousand Oaks: Sage, p.13 
11
 Gerring, J. (2004) What is a Case Study and What is it good for? American Political Science 
Review, 98(2), 341-354, p.342 
12
 Ibid. p.342 
13
 Maoz, Z. (2002) Case study methodology in international studies: From storytelling to 
hypothesis testing. In: Evaluating methodology in international studies, eds. Harvey, F. P. 
& M. Brecher, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 161-186, p.164-165, quoted in: 
Bennett, A. & C. Elman (2007) Case Study Methodology in the International Relations 
Subfield. Comparative Political Studies, 40(2), 170-195, p.341 
13 
to explain processes with the aim to link the processes to both: causes and 
outcomes. The narrative needs to be verified and other competing 
explanations need to be eliminated.14  Thus, process tracing is not unlike a 
historical study. For the purpose of this dissertation, the narratives are 
gathered from interviews, published materials, and available literature. I will 
return to the concept of narratives in the concepts chapter below in greater 
detail. 
A case study approach is used because the formation of policies to 
address highly uncertain events with potentially large consequences is a 
phenomenon with unique characteristics, as mentioned above. The specificity 
of the case, its idiosyncrasies, makes it difficult to generalize beyond this case 
to the wider population; in other words: to generalize from the bioterrorism 
case study to wider policy formation processes in the UK. It has to be kept in 
mind that generalization from a bounded and focussed topic to a wider field is 
problematic, not least because of peculiar features of the case. Thus, 
extending findings, from the case under investigation (bioterrorism policies in 
the UK) to policy making in the UK as a whole, must be treated with care, or 
avoided altogether.15 
The case study approach and the process tracing technique serve two 
purposes. First, a descriptive aim, to answer the first research question (Who 
are the main actors?). Second, to link the conceptual framework to the 
empirical findings; in order to answer the second research question (How are 
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 George, A. L. & A. Bennett (2004) Case Study and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences. Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs 
15
 Similar concerns over the generalisability of single cases are raise elsewhere. See, for 
example: Burnham, P.& others (2008) Research methods in politics. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, pp.63 
14 
the threats assessed).16  The methodological framework has largely been 
sourced from writers in studies of politics, even if this methodological 
approach is applicable in various social science disciplines, there is a difference 
in aims between political studies and policy research, the latter being the one 
attempted here. Unlike political inquiry, where the development of theories is 
the “quintessential end”17  in itself; in policy studies the development of 
theories is rather a means for providing policy makers with “generic 
knowledge” that will help them form effective strategies. In other words, 
policy studies has a problem-solving nature, at least in aspiration, and 
therefore an inherent instrumental rationality guiding the research.18   
The following section outlines sources of evidence and method of data 
collection used in this dissertation.  
Use of Interviews 
The use of interviews is a critical part in this investigation. The interview 
process was ongoing throughout the research, especially informal interviews 
which tended to be ad hoc, conducted when and where opportunity arose. 
Formal interviews occurred at two periods of time in the research project. The 
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 This is a two-way process – using the methodology as a heuristic backdrop to the 
theoretical conceptual framework to exemplify and build on theory; and conversely, to 
use the methodological framework to build theories. As Eisenhardt points out, the 
process between theory building and data collection is iterative. Eisenhardt, K. M. 
(1989) Building theories from case study research. Academy of Management Review, 
14(4), pp. 532-550. 
17
 Eckstein, H. (1975) Case study and theory in political science. In: Handbook of political 
science, eds. Greenstein, F. I. & N. W. Polsby, Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 
p.86 
18
 Brunner makes a similar point: policy studies should be problem oriented and it is in its 
contribution to policy that its validity can be tested. Brunner, R. D. (1991) The policy 
movement as a policy problem. Policy Sciences, 24(1), 65-98 
15 
first was early in the research, after a rough identification of the topic, to gain 
an insight into views on bioterrorism. The second part of the formal interview 
process was undertaken in the later stages of the research project, to gather 
specific information on processes, networks, and actors. However, the use of 
interviews also presented a number of problems. This section will outline the 
interview methodology and problems encountered.  
Two general approaches were used – formal and informal. Formal 
interviews were pre-arranged, with a list of questions which were asked in a 
semi-standardised qualitative manner. The semi-standardised qualitative 
interview is useful to “uncover insights or unanticipated areas of relevance to 
the study, which can then be followed up and capitalized on with the same 
respondent in the same interview.”19  Interviews were tailored, or adapted, to 
each respondent and thus varied in content and questions according to the 
respondent’s specific field of expertise and organizational affiliation.20   
The interview candidates for formal interviews were given a précis of the 
study undertaken, together with a request for an interview appointment. 
Interviews were generally conducted in a relatively informal atmosphere with 
the interviewee happy to share anecdotes and stories. Access to interviewees, 
and selection of potential candidates, was facilitated by an extensive network 
of contacts of the Harvard Sussex Program, and in consultation with my 
supervisors. Interviewees also suggested further interview contacts whom they 
felt should be included in this study and would be useful to this investigation.  
Referrals of this kind can not only indicate ‘who knows who’ but also give 
                                                     
19
 Richardson, S.& others (1965) Interviewing - its forms and functions. New York and London: 
Basic Books, p. 54 
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 A list of interviewees has been deposited with my supervisors. 
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some insight on the value one actor places upon another and the socio-
dynamics of the network.21  But referrals can also lead to a kind of ‘lock-in’ 
into a specific network of like minded individuals. 
Informal interviews and informal discussion provided a good source of 
information for this research. These were unscheduled short discussions or 
questions and answers, held at conferences, or similar meetings, and 
conducted when opportunity arose, either by asking speakers specific 
questions about their presentations during question and answer sessions, or 
through approaching speakers or potential interviewees for an informal 
discussion after presentations or during general ‘coffee talk’. However, these 
‘interviews’ were generally restricted to a small number of questions, and 
more general comments, rather than in depth discussions of the subject due to 
constraints on time and access to the respondents at these venues. 
Opportunity for many of these informal approaches arose during seminars 
organized by, amongst other, the Harvard Sussex Program at the University of 
Sussex, at conferences organized by the Royal United Services Institute in 
London, and, in the early stages of the research the research consortium of the 
ASSRBCVUL22 project.  
The interview “population” included a range of respondents with 
different affiliations and backgrounds to gain a broad set of views on the 
issues involved in the policy formation process and the policy network 
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 Duke, K. (2002) Getting beyond the 'Official Line': Reflections on dilemmas of access, 
knowledge and power in researching policy networks. Journal of Social Policy, 31(1), 39-
59. 
22
 European Commission FP6 programme Project 502476: “Assessment of the vulnerabilities 
of modern societies to terrorist acts employing radiological, biological or chemical 
agents with the view to assist in developing preventative and suppressive crisis 
management strategies” 
17 
involved. Respondents included security industry representatives; academic 
scholars; serving and retired government officials, police, journalists, civil 
servants; and serving and retired military personnel.  
Problems with interviews 
Conducting interviews in this peculiar field of inquiry (biological weapons 
and terrorism and associated policies) presented a number of problems 
connected to trust and familiarity of the interviewer with the interviewee. 
Similar to Duke, I found that “gaining physical access to my respondents was 
relatively easy, it proved much more difficult to negotiate access to their 
personal views and opinions”.23   
Issues surrounding a perceived sensitivity of the subject of biological 
terrorism and attribution in some cases were a common obstacle. To overcome 
the perceived sensitivity of the subject in formal interviews a précis was 
prepared to inform the potential interviewee of the specifics of the 
dissertation. In informal interview settings this was done by a verbal précis 
specifically pointing out that the study does not involve sensitive aspects as it 
is a study in science and technology policy research concentrating on policy 
mechanisms and policy networks. Gaining access and establishing rapport was 
important and an on-going process. Connection to the Harvard Sussex 
Program, and regular conference attendance helped to create familiarity with 
the respondents, and eased some of the concerns. However, despite 
explanation of the nature of the research many, but not all, of the respondents 
remained guarded, or unwilling to divulge any but the most obvious, 
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 Duke, K. (2002) Getting beyond the 'Official Line': Reflections on dilemmas of access, 
knowledge and power in researching policy networks. Journal of Social Policy, 31(1), 39-
59, p.48 
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superficial information. One respondent explained refusal to be interviewed 
the following way: 
“I hope that you will appreciate that derivation of the 
threat position is perhaps the most sensitive of all the 
activities that are carried out in government. Knowledge 
of even the process used could inadvertently give an 
advantage to an aggressor and hence it must be closely 
guarded.”
24
 
In formal interviews anonymity of the respondent was always offered. 
Respondents, in formal as well as informal interviews, often introduced 
information and anecdotes with “…this is off the record, but…” However, 
despite being interesting, in most cases the information gained “off the 
record” was only of peripheral interest, to this dissertation, if at all.  
Many of the conferences, seminars, presentations, and talks attended 
were held under the Chatham House Rule.25  The Rule states that the 
information gained can be used freely, but the identity and affiliation of the 
speaker may not be revealed. The Rule’s aim is to provide anonymity to 
facilitate the free and open sharing of information. Non-attributable 
information gained in this way is difficult to use in an academic study, and 
where possible I have attempted to gain the information from a different 
source, where this was not possible the location, venue and date are cited, and 
the Chatham House Rule condition is noted.  
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 Senior Home Office Official, personal communication, 14
th
 July 2008 
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 The Chatham House Rule states that: “When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the 
Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the information received, but neither 
the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may 
be revealed”. Further explanation of the Rule and its interpretation can be found at: 
http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk 
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Information gained in interviews was triangulated, or corroborated, 
where possible with respondents interviewed at a later stage, or with the help 
of documentary evidence where available to increase confidence in the 
information gained in interviews, formal and informal, and to be able to place 
the information in the correct historical, institutional, and wider context of the 
research. The real value of most of the interviews turned out to be that they 
guided and supported finding of documents, provided anecdotal evidence, 
detail, direction, and corroboration. Most of the respondents remain 
unacknowledged due to confidentiality and non-attribution agreements. 
However, the interview process was critical and helped substantially in the 
construction of the case study, and in answering the research questions as far 
as possible. 
Use of Documents  
Documentary evidence was, together with interviews, another important 
source of information for this dissertation. A variety of different documentary 
sources, material and information was consulted, and where possible primary 
or secondary sources were used.26  Attempts have been made, wherever 
possible, to corroborate information with a variety of sources; this was, 
unfortunately, not always possible due to secrecy and confidentiality, or 
general sparseness of information publically available.  
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 Documentary sources can be categorised as ‘primary’, ‘secondary’, and ‘tertiary’. This 
rough distinction is based on two factors: timescale and the intended audience – 
primary sources are part of or produced at the event in question for internal circulation 
(e.g. government documents); secondary sources are produced after an event consisting 
of other evidence given to participants and publically available (e.g. Command Papers, 
Parliamentary debates and news reports), tertiary sources are reconstructing the event 
and are in the public domain (e.g. books, academic publications). See, for example: 
Burnham, P.& others (2008) Research methods in politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan 
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The dissertation benefitted greatly from two information collections 
which have been accumulated and maintained by the Harvard Sussex Program: 
the Sussex Harvard Information Bank (SHIB) and the CBW Events database. The 
SHIB is a subject orientated archive storing thousands of primary, secondary 
and tertiary documents, going back to the 19th Century. The CBW Events 
database contains a fully searchable, partially published chronology of over 
16300 events pertaining to chemical and biological warfare armament and 
disarmament going back to 1986.  
These two sources of documentary material were complemented, where 
necessary, by collecting documents from a variety of sources: governmental 
and inter-governmental and non-governmental agencies, as well as libraries, 
online repositories, and news paper archives.  
At several locations in this dissertation confidential and secret material – 
which has been declassified and publically released – is quoted. There is an 
inherent problem with these kinds of resources, as with much of the 
information gained in an area of inquiry where secrecy is habitually employed. 
Material released into the public is rarely complete, it is either redacted or 
only snippets are provided (material found in the Butler Inquiry27 is a good 
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 On 3 February 2004, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary announced in the House of 
Commons that the Prime Minister decided to establish a committee of Privy Counsellors 
to review intelligence on weapons of mass destruction. The terms of reference were “to 
investigate the intelligence coverage available in respect of WMD programmes [...and] 
to investigate the accuracy of intelligence on Iraqi WMD up to March 2003, and to 
examine any discrepancies between the intelligence gathered, evaluated and used by 
the Government before the conflict, and between that intelligence and what has been 
discovered by the Iraq survey group since the end of the conflict; and to make 
recommendations to the Prime Minister for the future on the gathering, evaluation and 
use of intelligence on WMD, in the light of the difficulties of operating in countries of 
concern.[...The committee] will have access to all intelligence reports and assessments 
and other relevant Government papers, and will be able to call witnesses to give oral 
evidence in private.” Lord Butler (2004) Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass 
continued… 
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example of this), thus lacking context. These incomplete pieces of information 
allow only a blinkered view of the information at hand. Further complicating 
the picture is that even complete documents would not necessarily give a 
fuller picture, especially in the case of intelligence; as Colin McColl, former 
head (1988-1994) of the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) said – the 
most intelligence can provide is “cat’s eyes in the dark”.28  
Participation in an Expert Group 
The third source of information for the dissertation was the participation 
in a research consortium engaged in a co-ordination action funded by the 
European Commission.29  This co-ordination action, with the project acronym 
ASSRBCVUL, assessed the vulnerabilities of the European society to 
radiological, biological and chemical terrorist attacks, and evaluated and 
proposed countermeasures.  
The following section will outline the co-ordination action in more detail, 
and outline the role and effect that engagement with the co-ordination action 
had on this dissertation. 
The European Commission has, in response to the terrorist attacks of 
September 2001, and the wider perception of a threat from terrorism, 
                                                                                                                                                           
Destruction, HC 898. London: The Stationery Office (14 July 2004), p. 1 
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 McColl’s metaphor likens counter-terrorism efforts to a cat in the darkness, in darkness all 
one can see are the eyes of the cat rather than the whole of the creature. Economist 
(2005) Cat's eyes in the dark Economist (London) 19 March 2005, pp. 32-34 
29
 For information on the project see: European Commission FP6 Project 502476 ASSRBCVUL 
Co-ordination action, SSP Area 8.1.B.2.7, “Assessment of the vulnerabilities of modern 
societies to terrorist acts employing radiological, biological or chemical agents with the 
view to assist in developing preventative and suppressive crisis management strategies”, 
Executive Summary, May 2007 
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prepared a programme of activities to counter the threat of radiological, 
biological and chemical terrorism (RBC). In order to inform its Member States 
of the threat posed by, and the societal vulnerabilities to RBC terrorism a 
prospective study was performed by an international consortium of ESTO30 
network members. ASSRBCVUL was meant to update the restricted ESTO study 
and to make the updated findings of ASSRBCVUL available to a wider audience 
by avoiding classification. This, however, failed. An ‘EU restricted’ 
classification suppressed much of the resultant report. 
ASRBCVUL was carried out by an international consortium of seven 
organizations31, each with responsibility for discrete work packages. The 
overall remit of the study was to:  
“assess technological, social, economic and 
psychological vulnerabilities of modern societies [to 
terrorist acts employing radiological, biological or 
chemical agents] with the view to developing preventive, 
risk communication and crisis management strategies”
32
 
The work packages were assigned to individual organizations and served 
to set the operational goals. These goals included the assembly of a model of 
European society to assess the impact of RBC terrorism, an up-to-date threat 
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 ESTO stands for the “European Science and Technology Observatory”, and was a network 
project of the European Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC) Institute for 
Prospective Technological Studies (IPTS). ESTO was a “platform of experts engaged in 
monitoring and analysing scientific and technological developments and their relation 
and interaction with society”. 
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 The consortium was comprised of seven partner organizations and about 15 participants: 
Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research (TNO), the consortium lead 
partner; Compagnie Européenne d’Intelligence Stratégique (CEIS); Centro Nacional de 
Biotecnologia (CSIC); Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI); University of Sussex 
(author’s affiliation); Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (IPTS) of the 
European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC); University of Ottawa. 
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 European Commission FP6 programme for integrating and strengthening the European 
Research Area, paragraph 2.7, task 5 
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and vulnerability assessment, a collection of existing policy and 
countermeasures, designing of a set of planning scenarios which were 
informed by the preceding threat and vulnerability assessment, and an 
assessment of policies and countermeasures on an international, EU, and 
Member State level. Literature reviews were augmented by expert opinion of 
consortium participants and their associates. The project was harmonised 
overall through a series of meetings in which progress and structure of 
individual working packages were discussed and amended as necessary. 
As part of the University of Sussex team I was able to participate in 
discussions and drafting of the report that resulted from the consortium’s 
effort. Being actively engaged in the conceptualisation of the problem of RBC 
terrorism within an expert group allowed insights into various modes of how 
threat assessments might be done. Another consequence of being involved in 
the project, apart from benefiting from participation in discussions, was that 
the project affected my understanding of the threat assessment process and 
possible manifestations of the threat. Furthermore, the project gave me an 
insight into potential shortcomings of a threat assessment exercise. These 
shortcomings are, for example, connected to how the remit is set for an 
assessment exercise, politics and tensions within a policy (or working) 
network, the dilution of meaning through negotiated common understanding 
of concepts to the lowest common denominator, and resource and time 
constraints, all of which may adversely affect the outcome of such an 
assessment exercise.  
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3 Concepts & Theory 
Introduction 
This section will explore key concepts applicable to this dissertation with 
a view towards defining terms for use in this dissertation. The concept of 
biological weapons and that of bioterrorism are explained in detail as they are 
central to the present study. The term ‘bioterrorism’ is defined here as “the 
use of a ‘biological weapon’33  in acts of ‘terrorism’34.” The following sections 
discuss in detail the specific meaning of these terms in the context of this 
dissertation concluding with the above definition.  
 Second, the concept of pandemic influenza is briefly examined as it is 
used in this dissertation as a heuristic device as described in chapter 2. Third, 
policy formation models are explained as understood in this dissertation. 
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 ‘Biological weapon’ as defined by Section 1(1) and (2) Biological Weapons Act 1974 (c.6); 
that is excluding the amendment of the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 
concerning transfers of toxins and other biological agents. This definition has been 
transposed from the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, see below for an elaboration. 
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 ‘Terrorism’ as defined by Section 1(1) of the Terrorism Act 2000. It is worth noting that this 
definition of terrorism includes “serious damage to property” (Section 1(2b)) which 
could be interpreted in the context of biological weapons use as infestations of crops 
and infection of livestock in anti-agricultural terrorist attacks. It is also conceivable, 
however unlikely, that use of anti-material biological agents falls into this category. 
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Fourth, the concepts of risk and threat are outlined and their use in this 
dissertation are explained.  
Concept of biological weapons 
The concepts of ‘biological weapons’ and ‘biological weapons agents’ are 
central to this dissertation and thus a formal definition of what the terms 
mean is needed here.  
Some of the difficulty of defining biological weapons stems from a wide 
variety of different modes of dissemination, uses, and agents that can be 
chosen. This section outlines what a biological weapon is for the purpose of 
this dissertation.  
Biological weapons are, broadly speaking, comprised of two components: 
a biological agent and a means of delivery of that agent.35  
The easier of the two to define is the means of delivery, which refers to 
equipment used to disseminate the agent. These range from bombs and spray 
tanks to affect large areas, to poison arrows or a phial containing the agent to 
affect a single or localised target. Besides ammunition, animals, such as 
arthropods, can also be used as carriers of disease, for example fleas carrying 
plague, mosquitoes carrying malaria. In this case the arthropod would be a 
means of delivery carrying the biological agent.  
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 Following the Biological Weapons Act 1974 (c.6)a biological weapon can be either since the 
definition of a biological weapon hinges on the purpose to which material is put to. The 
separation into two principal components follows: SIPRI (1973) The problem of chemical 
and biological warfare: a study of the historical, technical, military, legal and political 
aspects of CBW, and possible disarmament measures. - Vol. 2 : CB weapons today. 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, p.27 
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Biological agents are more difficult to define. Biological agents are, 
literally speaking, something living.36  Thus, they can range from bacteria to 
plants and from fungi to animals and their products. The problem with defining 
biological agents, in the context of biological weapons, is the bounding of the 
category. Commonly, in the biological weapons context, biological agents are 
pathogenic, which literally means suffering- or disease-causing. Agents, in the 
biological weapons sense, are micro-organisms, including viruses.37  Moreover, 
biological agents can also include products of living organisms, such as toxins, 
which can be isolated and used as biological weapons agents.38  Causing 
disease, pathogenicity in other words, appears to be a defining factor.39  Apart 
from arthropod infestations, biological weapon agents are pathogenic in the 
sense that they cause clinical symptoms in the affected organism either 
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 Literally ‘bio-’ of or relating to life or living. Stemming from ancient Greek βίο- , combining 
form (as in βιόδωρος life-giving) of βίος life. Oxford English Dictionary (1989) Oxford 
English Dictionary - 2nd Edition (Online). Oxford: Oxford University Press 
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 See: World Health Organization (2004) Public Health Response to Biological and Chemical 
Weapons - WHO Guidance (2nd Edition). Geneva: World Health Organization. Although 
viruses are not strictly living they are included as biological agents because of their 
pathogenic properties and ability to replicate, albeit only within host cells. Another 
example of non living pathogenic material in the above sense are infectious proteins, or 
prions, thought to be the causative agent of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) in 
humans, and bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in cattle. 
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 Some biological agents are pathogenic because they secrete, or produce toxic substances 
(for example the bacterium Clostridium botulinum, the causative agent of botulism, 
produces botulinum toxin; or the plant Ricinus communis which produces ricin toxin). 
Their pathogenicity relies on toxicity rather than replication within the host. Even more 
complicating is the fact that consideration has been given to arthropods as biological 
weapons. The Colorado potato beetle (Leptinotarsa decemlineata) and Thrips palmi are 
examples of so called “pyhtopathogenic” (plant disease-causing) agents which cause 
destruction through infestation, rather than infection. The Colorado potato beetle was 
perceived to be a threat by the Germans during World War II. See: Geißler, E. (2003) 
Anthrax und das Versagen der Geheimdienste. Berlin: Kai Homilius Verlag. Cuba formally 
accused the USA of using a biological weapon by disseminating Thrips palmi over her 
territory, in 1997. See: Sims, N. A. (2006) Legal Constraints on Biological Weapons. In: 
Deadly Cultures - Biological Weapons since 1945, eds. Wheelis, M., L. Rózsa & M. Dando, 
London: Harvard University Press, 329-354 
39
 Perhaps size is another defining factor, because a dog or man, however vicious, would not 
be considered a biological agent. 
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through infection or toxicity. These agents cause harm through their 
infectivity, or their toxic properties. The clinical symptoms caused by biological 
agents range from incapacitation to lethality.40 
The use of infective or toxic agents has a long history in warfare as a 
means to overcome an enemy, dating back to ancient history.41  Although 
historical antecedents of “germ warfare” are interesting and possibly 
illuminating in terms of normative prohibitions against the use of disease and 
poisons it is important to distinguish these episodes from the modern 
understanding of biological warfare. An understanding of how disease works is 
not necessary to use disease in warfare, however, without this understanding 
the use of disease is haphazard and a matter of chance – which does not mean 
that it is ineffective as shown by historical examples of poisonings of wells, 
hurling diseased bodies over the walls of besieged cities, and distribution of 
disease tainted gifts such as blankets and handkerchiefs.42  The formulation of 
the germ theory of disease – following the work of, amongst others, John 
Snow, Louis Pasteur, Joseph Lister and Robert Koch towards the end of the 19th 
Century – enabled less haphazard and more deliberate, targeted use. Prior to 
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 Sidell, F. R.& others (1997) Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare. Falls 
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Warfare in the Ancient World. Gerald Duckworth & Co Ltd
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The history and threat of biological warfare and terrorism. Emergency Medicine Clinics 
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42
 See for example: Mayor, A. (2003) Greek Fire, Poison Arrows and Scorpion Bombs: 
Biological and Chemical Warfare in the Ancient World. Gerald Duckworth & Co Ltd; & 
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28 
the germ theory, disease was thought to be caused by bad air, foul smells, the 
pollution of decay – noxious vapours coming from putrescent organic matter, 
called ‘miasma’ accordingly, in which disease generates spontaneously. Only 
following the identification of the causation of disease was it possible to 
‘bottle disease’ – the germ theory of disease and the understanding of disease 
causation thus also enabled germ warfare in its modern incarnation.   
During the long use of disease and poisons all four routes of exposure 
have been exploited. The routes of exposure are concerned with the uptake of 
the agent into the target organism, which occurs: via inhalation, via 
consumption of agents in food or drink, via direct injection, or via direct 
contact with the target.43  Targets of biological weapons are biological 
organisms, and thus include not only humans but plants and animals as well.44  
State programmes of the 20th century have primarily focussed on the 
production of aerosols to infect human populations. Aerosols can drift with the 
wind contaminating large areas.45    
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 Another target of biological weapons can be inanimate material. Further, for an in depth 
discussion of biological weapon systems see:
 
SIPRI (1973) The problem of chemical and 
biological warfare: a study of the historical, technical, military, legal and political 
aspects of CBW, and possible disarmament measures. - Vol. 2 : CB weapons today. 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell; for 
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Sidell, F. R.& others (1997) Medical Aspects of 
Chemical and Biological Warfare. Falls Church, VA: Office of the Surgeon General (Army) 
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Guillemin, J. (1999) Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak. London: University 
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continued… 
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Biological weapons have utilities, other than causing harm directly 
through toxicity or infectivity. One such utility is contamination of produce to 
render it unfit for consumption, or contamination of landscape, which has 
been used militarily in the concept of ‘area denial’. An important factor for use 
against human targets is the psychological dimension of biological weapons. 
Disease has a certain kind of dread associated with it.46  Invisible, possibly 
contagious, disease is seen as insidious, attacking the body from within.47   
Biological Weapons as Weapons of Mass Destruction 
The reason for outlining different means of delivery of biological agents 
and toxins, and thus different uses to which these agents can be put to is to 
highlight differences in destructive potential within the category of biological 
weapons. The destructive potential can range, depending on the means of 
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 One explanation of this dread is the psychology of disgust and associated hygienic 
behaviour. The psychology of disgust explains dread as a defence mechanism against 
infectious disease. This behaviour is an evolutionary adaptation rooted in culture as well 
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Jefferson, C. (2009) The Taboo of Chemical and Biological 
Weapons: Nature, Norms and International Law. Brighton: University of Sussex; & Curtis, 
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Referring to gas in particular and chronic disasters in general, Erikson states: “It is 
furtive, invisible, unnatural. […] it moves for the interior, turning the process of assault 
inside out and in that way violating the integrity of the body”. This is why disease 
invokes a special kind of dread. In:
 
Erickson, K. (1994) A new species of trouble - the 
human experience of modern disaster. London: W.W. Norton & Company, p.150
 
 
Fritz Haber, one of the initiators of gas warfare in World War I explained, in 1920, to 
officers of the Reichswehr that contamination is unlike combat with normal means, to 
which the senses get used to. When exposed to a contaminant “[…] each change in 
perception, which nose or mouth sense, unsettles the soul with imaginations of an 
unknown consequence and is thus a new challenge to the morale…”. Fritz Haber, 1920, 
Lecture delivered to Officers of the Reichswehr. Reproduced in part in:
 
Gratz, J. (2003) 
Chemische Kampfstoffe - Der Tod der aus Deutschland kam. Löhrbach: Werner Pieper & 
Die Grüne Kraft, p.7 (my own translation) 
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delivery and agent used, from the poisoning of a single person to large area 
applications with the potential for massive destruction of life, or massive 
disruption of human activity. 
This range of destructiveness is important to note as biological weapons 
are classed as “weapons of mass destruction” (WMD), alongside with nuclear 
and chemical weapons. WMD is a precise term as used in arms control treaties 
and has a long history in disarmament negotiations. In January 1946, the term 
appeared in a United Nations General Assembly document outlining the 
establishment of a commission to deal with the problems raised by the 
discovery of atomic energy. The commission’s terms of reference specifically 
included, amongst other tasks, task ‘b’, which reads: 
“the Commission shall make specific proposals:  
(b) for the elimination from national armaments of 
atomic weapons and of all other major weapons 
adaptable to mass destruction”.
48
 
Attention is drawn here to the term’s history, and that it grew out of the 
specific meaning in the context of disarmament and arms reduction. Today, 
the term is used to simply denote the three weapons systems. WMD has 
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become shorthand for chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, this is 
misleading as there are fundamental differences between them. These 
differences include the specific way of causing harm in their target, the 
delivery to the target, the type of damage caused, and the method of 
production of the different weapons. Importantly, the term WMD only denotes 
one small part of the spectrum of damage that these weapons can cause, 
namely the massively destructive part, at the extreme end of a threat 
spectrum; at the other end of the spectrum are the so called “non-lethal” 
weapons. Jones thus complained about the use of the term:  
“The truth is that the term ‘weapons of mass 
destruction’ is pretty hopeless in that it doesn’t mean 
very much, but WMD rolls easily off the tongue and is 
now so imbedded in the language that we are stuck with 
it.”
49
  
The use of biological weapons 
Despite a long history of use and knowledge of disease and poisons, 
historical incidents are rare compared with conventional means of warfare and 
conventional terrorism, especially during the 20th and 21st Century.50  Various 
authors have offered explanations to account for the rarity of use. These 
explanations can be grouped in four main categories, ‘make and use’, ‘taboo 
and morality’, ‘legal constraints’, and ‘impact’.  
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The first explanation is that biological weapons are difficult to make and 
use. This explanation is concerned with the difficulty of obtaining virulent 
pathogens and cultivating them in sufficient quantities, purifying the agent 
and eventually effective delivery to a target. Delivery to a target can be 
accomplished in a variety of ways as indicated above. Each method has 
technical difficulties associated with it. For example, used in explosive 
ordinance much of the payload (the agent) is destroyed, sprayed agents are 
affected by meteorological conditions and the adverse effects of UV radiation 
and other sources of environmental challenges to the viability of the agent. 
Contamination of water supplies suffers from dilution of the agent. Moreover, 
the release of biological agents can cause ‘blow back’, which is a possible 
boomerang effect of biological weapons. Blow back can occur in two varieties: 
the first is that an aerosol can literally be blown back by wind. The second 
form of blow back is that contagious diseases can infect those who have 
initially released the agent. The ‘make and use’ explanation is comprised of the 
technical difficulties of making and using biological weapons and the 
unpredictability of biological agents once released. However, crude 
dissemination of biological agents is not necessarily technically difficult, nor 
does it require in-depth knowledge of aerobiology, microbiology, or an 
understanding of pathogenicity. Historical episodes, such as catapulting plague 
victims into besieged cities, or contaminating cisterns are testament to the 
relative ease of crude dissemination of biological agents.51  
The second group of explanations is normative, concerned with the taboo 
and morality against the use of poisons and disease. It has been argued that 
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 See, for example: Wheelis, M. (1999) Biological warfare before 1914. In: Biological and 
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the use of poisons and disease is morally repugnant and that an ancient cross-
cultural taboo exists against use of these insidious and nefarious means of 
waging war.52  Thus, it can be argued that armed forces or groups resorting to 
the use of morally repugnant means risk disaffecting sympathisers by 
appearing to be morally corrupt. Disaffecting sympathisers may not prevent 
some groups from using disease and poisons as weapons. Other groups, 
however, will be deterred from their use because support of sympathisers is 
an important part of their campaign.53  The ‘taboo and morality’ explanation is 
a precursor to the next two explanations.  
Legal constraints against the use of biological weapons can be regarded 
as the codification of the taboo. From early examples found in Indian Code of 
Manu to modern international conventions, the prohibition of poisons and 
disease is a recurring theme in the conduct, and morality, of war and conflict.54  
Violating rules of engagement and rules of conduct may not be an obstacle, 
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but credible sanctions – the possibility of retribution and punishment – may be 
inhibitive.55   
The last group of explanations is concerned with the tactical and strategic 
impact of biological weapons and is a combination of technical difficulties of 
using biological weapons and the moral implications of their use. Biological 
weapons, disease in this case rather than poisons, require time before effects 
manifest themselves. This time lag, or incubation period, not only delays the 
physical impact, that is decimating the enemy, but also the psychological 
impact. Modern warfare and some forms of terrorism depend on spectacular 
displays of power. Armies use, for example, aerial bombings as a show of 
force, whereas terrorist groups use improvised explosive devices or other 
highly visible means to achieve an immediate and often symbolic impact upon 
an audience. The relatively slow onset of illness may not serve the purpose of 
displaying strength and power. However, the incubation period of disease 
creates an ideal opportunity for covert releases and undetected escape of a 
perpetrator.   
Working Definition – biological weapon 
Having outlined the difficulty of defining what constitutes biological 
agents this section turns towards definitions found elsewhere in order to 
arrive at a working definition of biological weapons used in this dissertation. 
The first step towards a definition is the definition found in the 1972 
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Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons (BWC).56  The 
BWC is an international treaty which outlaws development, acquisition, 
production and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons. Instrumental to 
the convention is the way it defines its scope. Rather than defining specific 
agents, quantities thereof, or technologies that are prohibited, the BWC is 
built on what is known as the “general purpose criterion”. As the term implies 
the prohibition is constructed on the purpose of use, rather than the 
prohibition of certain artefacts. The BWC defines its scope in Article I: 
(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins 
whatever their origin or method of production, of types 
and in quantities that have no justification for 
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;  
(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed 
to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in 
armed conflict.
57
 
A definition by purpose of use rather than by artefacts serves two 
important functions: first, biological, medical and all other peaceful research is 
exempted from the prohibition, so that these purposes are not inhibited. 
Second, by not specifying artefacts, at the time of writing, ensures that the 
BWC stays abreast of unforeseen technological developments. There is still a 
certain ambiguity in the terms used in the convention. However, the terms 
“microbial or other biological agents” and “toxins” create a catch-all clause 
because it does not matter what “their origin or method of production” is as 
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long as there is a “justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful 
purposes”.58   
The reason for turning towards the BWC first is twofold. First, the UK was 
the originator of the idea for the BWC as a separate treaty, is a state party and 
one of three depositories of the treaty.59  Second, as a state party of the 
convention the UK is obliged to implement the provisions of the BWC into 
domestic law. As an international treaty the BWC operates on the level of 
nation states, and not on the level of the individual. Article IV of the BWC thus 
states that:  
Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance 
with its constitutional processes, take any necessary 
measures to prohibit and prevent the development, 
production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the 
agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of 
delivery specified in article I of the Convention, within 
the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or 
under its control anywhere.
60
 
It should be noted that Article IV of the BWC requires each State Party to 
prohibit activities, as set out in Article I cited above, on its territory. The BWC 
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does not require violations to be penalised, neither nationally nor 
internationally.61  
In the UK, the BWC was adopted in, and implemented through, the 
Biological Weapons Act 1974.62  Article 1 of the Biological Weapons Act 1974 
reads: 
1(1) No person shall develop, produce, stockpile, acquire 
or retain— 
any biological agent or toxin of a type and in a quantity 
that has no justification for prophylactic, protective or 
other peaceful purposes; or 
any weapon, equipment or means of delivery designed 
to use biological agents or toxins for hostile purposes or 
in armed conflict.
63
 
There are two important points to note here. First, the UK adopted 
Article I of the BWC almost word for word in the Biological Weapons Act 1974, 
only substituting the words “microbial or other” biological agent with “any” 
biological agent.64  Thus, the UK has adopted the general purpose criterion of 
the BWC, which prohibits those purposes of use that have “no justification for 
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes”. Second, with the 
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adoption of the general purpose criterion it has been illegal in the UK since 
1974 for any person engage in acts specified in the Act.65  
Prohibited activities connected to Biological Weapons 
The comprehensive prohibitions achieved through the Biological 
Weapons Act 1974, and thus the general purpose criterion, have subsequently 
been supplemented and extended by a host of Parliamentary Acts in response 
to terrorism. The Acts that have most notably affected the Biological Weapons 
Act 1974 are: Terrorism Act 2000, Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, 
and Terrorism Act 2006.  
The Terrorism Act 2000 makes it an offence to “provide instruction or 
training in the making or use: (c) of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons”66, 
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conversely it is also an offence to receive instruction or training. This includes 
inviting or accepting an invitation to receive instruction or training67, and to 
“incite” or “commission” anything listed under section 1 in the Biological 
Weapons Act 1974.68   
The Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 includes various parts 
pertaining to biological weapons, notably, Part 6 “Weapons of Mass 
Destruction”, Part 7 “Security of Pathogens and Toxins”, Part 13 
“Miscellaneous – Dangerous Substances”, and Schedule 5 “Pathogens and 
Toxins”. The Act extends the Biological Weapons Act 1974 and makes it an 
offence to “transfer any biological agent or toxin to another person or enter 
into an agreement to do so”.69  Further, the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security 
Act 2001 covers offences perpetrated outside of UK territory by UK persons. 
Section 45, which is entitled, “Customs and Exercise prosecutions for biological 
weapons offences” outlines offences as involving-  
the development and production outside of the United 
Kingdom of any thing mentioned in section 1(1)(a) or (b)  
the movement of any such thing into or out of any 
country or territory; 
any proposal or attempt to do anything falling within
 
paragraph (a) or (b) above
70
 
Further, the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 makes it an 
offence to assist or induce acts contravening section 1 of the Biological 
Weapons Act 1974, these offences include “aiding, abetting, counselling, 
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procuring or inciting the commission of, or attempting or conspiring to 
commit, such an offence”.71  It should be noted that Part 6 of the Anti-
terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, is specifically concerned with 
amendments of the Biological Weapons Act 1974, the Chemical Weapons Act 
1996, and with nuclear weapons related issues is entitled “Weapons of Mass 
Destruction”. The term “Weapons of Mass Destruction” is not mentioned at 
any place in the Act, apart from the title of Part 6. Neither, the Biological 
Weapons Act 1974, nor the Chemical Weapons Act 1996 makes a reference to, 
or use of, the term “weapons of mass destruction”.  
Part 7 of the Act is concerned with what is known as biosecurity and 
biosafety, which is, in simple terms, keeping pathogens safe from people, and 
people safe from pathogens, respectively. This part of the Act draws on 
Schedule 5 of the Act which lists viruses, rickettsia, bacteria and toxins for the 
purposes of Part 7. Part 7 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 
defines “dangerous substances” as:  
anything which consists of or includes a substance for 
the time being mentioned in Schedule 5; or  
anything which is infected with or otherwise carries any 
such substance.   
The Act requires that notifications are given to the Secretary of the State 
about: premises that hold dangerous substances and information about 
measures taken to secure dangerous substances, and persons with access to 
the dangerous substances. The Act confers powers of entry to constables of 
the police to enter premises72, after prior notice, that hold dangerous 
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substances. Constables can also require occupiers of such premises to follow 
directions concerning adequately securing substances, to limit, or deny, access 
of certain person to dangerous substances, and order the destruction of the 
substances.73  Various definitional matters of this Part of the Anti-terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act 2001 are worth noting. First, dangerous substances are 
defined as those found in Schedule 5, they are not defined by a purpose 
criterion.  The Secretary of State can amend the list given certain conditions 
are met. Section 58(b) thus states that:  
“the Secretary of the State may not add any pathogen or 
toxin to that Schedule [5] unless he is satisfied that the 
pathogen or toxin could be used in an act of terrorism to 
endanger life or cause serious harm to human health”
74
  
Moreover, Section 75 clarifies that the powers of this Part of the Act only 
extends to toxic chemicals, animal and plant pathogens and pests where:  
there is a risk that the pathogen or pest is of a 
description that could be used in an act of terrorism to 
cause – 
widespread damage to property; 
significant disruption to the public; or 
significant alarm to the public.
75
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The Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 also prohibits hoaxes, 
that is the use of any substance or other things with the intention to make 
someone belief that it is dangerous.76  
The Terrorism Act 2006 makes it an offence to provide or receive training 
for, or in connection with the preparation of acts of terrorism, or to assist in 
such provisions. The Act states that a person commits an offence if he receives 
or provides, or assists in providing, instruction or training in specific skills. The 
skills pertinent to this dissertation which the Act refers to are: “the making, 
handling or use of a noxious substance”.77  The term “noxious substances” 
means the same as “dangerous substances” in the Anti-terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act 2001.78  The Terrorism Act 2006 makes it also an offence to glorify, 
encourage, induce persons to prepare or instigate acts of terrorism.79  
In summary, biological weapons are substances that include pathogenic 
toxins, microbes, and other biological agents or devices to disseminate them,80 
that can be used maliciously to endanger or harm life.  
Concept of (bio)terrorism 
The term bioterrorism implies the use of biological weapons by terrorists. 
Thus, following the definition of biological weapons, a discussion of what 
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constitutes ‘terrorism’ is required. The following section is on the definition of 
terrorism in general, concluding with a working definition of bioterrorism as 
understood in this dissertation.  
Literature on terrorism is substantial and has grown dramatically since 
the events of September 11.81  This section can only discuss a small section of 
this literature, with a view towards the definition of terrorism and the 
formulation of a working definition of bioterrorism for this dissertation.  
‘Terrorism’ is a political term and its definition depends on the context it 
is used in. The term ‘terrorism’ is now used widely for a variety of different 
activities from crank phone calls, electronic attacks, to suicide bombings. In 
colloquial usage the term shifts and changes.82  Within one newspaper article, 
for example, which refers to a specific event, terms like ‘extremism’, 
‘fundamentalism’, ‘guerrilla’, and ‘militants’ can be used interchangeably with 
‘terrorism’.83  Etymologically, ‘Terrorism’ derives from Jacobin’s ‘Reign of 
Terror’84, or the system of the ‘Terror’ during the French Revolution of 1789-
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94. The term came into common usage after it was adopted by Russian 
anarchists in their violent struggle against tsarist rule in the late 19th 
Century.85 
The difficulty in defining terrorism is often attributed to the problem of 
separating the phenomenon of terrorism from other types of political violence.  
The term ‘terrorism’ has become a catch-all for phenomena such as guerrillas 
fighting, insurgencies, freedom fighters, or organized crime.86  As Jenkins quips 
“terrorism is what the bad guys do.”87  The phrase “one man’s terrorist is 
another man’s freedom fighter” is a caricature of the definitional problem and 
is an example of the ambiguity and subjectivity inherent in the use of 
                                                                                                                                                           
used organized, targeted and systematic intimidation to subdue dissent and counter-
revolutionaries. The semantic shift of the term, from method of governing to struggle 
against ruling powers to derogatory label used to delegitimize political opponents, is 
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terrorism. However, the phrase confuses legitimate ends with illegitimate 
means, or legitimate grievances with illegitimate tactics.88   
In 1988, Schmid and Jongman surveyed leading scholars on terrorism and 
counted 109 definitions with 22 definitional elements, the list has undoubtedly 
grown since in definitions and constituent elements. Their survey revealed 
that the three most frequent definitional elements are “violence or force” 
(83.5%); “political” (65%); “fear” (51%); on average eight elements are used to 
define terrorism.89  Consensus on a generic and universally adopted definition 
has yet to emerge. However, there are some definitional elements which are 
almost commonly accepted in academic discourse. Terrorism is a pejorative 
label which is given to one’s enemies, and as such it is a moral judgement, and 
furthermore, terrorism is a type of violence.90  Schmid and Jongman offer a 
definition, or as they state, another definitional attempt. This definition is a 
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lowest common denominator, resulting from accommodating a wide rage of 
comments and criticisms from their survey. The definition reads: 
Terrorism is an anxiety- inspiring method of repeated 
violent action, employed by (semi-)clandestine 
individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, 
criminal, or political reasons, whereby – in contrast to 
assassination – the direct targets of violence are not the 
main targets. The immediate human victims of violence 
are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) 
or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a 
target population, and serve as message generators. 
Threat- and violence based communication processes 
between terrorist (organization), (imperilled) victims, 
and main targets are used to manipulate the main target 
(audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target 
of demands, or a target of attention, depending on 
whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is 
primarily sought.
91
   
Lord Carlile of Berriew criticises this definition in his review of the 
definition of terrorism from a legal point of view for being too inclusive, 
because it would result in crimes being labelled as terrorism where the label is 
not suitable.92  Schmid and Jongman acknowledge that such a lengthy and 
complex definition is open to criticism. Their definition, or classification, 
reflects the complexity and range because terrorism can be use by “almost 
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anyone as a tactic or strategy, for almost any reason and in almost any number 
of ways”.93   
Richardson outlines a number of characteristics of terrorism which sets 
terrorism apart from other forms of political violence, echoing some of the 
elements in the Schmid-Jongman definition. According to Richardson terrorism 
is politically inspired, it communicates a message, the audience of that 
message is not the target of the violence, and the target of the violence are 
civilians. For Richardson these characteristics outline the ‘primary tactic’ used, 
and are a rule of thumb rather than a hard and fast rule, because “in the very 
messy worlds of violence and politics all actions don’t always fit neatly into 
categories”.94  Contrasting terrorism with guerrilla warfare, which Richardson 
calls “the most proximate form” of political violence stating that “guerrillas are 
an irregular army fighting the regular forces of a state […] conducting 
themselves along military lines”.95  Whereas:  
if the primary tactic of an organization is deliberately to 
target civilians, then they deserve to be called a terrorist 
group, irrespective of the political context in which they 
operate and irrespective of the legitimacy of the goals 
they seek to achieve.
96
   
Jenkins cautions against labelling groups as terrorist, because once the 
label is attached to a group every subsequent action of that group will be 
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classed as terrorism. Jenkins’ caution is concerned with erosion of the 
definition of terrorism. In other words, if someone has acquired the label 
‘terrorist’ their subsequent actions are likely to be called ‘terrorism’97 whether 
or not the action is “politically motivated subversive violence”98.   
Jenkins defines terrorism by the nature of the act, not the identity of the 
perpetrator. His definition is sharper than that of Richardson, who defines 
terrorism as a ‘tactic’. Both define terrorism by the nature of the ‘act’. 
However, there is a subtle difference in the conception between Richardson 
and Jenkins. Richardson, writing in 2006, contents that the conceptualisation 
of terrorism as a tactic is policy orientated with a view towards counter-
terrorism:  
“understood as a tactic it makes little sense to speak of 
defeating terrorism. Tactics are used as long as they are 
effective. Our goal … should be to contain the use of this 
tactic” [emphasis added]
99
 
Jenkins, writing in 1980, is concerned with researching terrorism 
quantitatively, thus using the concept of an “instance” rather than that of 
‘tactic’ or ‘strategy’ is better suited for methodological reasons.100 
The, often lamented, lack of definition, especially in academic discourse, 
is the result of numerous understandings and conceptualisations of terrorism, 
and is as such not a failure of the discourse on terrorism but indication of 
lively debate. Horgan and Boyle note that:  
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“Any attempt to impose a single consensus definition on 
something that one can understand as a tactic, strategy, 
concept, social or political phenomena would be an 
over-simplification of a complex phenomenon. There are 
so many conflicting definitions of terrorism precisely 
because terrorism scholars have realized that 
judgements about what is and is not terrorism are 
inherently contested. Scholars are unlikely to ever 
uncover an accepted definition of terrorism because of 
the deep differences of opinion over the acceptability, 
justifiability and legitimacy of both the methods and 
causes associated with those who conduct terrorist 
acts.” [author’s own emphasis]
101
 
However, finding a definition is important in a legal context. In 
international law, attempts have been made to capture a generic definition of 
terrorism for more than seven decades, again, indicating the importance of a 
definition as well as the inherent difficulty in doing so. The practice of defining 
‘acts of terrorism’, rather than ‘terrorism’ goes back to the mid 1930s to 
negotiations at the League of Nations for the 1937 Convention for the 
Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism where terrorism is defined as:  
“criminal acts directed against a State and intended or 
calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of 
particular persons or a group of persons or the general 
public”
102
 
A generic definition of terrorism was disputed, the treaty attracted few 
signatories, and the treaty did not enter into force following the collapse of 
the League of Nations.103 
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More recently, in 1994, the UN adopted the Declaration on Measures to 
Eliminate International Terrorism104, in an effort to create a comprehensive 
international legal framework to address international terrorism. A number of 
treaties have resulted from these efforts105, however negotiations to conclude 
the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism are ongoing since 
1996.106  One of the main stumbling blocks in the negotiation is the definition 
of terrorism. The problem of a definition in international law has not yet been 
resolved.107  In 2011, the UN Ad Hoc committee reported on outstanding issues 
concerning the draft text of the Comprehensive Convention On International 
Terrorism that several delegations: 
“reiterated that the convention should contain a 
definition of terrorism that would provide a clear 
distinction between acts of terrorism covered by the 
convention and the legitimate struggle of peoples in the 
exercise of their right to self-determination or under 
foreign occupation [...and that] the convention should 
address terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, 
including State terrorism, that activities undertaken by 
the armed forces of States not regulated by 
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international humanitarian law should also fall within its 
scope. While referring to previous proposals, some 
delegations considered that it might be necessary to 
revisit the text of the definition of terrorism…”
108
 
The definition of terrorism is not just a semantic or academic exercise - 
embedded in legislation the term ‘terrorism’ triggers many powers of the 
executive of a state.109 
As well as in numerous international treaties, definitions of ‘acts of 
terrorism’ can be found in national policy documents.110  In the UK, the main 
legislation addressing terrorism is the Terrorism Act 2000, Anti-terrorism Crime 
and Security Act 2001, and the Terrorism Act 2006.111  
Terrorism in UK Law 
Five Acts of Parliament currently regulate terrorism related activity in the 
UK, they are: the Terrorism Act 2000, the Anti-terrorism Crime and Security Act 
2001, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, Terrorism Act 2006, Counter-
Terrorism Act 2008.112 
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In UK law the first instance of defining terrorism can be found in the 
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, a temporary law 
subject to annual renewal. The Act has ceased to have effect with the 
introduction of the Terrorism Act 2000.  The Prevention of Terrorism 
(Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 defined terrorism as: 
The use of violence for political ends, and includes any 
use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or 
any section of the public in fear.
113
 
The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 definition of 
terrorism is broad in its remit as it is any violence for political ends, on the 
other hand it does not include a provision for the threat of violence. In his 
review of the definition of terrorism the independent reviewer of terrorism 
legislation in the UK, Lord Carlile, states that the Prevention of Terrorism 
(Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 excludes acts of terrorism done for reasons 
other than political, such as terrorism done for religious or non-political 
ideological reasons.114 
The Reinsurance (Acts of Terrorism) Act 1993 contains the second and still 
current definition found in UK law. The Act addresses liability of reinsuring 
                                                                                                                                                           
further relevant to this dissertation. The Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 confers further 
powers to gather and share information, powers to act against terrorist financing, makes 
provisions about detentions and questioning, prosecution and punishment of terrorist 
offences, and confers authorisations for post-charge questioning. 
113
 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 (repealed) (c. 4). The definition 
dates back to at least 1974 when the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 
1974 was initially introduced by then Home Secretary Roy Jenkins in response to the IRA 
Birmingham bombing. The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974 (c. 
56) section 9(1) states: “terrorism” means the use of violence for political ends, and 
includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the 
public in fear. 
114
 Lord Carlile of Berriew (2007) The Definition of Terrorism, Cm 7052. Independent Reviewer 
of Terrorism Legislation: The Stationery Office 
53 
risks against any loss, or damage to, property in the UK as a result of ‘acts of 
terrorism’. Section 2(2) defines ‘acts of terrorism’ as:  
(2) In this section “acts of terrorism” means acts of 
persons acting on behalf of, or in connection with, any 
organisation which carries out activities directed 
towards the overthrowing or influencing, by force or 
violence, of Her Majesty’s government in the United 
Kingdom or any other government de jure or de facto.
115
 
The Reinsurance (Acts of Terrorism) Act 1993 is limited to specific acts, 
namely the overthrowing or influencing of HM Government, using either force 
or violence. The Reinsurance (Acts of Terrorism) Act 1993 is therefore based on 
the objective of terrorism, as opposed to the motivation, ideology or specific 
criminal activities.  
In 1996, addressing the shortcomings of the Prevention of Terrorism 
(Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 Lord Lloyd of Berwick recommended that 
even if lasting peace was established in Northern Ireland there would still be a 
need for permanent counter-terrorism legislation.116  HM Government acted 
on the advice with the publication of a permanent anti-terror Bill, which 
eventually resulted in the Terrorism Act 2000, which includes the present 
definition of terrorism in UK law.  
The Terrorism Act 2000 section 1 (amendment by the Terrorism Act 2006 
is italicised) defines terrorism as:  
In this Act “terrorism” means the use or threat of action 
where -  
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the action falls within subsection (2), 
the use or threat is designed to influence the 
government [or an international governmental 
organization] or to intimidate the public or a section of 
the public, and 
the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a 
political, religious or ideological cause. 
Action falls within this subsection if it— 
involves serious violence against a person, 
involves serious damage to property, 
endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person 
committing the action, 
creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the 
public or a section of the public, or 
is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to 
disrupt an electronic system. 
The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) 
which involves the use of firearms or explosives is 
terrorism whether or not subsection (1)(b) is satisfied. 
In this section— 
“action” includes action outside the United Kingdom, 
a reference to any person or to property is a reference 
to any person, or to property, wherever situated, 
a reference to the public includes a reference to the 
public of a country other than the United Kingdom, and  
“the government” means the government of the United 
Kingdom, of a Part of the United Kingdom or of a country 
other than the United Kingdom. 
In this Act a reference to action taken for the purposes 
of terrorism includes a reference to action taken for the 
benefit of a proscribed organisation.
117
 
The definition of terrorism in the Terrorism Act 2000 frames terrorism in 
a specific way. The Terrorism Act 2000 is concerned with the objectives of 
terrorism. The objective of terrorism is defined as the advancement of a 
political, religious or ideological cause. In order to advance these causes 
threats or intimidation of the public or the government are used. The means to 
threaten, influence, or intimidate the public are outlined in Section 1(2)-(5), 
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and include: threatening or causing serious violence against people, 
endangering people’s life, health or security, damaging property, or interfering 
with electronic systems. The definition does not outline the ‘motives’ of 
terrorism, just that terrorism is done for political, religious or ideological 
causes, thus it is based on objectives. Motives, or motivations, for terrorism 
determine, amongst other things, the objectives of terrorism.118   
In UK law terrorism is understood as a tactic or method. Thus, it is 
characterized as what one does, not who one is. In this way the definition of 
terrorism found in UK law satisfies concerns over assigning the label of 
terrorist to groups or individuals, a practice which could erode the definition 
of terrorism. However, Part 2 and Schedule 2 of the Terrorism Act 2000 are 
directly concerned with the proscription of groups and organizations. 
Moreover, Part 3 is concerned with ‘terrorist property’.119  Although these 
sections of the Terrorism Act 2000 are essentially related to operational and 
procedural counter-terrorism measures and powers of the executive – the 
inclusion of these sections are a departure from the practice of defining ‘acts 
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of terrorism’, and thus potentially eroding and diffusing the definition of 
terrorism.120   
Working Definition – bioterrorism 
In UK law bioterrorism is not defined, although implicitly recognised in 
terrorism legislation through amendments of the Biological Weapons Act 1974. 
As discussed above, the Biological Weapons Act 1974 defines a biological 
weapon as any microbial or other biological agent, or toxin what ever its origin 
or method of production of a type and in a quantity that has no justification 
for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes or any weapon, 
equipment or means of delivery designed to use biological agents or toxins for 
hostile purposes.  
The provisions of the Terrorism Act 2000, the Anti-Terrorism Crime and 
Security Act 2001, and the Terrorism Act 2006 which regulate activities related 
to biological weapons are set out in the section above (‘Prohibited activities 
connected with Biological Weapons’). However, ambiguity arises when 
considering the offences set out in UK terrorism legislation as to what 
constitutes bioterrorism. Although ‘bioterrorism’ is not a legal term the 
question remains. Terrorism legislation makes explicit links to the Biological 
Weapons Act 1974, making it an offence to: 
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- giving or receiving instructions or training for the 
development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or 
retention of biological weapons; 
- assisting in, inciting to, or commissioning of, the 
development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or 
retention of biological weapons; 
- the transfer, or agreement to transfer, of biological 
weapons; 
- the encouragement, and or glorification, of the use of 
biological weapons.
121
 
What constitutes bioterrorism? Is the engagement in these activities 
‘bioterrorism’? Or, is a ‘biological weapon’ used for ‘acts of terrorism’ as 
defined in the Biological Weapons Act 1974 and the Terrorism Act 2000 
respectively, bioterrorism? For the purposes of this dissertation the latter 
definition will be used – ‘bioterrorism’ is the use of a ‘biological weapon’122  in 
acts of ‘terrorism’123.    
Concept of Pandemic Influenza 
Influenza pandemics are cyclical, reoccurring periodically, every ten to 
forty years. New influenza virus subtypes emerge as a result of virus re-
assortment or antigenic shift; unlike seasonal influenza epidemics which are 
the result of continuous mutations resulting from antigenic drift.124  Antigenic 
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shift – prerequisite for an influenza pandemic – occurs when animal influenza 
viruses acquire the ability to cause sustained human to human transmission. 
Usually there is no, or little, immunity in human populations to these ‘shifted’ 
strains. Community wide epidemics can then lead to world wide pandemics. 
The emergence of a novel influenza virus strain does not necessarily lead to a 
pandemic, and in most cases it does not. Equally, a pandemic does not 
necessarily cause wide spread mortality; and a pandemic does not necessarily 
come from abroad, a domestic UK origin is plausible but considered remote.125  
Response and outbreak narratives found in, for example the UK pandemic 
contingency plans, suggest that pandemic influenza is seen as an external 
threat, and a Far Eastern origin is thought to be most likely.126 
Although influenza epidemics and pandemics have occurred since ancient 
times, it makes little sense talking about influenza – in terms of counter-
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measures against it and policies associated with it – prior to the formulation of 
the germ theory of disease by Snow, Pasteur, Lister, and Koch in the late 
nineteenth Century and the eventual discovery of the of the viral causative 
agent in 1933 by Smith and others.127  Three notable human influenza 
pandemics occurred during the twentieth century; these provide a backdrop to 
the current concerns about a possible pandemic influenza – 1918 “Spanish 
Flu”, 1957 “Asian Flu”, and the 1968 “Hong Kong Flu”.128   
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which are commonly and universally present.” Causative understanding is critical to 
intervention strategies. Brit, G. (1895) Influenza: Wanted a definition (Correspondence). 
British Medical Journal, (30 November, 1895), 1391. 
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1918 “Spanish Flu” 
The first of these notable129  twentieth century influenza pandemics, was 
the most devastating, the 1918 “Spanish Flu”. Despite the name, it is not clear 
where the disease originated.130  In the summer of 1918 a mild first wave 
struck, resurging with a second, main wave during autumn 1918, a third wave 
continued until 1920. The second wave was characterised by high mortality 
and an unusual prevalence of mortality occurring in adults between the ages 
eighteen and thirty. Approximately one third of the world’s population, around 
500 million, got infected, with about 50 million fatalities; one third of the 
deaths were caused by secondary bacterial infections.131   The 1918 Spanish Flu 
pandemic is important as is often referred to as a ‘benchmark’ for pandemics 
to come – attempting to answer “what if?” questions, drawing lessons from 
history and extrapolating historical data to the present. A number of 
commentators see an impending catastrophe if a pandemic emerged today on 
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the scale of 1918 – extrapolating estimates to 180-360 million deaths132, 
causing political instability in many countries, potential break down of 
economy and supply chains due to travel and trade restrictions, loss of 
productivity, and absenteeism.133 Other commentators contend that a 
contemporary pandemic is not comparable with the pandemic experienced in 
1918. Factors that might mitigate a pandemic of 1918 proportions include 
improved epidemiology and advanced warning systems, a global public health 
system, and the availability of medical countermeasures, such as anti-viral and 
anti-biotic medicine to control primary and secondary infections.134  Social, 
political and technological developments – local as well as global – since 1918 
make comparisons difficult, and results of extrapolations from 1918 to the 
present must be treated with caution. Factors that complicate comparisons 
include increased global movements of people and goods – the ability to 
circumnavigate the globe within the incubation period (1-3 days, for H5N1 the 
incubation period is thought to be 2-8 days, possibly as long as 17 days135); 
dramatic increases in global population (from 1 billion to almost 7 billion) and 
urbanisation. Not just the numerical increase in global population size but also 
its distribution: density and changes in demography – including aging and 
changes in the make up of families, and working patterns. Working, and single 
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parent households make non-medical interventions such as social distancing, 
especially school closures problematic in terms of either compliance or wider 
economic repercussions.136    
The virological era 
Following the discovery of the causative agent of influenza in 1933, and 
thus entering the “virological era”,137  two pandemics of note occurred, the 
“Asian Flu” in 1957, and “Hong Kong Flu” in 1968. These pandemics were 
comparatively mild, with two million and one million estimated world-wide 
fatalities, respectively.138  The table below gives an overview of notable 
twentieth century influenza pandemics. 
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Table of Notable Influenza Events (world-wide fatalities) 
Year Common 
name 
Subtype Fatality rate 
percentage 
Morbidity mortality 
worldwide.  
UK 
population 
infected  
1918 Spanish Flu H1N1 2-3% 50 million fatalities,  
~500 million cases 
23% 
1957 Asian Flu H2N2 <0.2% 1-4 million fatalities 17% 
1968 Hong Kong Flu H3N2 <0.2% 1-4 million fatalities 8% 
1997 Avian Flu H5N1 n/a 262 fatalities, ~ 442 
cases 
n/a
139
 
Table 1: Notable Influenza Pandemics in the 19
th
 Century. Table adapted from (World Health 
Organization, 2009), p. 13. Percentage of UK population infected taken from (Department of 
Health, 1997).
140
 
 
Public Policy  
Following the discussion of biological weapons, terrorism and pandemic 
influenza I now turn to the theoretical framework of this dissertation. The 
framework conceptualises the political process of government and in 
particular policy-formation processes. Because of the width and breadth of the 
available literature on policy analysis and political processes the guiding 
principle for this discussion is a focus on the relevance to the processes 
pertinent to the formation of policies for the management of technological 
and security related risks; especially in terms of terrorism and biological 
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related risks. The discussion starts with general observations on the nature of 
the political system before narrowing down to a discussion of policy-formation 
in technically complex areas.  
The process of policy-making is conceptualised within two theoretical, or 
conceptual, frameworks: ‘institutions’, and ‘narratives’. These two frameworks 
provide two layers of conceptualisation of the process: The ‘institutional’ 
approach provides an insight into the structural backbone of the policy 
environment – that is: the organization of actors in the policy environment, 
and the institutional set-up in a specific field of policy. Policy actors operate in 
a dynamic and inter-dependent network. The networked aspect of the 
institutions is an important feature here. The approach conceptualises how the 
separate but inter-dependent actors in the policy-making process relate to one 
another, interact and are organized around interests. However, the 
institutional approach has shortcomings in this particular field of study as 
substantial parts of the network are not open to scrutiny and available data is 
limited. Nonetheless, the institutional approach holds some explanatory power 
which warrants its examination in some detail. Emphasis is placed upon the 
role of institutions in policy formation, bearing in mind that the institutional 
network approach can offer only a partial explanation in the absence of a clear 
and full picture of the network as a whole.   
The ‘ideas’-based, or narrative approach, in contrast to the institutional 
approach looks at the structural components, provides the cognitive and 
discursive part of the policy-formation process. Narratives structure discourse, 
shape beliefs and actions by providing a logic and rationale. Narratives weave 
ideas and information together into a story line, thereby abstracting, 
organising and simplifying complex information. An emphasis is placed upon 
the role of dominant narratives in policy formation.  
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These two frameworks, the institutional approach and the policy 
narrative model, provide the context and vehicle within which, and through 
which, bioterrorism policies have evolved. Of central interest to this study is 
how different narratives have shaped policy. The role of narratives and ideas 
in explaining policy formation will be examined in greater detail below.  
Before delving into the aforementioned concepts in detail it is useful to 
take a step back to briefly examine some broader aspects of policy, 
government and governance.  
Policy, Government and Governance 
The traditional model to view the British governmental system and 
political tradition is the ‘Westminster Model’. The Westminster Model 
describes the British government as comprised of the rules, procedures and 
formal organization of government. At the heart of the model is the Prime 
Minister, cabinet, and the civil service, who are guided and governed by: 
parliamentary sovereignty, accountability through elections, and majority 
party control. In the Westminster Model of government the executive and 
legislative are merged. This contrasts with other democratic traditions, such as 
Germany, where there is a strict separation of the two.  
An alternative and more elaborate approach to the Westminster Model is 
offered by Rhodes. His ‘differentiated polity’ model is “characterized by 
functional and institutional specialization and the fragmentation of policies 
and politics”141 and is a good starting point for the following discussion. The 
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model highlights key themes, such as the networked and transient nature of 
government. It is also specific to the British government and takes its history 
into account. The model is therefore briefly described below.  
The ‘differentiated polity model’ conceives policy-making as a process 
where the locus of decision making is fragmentary but inter-dependent; the 
model encompasses following: ‘interdependence’, a ‘segmented executive’, 
‘policy networks’, ‘governance’ and ‘hollowing out’.142   
‘Interdependence’ denotes intergovernmental relations between 
government units and institutions at all levels – that is local-regional 
governments, national governments, and supra-national governments which 
interact with each other by either promoting or inhibiting activities. The 
‘segmented executive’ is the recognition of dispersed sovereignty and decision 
making, away from the Prime Minister and political leaders where the 
executive authority of policy decisions is traditionally thought to reside, to a 
‘core executive territory’. This core executive territory still includes the Prime 
Minister and the political leaders, but also includes institutions, agencies, 
committees, and policy networks. The core executive territory decision making 
process is guided by ‘bureaucratic co-ordination’, through, for example, the 
Treasury, Cabinet Office and occasional intervention by the Prime Minister. 
The core executive territory does not have a fixed membership but is 
characterised by changing membership caused by the dynamic nature of policy 
networks.143   
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A ‘Policy Network’ is the group of actors influencing the policy process: 
individuals, agencies, organizations and institutions, with a specific interest in 
a given policy issue – constituting what Rhodes calls “the oligopoly of the 
political market-place”144. Policy networks serve as constraints in the policy-
formation process in terms of limiting participation, privileging certain policy 
outcomes, and setting the agenda for the policy process. Inter-dependencies in 
a networked structure diffuse accountability in the policy-formation process 
because of a diminished transparency of the decision making process and lack 
of individual ownership.145   
‘Governance’, in the Rhodes model, refers to the shift of power away 
from government to the process of governance. This process is the 
‘asymmetric interdependence’ of the central government with other actors in 
the policy network. Although, central government has more power to 
intervene in the policy process than other actors in the policy network, 
government is constrained by a dependence on compliance by the actors in 
the policy network.146  Thus ‘governance’ is the process of negotiation and 
bargaining of policy in a pluralistic decision-making process, rather than an 
authoritative assertion of policy decisions from a single source.  
‘Hollowing out’ refers to the diffusion of power through administrative 
and institutional reform. Three types of loss of control or diffusion of power 
can be distinguished: upwards, sideways and downwards. All three processes 
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are characterised by divesting, or relinquishing activities, which were 
previously managed centrally, to other parties. ‘Upwards’ is the loss of 
functions and responsibilities to supra-national organizations, such as the 
European Union (Europeanization) and the United Nations (Globalisation). 
‘Sideways’ loss of control refers to redistributing power and functions away 
from government departments to semi-autonomous agencies during 
institutional reforms, thus creating distance to central government. 
‘Downward’ is the relinquishing of functions to the private sector in 
privatisations. The process of ‘hollowing out’ has the consequence that central 
authority becomes fragmented; control over and management of the divested 
parts becomes more difficult with increasing numbers functions residing in 
semi-autonomous organizations; transparency of the organizations decreases; 
barriers to communication are created due to increasing incentives found in 
distorting information and blame avoidance; and accountability is shifted away 
from central government.147  
The ‘differentiated polity model’ highlights the complexity in the political 
landscape of British government and thus in decision making and the policy-
formation process. The next section looks at policy networks in more detail.  
Institutions – “Interdependence confounds centrality”
148
 
Policy-formation involves the interaction of various actors. 149  It is a 
social-political process, which means that the decision-makers in government 
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are not the central element but part of a complex dynamic between state, 
market and civil society, which operate in an international environment.150  
Formal institutions, such as government departments, are the most 
visible actors in these networks. Other actors in the policy arena are important 
in shaping decisions, due to the networked nature of the system. These other 
actors are, however, less visible from the outside. Institutions are the locus of 
decision making and thus the focus in this dissertation. 
Policy, which is essentially decisions and actions taken, has three basic 
components: goal setting, information gathering, and behaviour 
modification.151  However, these three components do not necessarily happen 
sequentially. The process of policy-formation is complex and dynamic, 
involving a number of actors who shape policy: though decisions are made 
within government, they are shaped by individuals, groups and organizations 
within and outside the government who participate in the policy process. The 
forces which shape policy decisions include bargaining of resources and 
interests between the actors of the policy network. Other factors affecting the 
policy-formation process are: economic considerations,152 international 
obligations (such as EU directives), legal defensibility of policies to avoid or 
diffuse blame, and dealing with uncertainty and incomplete knowledge. 
The actors involved in a specific policy issue are linked to one another by 
interaction and dependencies, they can thus be conceptualised as a network. 
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The nature and structure of a policy network depends on the how the separate 
(but inter-dependent) actors of the network co-ordinate their actions over 
time. In other words the network structure depends on the distribution of 
power, composition, the intensity of the linkages, and frequency of interaction 
between the actors residing in the network.153  Consequently, policy networks 
differ from one policy issue to another, because the identity of actors 
participating in the policy-formation process, the intensity of linkages between 
them, the distribution of power amongst them, the frequency and mode of 
interaction, and the cohesiveness of the network, are specific to each policy 
issue. Furthermore, history plays an important role. The network, and the 
actors within it, evolve over time in response to pressures, and opportunities.   
The key characteristic of the institutional approach is that it recognises 
different actors who are interacting in the process of policy-formation rather 
than seeing the government as an undifferentiated whole. The concept can 
thus aid in revealing the complexities involved in policy-formation processes.  
The institutional approach can only provide a partial explanation, or 
interpretation of the policy-formation process. It can provide a structural 
explanation of the institutional set-up. However, it does not sufficiently 
explain how the structure of a policy network links to the outcome of a policy 
process.154 Moreover, in this policy area some of the network of actors 
operates behind closed doors and is not open to scrutiny.   
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The next section will look at what and how policy formation processes 
are shaped and influenced. 
Models of Policy-formation 
The above discussion describes and outlines the structural composition of 
the environment within which policy formation takes place. This section looks 
at models of policy formation. A particular focus in placed upon the discursive 
and cognitive elements which shape and influence the policy formation 
process. 
A number of different approaches have been put forward to explain 
policy-formation processes. These approaches can be divided into five main 
traditions:  
1. ‘institutional approaches’ - argue that policy 
decisions are the product of political organizations; 
paramount policy shaping influence is exerted by 
institutional interests, and norms, which are deeply 
embedded in the institutional framework and 
internalized by decision makers.
155
  
2. ‘socio-economic approaches’ - argue that policy 
decisions are shaped by economic and social pressures 
on officials and institutions; resource dependencies are 
stressed, and thus policy decisions are a function of 
minimising cost and maximising benefit.
156
  
3. ‘rational choice approaches’ - emphasise the 
rationality of actors in policy decisions. The bargaining 
between actors is a game where each actor seeks the 
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best possible outcome to satisfy their institutional and 
personal preferences.
157
  
4. ‘group and network approaches’ - emphasise the 
relationships and interactions between individuals, 
groups within and outside of institutions.
158
  
5. ‘ideas based approaches’ - centre around the notion 
of epistemic communities, groups that share and 
maintain ideas. Furthermore, ideas circulate and gain or 
lose momentum in a policy community and thus 
influence decisions.
159
 
These approaches are ways to model policy formation processes. Each 
approach uses, to a greater or lesser extent, discrete elements which are 
involved in the policy-formation process: institutions, social and economic 
factors, actors’ agency, ideas, interests, and groups and networks. Further, 
history and culture, and the wider context (events outside of the policy-
formation process) are also recognised as factors in the process. It is important 
to stress that all of these elements are involved in the policy-formation 
process, and that all of these elements interact with each other.  
John proposes an evolutionary approach160, drawing together 
components of the five approaches to address the failure of the individual 
approaches to deal with policy change and variation. The evolutionary 
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approach highlights the role of ideas and interests interacting with 
institutions, groups and networks, and socio-economic factors to provide an 
account of adaptation and variation of policy decisions. The evolutionary 
approach emphasises that the elements (institutions, socio-economic factors, 
interests and ideas, groups and networks) interact continuously.161  This 
approach, rather than a pure ideas-based approach, provides a useful stepping 
stone into a discussion of narratives as factors that influence and shape policy. 
It is useful insofar as recognising a continuous interaction of these various 
elements. Narratives, which are implicit in John’s framework as ideas, are only 
part of the story as they are subject to interactions with other elements.  
Policy formation processes happen on the backdrop of a dynamic network 
of actors who are involved in and interact with the policy process. Both 
institutional networks, and narratives, which capture and frame knowledge, 
are useful frameworks to account for influences which shape policy over time. 
Narratives – making sense of complexity 
A narrative approach to understanding policy is closely linked to the 
‘ideas-based approach’. Ideas-based approaches are predicated around the 
notion of shared ideas which are maintained and diffused by groups.162  Ideas 
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gain and lose momentum as they circulate with in a community.163  In the early 
20th Century Weber observed the effect of ideas on actions, describing ideas as 
part of a broader interplay between various factors. The notion of ‘world 
images’ is akin to narratives as they are used here:  
“Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly 
govern men’s conduct. Yet very frequently the ‘world 
images’ that have been created by ‘ideas’ have, like 
switchmen, determined the tracks along which action 
has been pushed by the dynamic of interest.”
164
 
The role of ideas and their impact on beliefs, actions, and biases is 
subject to study in a number of academic fields, for example communication, 
neuroscience, marketing, and psychology.165 
Narrative approaches view ideas as part of a story. The idea is embedded 
within a storyline and dominant narratives can inhibit or promote new ideas, 
and frame solutions to problems. Thus, narratives are stories within which 
problems are framed.  
A narrative can be defined as a “story with a temporal sequence of events 
[…with] an unfolding plot […which] is populated by dramatic moments, 
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symbols and archetypal characters”166 and can “be both a particular category 
of communication and a method of cognitive organization.”167   
Narratives, as a method of cognitive organisation, are fundamental to the 
way humans think and make sense of the world around them. Empirical 
evidence from cognitive psychology and neuroscience points towards the 
fundamental role of narratives in processing and organising information.168  
Narration, as a cognitive function, can be neurally located in the brain. 
Pathologies (injury or disease) which have led to the loss of narrative ability 
have allowed insights into the role of narration in human cognition and 
communication.169  
On an individual level narratives help to make sense of, and organize, 
complex information. Narratives are used to aid understanding of, and 
represent complex social phenomena in simple, more accessible terms. First, 
by abstracting themes and gathering together disparate information; and 
second, by weaving information into a coherent and ordered story line, 
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privileging information which suits the narrative and discarding information 
which does not.170   
On a social level a narrative is a category of communication. The notion 
of socially transmitted concepts in the form of stories and ideas is pervasive. 
Dawkins likens the transmission of ideas and concepts within society to the 
transmission of genetic traits in biological evolution with his notion of the 
‘meme’, a self replicating unit of cultural evolution.171  Stone describes 
metaphors as ‘narrative framings’ of ideas which are prevalent in policy 
discourses.172  Hall posits that different ideas, embedded in institutions, are 
key factors in policy change and stability.173   
A number of frameworks have been proposed with an emphasis on 
narratives. Jones and McBeth divide the use of the narratives in policy 
research into two camps: positivist and post-positivist.174  The positivist 
narrative research agenda is characterised by taking “a specifically deductive 
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approach where narrative is clearly defined and some attempt is made to 
operationalize narrative structure and/or content to test clearly stated 
hypotheses […] many of these studies tend toward quantification and 
frequently apply statistical techniques.”175  Post-positivist narrative studies 
“place discourse and symbolism and the role these concepts play in 
persuading, manipulating, and generating meaning at the core of their 
methodologies.”176  The emphasis is on the identification of underlying 
assumptions which are used to construct the stories under investigation. These 
studies are, according to Jones and McBeth inductive, qualitative, difficult to 
test and replicate. 
Jones and McBeth contend that the concept of narrative  
…remains a mysterious and elusive concept in policy 
theory […] too superfluous to underpin theory building, 
and too nebulous to facilitate the empirical investigation 
of policy processes and outcomes
177
   
In this dissertation I use the concept of policy narratives as dominant 
explanations or framings which are persistent over time.  A narrative is “a 
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simple, unifying, easily expressed story or explanation that organizes people’s 
experience and provides a framework for understanding events.”178  Policy 
narratives here are specific, shared understandings; they are necessarily 
abstractions and simplifications of complex phenomena. I am aligning the 
concept with the post-positivist or constructivist perspective. The contention 
here is that narratives are indeed indicative of underlying assumptions. 
Moreover, they provide a lens, a mental shortcut or heuristic, through which 
phenomena are framed. Established narratives aid in the interpretation and 
communication of events. To paraphrase Weber, narratives determine the 
paths along which action is taken.179  A dominant narrative is difficult to 
dislodge because they become stabilised by lock-in processes that lead to path 
dependent developments. In other words, over time a particular narrative 
becomes embedded in an institutional context, it aids in framing responses, 
and can form the basis of institutional memory. The responses in turn reflect 
and vindicate the narratives and the narrative may thus become further 
entrenched.180  Thus narratives build and influence their environment. By 
stabilising certain framings or interpretations over alternative framings, 
narratives can lead to “organisational and conceptual blind spots.”181  
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Expert Advice in Policy-formation 
The policy context of bioterrorism is that the facts are uncertain, the 
stakes are high, and the public and pressure groups, although interested, 
concerned and with a voice, are almost excluded from the policy-formation 
process. Expert advice is an integral part of the process, either scientific or 
intelligence based advice is sought to assess risks and to subsequently inform 
decisions. This intersection of risk, uncertainty, and the necessary solicitation 
of expert advice places this area of policy firmly in the realm of ‘science 
policy’.  
This characterisation of the policy area does not conflict with the other 
concepts discussed above. Rather, the different characterisations are 
complementary and constitute different levels of abstraction. The institutional 
network provides the structural environment; the narrative is the vehicle; the 
expert groups in this notion of ‘science policy’ drive the vehicle. However, 
before this analogy becomes muddled it is important to note that these 
concepts are used analytically to help explain “how coherence and linearity 
can emerge in multi-actor, multi-level processes, without any one actor 
specifically being responsible for it.”182  
The term ‘science policy’ refers to the area of policy making where 
scientific, or expert, advice is central to the decision making process. Scientific 
experts have been instrumental in terms of characterising the threat of 
biological warfare in the UK and thus they have also been influential in terms 
of the biological warfare policy. Balmer points out that during the First World 
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War military and scientific institutions became linked.183  The origins of 
scientific advice on matters of biological warfare can be found during the 
inter-war period and moved through various stages of different conceptions of 
threat. Initially biological warfare was seen as unlikely to be employed and 
disease outbreaks following conventional bombing (for example, due to 
disruption of water supply) was thought to be the main threat to public health. 
During the Second World War, and the launch of a British offensive biological 
warfare research and development programme the dominant narrative of 
threat shifted to retaliation in case of a German attack. In the 1950s the 
dominant narrative of the threat shifted into a defensive posture, as 
“scientists began to agitate about the horrible possibilities of biological agents 
spread as an aerosol across large tracts of land”.184  
Importantly for the discussion of bioterrorism policy formation in the UK 
is the involvement of the scientific community in the process of identifying the 
threat and giving policy advice. In the UK, 
the answers to the ‘scientific’ question ‘what is the 
nature of biological warfare?’ were inextricably bound 
up with the answers to the ‘policy’ question ‘what shall 
we do with biological warfare’ […] international matters, 
particularly the supposed intentions of Germany and the 
Soviet Union, and the United States and Canada, were 
extremely important in shaping policy.
185
 
Scientific questions about the threat were inextricably linked to policy 
questions. Moreover, the assessment of threat was framed as a matter for 
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scientific inquiry. The assessment of threat was linked to scientific possibilities 
of the use of biological agents as weapons.186  
The idea that policy can be, and should be based on correct and precise 
knowledge has a long history. The industrial revolution started to introduce 
the world to more and more technological complexity and policy makers 
became more reliant on technical and scientific advice to make decisions. This 
position is echoed in Beck’s ‘risk society’ in which increasingly man-made 
unnatural risks need to be regulated.187   
Risk, threat and policy  
 A substantial school of thought in the social sciences recognizes that risk 
has transformed society. The beginning of twentieth century coincided with 
the advent of what Beck calls the “risk society”.188  In the risk society the 
production of wealth is inextricably linked to the production of risks – conflicts 
and problems associated with the distribution of wealth in Marx’s “capital 
society” have, in the risk society, been superseded by conflicts associated with 
the production, definition and distribution of techno-scientifically produced 
risks. In Weber’s industrial “class society” the question was how socially 
produced wealth could be distributed inequitably but, at the same time, 
legitimately. Whereas in Beck’s “risk society” the question is how risks, which 
are produced in tandem with the progressing modernisation, can be mitigated 
and distributed so that these risks neither hinder the progress of 
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modernisation, nor exceed a tolerable level.189  According to the “risk society” 
view risk has become the primary ordering principle of society.190  According to 
Beck, the ‘risk society’ thesis does not supplant the thesis of Weber or Marx 
but reframes it; the production of wealth in the advanced modernity goes 
hand in hand with the production of risks, the logic of wealth distribution is 
replaced by the logic of risk distribution, which in Beck’s formulation is 
dissociated from class hierarchy: need (of resources) is hierarchical, risk is 
democratic (Beck’s examples include smog and radioactivity). Beck’s 
sociological analysis might over-reach itself by claiming that risk is the 
ordering principle of modern society, rather than that society’s antennae have 
become more attuned to risks, so that they appear more abundant.191 
However, risk is the central concept and an ordering principle of policy 
formulation in a wide range of policy areas, such as health, finance, and 
security. Policy formulation in respect to security risks is in essence about risk 
management – the mitigation and management of potential losses, dangers, 
challenges, or hazards. The following discussion focuses on expert risk 
management and risk assessment strategies relevant to policy.  
To have a useful discussion about risk it is necessary to define the key 
terms used here: Risk, and threat.192  Both terms are substantially overlapping 
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in meaning, use, and definition. One distinguishing feature of threat is that it 
involves agency. The Oxford English Dictionary describes ‘threat’ as “a 
declaration of hostile determination” which is “to be inflicted”193  upon 
someone or something. In terms of formal assessments, threats are often 
described as a function of ‘capability multiplied by intent’194; whereas risk is 
often described as a function of ‘potential loss or harm multiplied by the 
likelihood of occurrence’.195    
For the purposes of this dissertation the difference between risk and 
threat is agency, more accurately hostile intent. A threat is something hostile, 
whereas a risk is a quality of a system, or inherent in activities and choices.  
Risk and threat are such similar concepts, not least in everyday parlance, 
making a neat separation difficult. The substantial overlap of both concepts is 
evident when considering the difference between two statements: “we are at 
risk from terrorists”, and “we are threatened by terrorists”. Both statements 
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are semantically equivalent; both statements involve the agency of an actor 
who intends to inflict harm. The difference, between risk and threat, emerges 
when considering tolerability of each condition: there is an acceptable or 
tolerable level of being at risk from terrorist attacks, because the risk of 
terrorism is an inherent quality of the world we live in; being threatened, on 
the other hand, is not acceptable or tolerable.  
When considering the difference between threat and risk in formal 
assessments a substantial difference emerges. Threat is conceptualised as the 
function of intent and capability; risk is conceptualised as the function of 
impact and likelihood. In these conceptualisations threat is solely defined and 
assessed as a function of the perpetrator – their willingness to inflict harm and 
their ability to do so. Risk, on the other hand, is wider ranging; a function of 
likelihood and consequence.  
Risk and threat can therefore be said to be hierarchical concepts: risk is 
something omnipresent, threat is something acute. The risk of falling victim to 
an attack is always given (to greater or lesser extent, given circumstances), the 
threat of an attack only materialises when potential perpetrators present 
themselves or declare intent. Threat will therefore be treated here as a 
concept that exists ‘beneath’ that of risk. The following section discusses the 
concept of risk, bearing these distinctions in mind. 
Risk 
Risk is a concept of the developed modernity, replacing fate or fortune, 
and is used to harness uncertainty.196  A common analogy used to illustrate risk 
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is the rolling of dice. In the case of dice the outcome is well defined with an 
equal distribution of probability for each possible outcome. However, rolling a 
die is a misleading analogy. Probabilities of outcomes in risk situations are 
rarely equally distributed, some outcomes are more likely to occur than 
others. Further, the probabilities change depending on the way we look at a 
specific risk. This peculiarity of risk arises from a variety of sources. One of 
these is futurity: risk describes something that may or may not happen in the 
future. Risk is inextricably linked to uncertainty - the incomplete knowledge of 
future events. The power of risk resides in the anticipation of harm. It 
therefore follows that as well as the factors involved in causing harm, it is the 
state of knowledge about these factors which is an important determinant of 
risk. In other words, risk is constructed not only from the possibility (or 
probability) of harm occurring and its magnitude but also depends on which 
factors are considered when assessing a course of action, or anticipated 
events. Assumptions have to be made when assessing a risk. Risk, therefore, 
depends on what factors are taken into account – judgement and subjectivity 
are inherent in risk assessment. Slovic points out: “risk does not exist ‘out 
there’, independent of our minds and cultures, waiting to be measured […] 
[a]lthough these dangers are real, there is no such thing as ‘real risk’ or 
objective risk”197. Wildavsky and Douglas approach the problem of subjectivity 
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and uncertainty of risks by asking: “Can we know the risks we face, now or in 
the future?” The answer they give is: “No, we cannot; but yes, we must act as 
if we do.”198   
It should be noted, at this point, that possibility of occurrence does not 
equate with inevitability of occurrence. The often repeated dictum “not if but 
when” is not helpful, as it presupposes the inevitability of an event occurring. 
‘When’ is an important question in risk estimates, since risk estimates are 
often expressed as statistical averages and probabilities. If an event occurs on 
average every five years, does not mean that it will re-occur again after five 
years.   
Risk assessments are, more often than not, built upon past experiences; 
they are retrospectives of things to come. Taleb points out that building 
general rules from observed events is fraught with danger. He uses the 
example of a ‘black swan’ – which, before discovered in Australia, was thought 
not to exist, and all swans were thought to be white. The black swan is a 
metaphor for general rules built from past experiences, which fail to predict 
rare or hard-to-predict events.199  Taleb specifically deals with rare high impact 
events and the problem of induction: “how can we logically make claims about 
the unseen based on the seen?”200  The problem of black swans is compounded 
when the historical record, of a specific event, does not offer a sufficient 
database which can be drawn upon to extrapolate to the future. That is, if the 
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event is rare it is more difficult to make reliable predictions about the event 
occurring in the future. Further complicating the picture is that “the severity 
of [a given negative] event, will be in almost all cases inversely proportional to 
its frequency: the ten year flood will be more frequent than the 100 year flood 
– the 100 year flood will be more devastating.”201  The dilemma is that rare 
events offer little data (because they are rare) to predict their occurrence, but 
the high impact, catastrophic nature demands a reliable prediction.  
Risk Assessment Strategies - Knowledge and Uncertainty 
A range of risk assessment strategies is used to evaluate possible 
mitigation strategies. Traditional risk assessment strategies include, amongst 
others: modelling, probability and statistical methods, game theory, scenarios, 
cost-and-benefit analysis.202  In terms of security risks quantitative elements 
are supplemented with intelligence and qualitative expert assessment. The 
assessment can then be used as a basis for ranking risks or threats and 
informing policy decisions.  
However, using risk assessments as the basis for policy decisions presents 
problems, especially the quantitative side of the assessment as it treats risk as 
an objectively determinate quantity. Quantitative problems arise, for example, 
in assigning values to impacts (these values may be monetary or cardinal) – 
how many sick people equal a fatality or a disability?, how to value the 
severity of consequences which evade simple monetary terms such as 
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reduction in life expectancy, political will attrition, or loss of trust?203  
Consequences and impacts which are problematic to capture numerically in 
quantitative assessments present the problem of commensurability – 
comparing apples with oranges.  
Risk assessments are models of the ‘real world’, and necessarily 
abstractions and simplifications. These models are contingent on the 
information fed into them – the state of knowledge of the risk is the limiting 
factor of any risk assessment model. The state of knowledge, the input into 
the model, is subject to judgements and assumptions, and most importantly, 
the knowledge is unavoidably incomplete.  
Conventionally two types of (incomplete) knowledge characterise any 
given risk, as discussed above: knowledge about outcomes and knowledge 
about probabilities. Stirling differentiates both of these factors of the risk 
function further (see figure 3). The state of knowledge for either factor can be 
unproblematic (relatively well known) or problematic (little known). Stirling 
slices the spectrum of incomplete knowledge into four, logically possible, 
states of knowledge: risk, ambiguity, uncertainty and ignorance.204  
According to this classification (figure 3) ‘risk’ is formally defined as 
relatively familiar, with both, the outcome and likelihood well characterised.  
Traditional quantitative risk assessment techniques can be used and 
confidence in assessments can be high. In circumstances where ‘uncertainty’ 
                                                     
203
 Slovic, P. (2000) Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics and Science: Surveying the Risk-Assessment 
Battlefield. In: The Perception of Risk, ed. Slovic, P., London: Earthscan Publications Ltd, 
390-412 
204
 Stirling, A. (2007) Science, Precaution and Risk Assessment: towards more measured and 
constructive policy debate. European Molecular Biology Organisation Reports, 8(April), 
308-315 
89 
prevails, knowledge of the likelihood of occurrence is incomplete, but the 
outcome of the event is relatively well characterized. ‘Ambiguity’ means that 
the likelihood of occurrence can be estimated, but the outcome of the event is 
not known. In the case of ‘ignorance’ neither the probability of the event 
occurring, nor its effect, is known.205   
“Risk assessment offers a powerful suite of methods 
under a strict state of risk. However, these are not 
applicable under conditions of uncertainty, ambiguity 
and ignorance. Contrary to the impression given in calls 
for ‘science-based’ risk assessment, persistent 
adherence to these reductive methods, under conditions 
other than the strict state of risk, are irrational, 
unscientific and potentially misleading.” (Emphasis 
added)
206
 
The purpose of this categorisation of ‘incertitude’ into four discreet 
states of knowledge is to suggest different risk assessment approaches for 
different states of incertitude. Stirling suggests that it is only in the case of 
‘risk’ (according to figure 3) that conventional risk assessment techniques offer 
a scientifically rigorous approach. In conditions where knowledge about either 
probabilities, or outcomes, or both is less complete subjective judgements are 
needed to supplement empirical data as a basis for systematic analysis. These 
“judgements might take several different – yet equally plausible – forms.”207   
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Figure 1: Possible states of incertitude. Knowledge about the probability of occurrence is on 
the vertical axis, knowledge about the outcomes is on the horizontal axis. Possible areas of 
applicability in a policy context are suggested for each state of incertitude. Source: (Stirling, 
2007), p. 310. 
Biological terrorism, or the deliberate release of pathogens, is necessarily 
situated in the area of ‘ignorance’ – both the knowledge about outcomes and 
knowledge about the probability are problematic and contested. The intention 
of an actor to use a pathogen is difficult to identify; the ability to acquire, 
produce and disseminate pathogens can at best be approximated. Even if 
intention is present; acquisition and dissemination are achieved, a wide range 
of different pathogens can be used in a number of different ways, for a 
number of different purposes. Further, the outcome, or impact, of an 
intentional release ranges from localised nuisance by just causing a scare, to 
catastrophic levels by causing numerous casualties and larger societal 
consequences.  
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In other words, the threat of bioterrorism is rife with uncertainty and the 
basis for traditional, reductive, risk assessments is insufficient. Representation 
of the threat of bioterrorism as a ‘risk’, in the formal sense, and the 
application of traditional risk assessment techniques are neither scientific, nor 
robust or rational.  
“From these fundamental issues of scientific rigour 
follow implications for the practical robustness of 
conventional reductive risk assessment in decision-
making. In political terms, a quantitative expression of 
risk or a definitive expert judgement on safety is 
typically of great instrumental value; however, these 
have little to do with scientific rationality. Any robust 
policy must go beyond short-term institutional issues 
and address the efficacy of policy outcomes. As such, 
robustness is a function of the accuracy of assessment 
results, not of their professed precision.”
208
   
Stirling argues that under conditions other than the formal state of risk, 
where a firm position of “sound science” is not attainable, a broader range of 
non-reductive methods is required, “which avoid spurious promises to 
determine ‘science-based’ policy”.209  He goes on to make the case for the 
application of the precautionary principle210  in cases of ambiguity, uncertainty 
and ignorance.  
It is important to acknowledge the context and premise of the 
precautionary principle. The precautionary principle is rooted in environmental 
protection and related policy areas. Although the concept is widely contested, 
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it is now being applied in an increasing number of countries and economic 
sectors as a principle for policy making.211 
Principle of Precaution 
The precautionary principle is a general principle for policy decision in 
circumstances where there is a lack of scientific certainty and the potential for 
serious damages. The modern precautionary principle grew out of the German 
“Vorsorgeprinzip” (lit.: pre-care principle, or principle of prophylaxis) and 
became an important concept in environmental protection and policy making. 
It was included in the drafting of German air pollution legislation in response 
to ‘acid rain’ in the 1970s.212   
The 1982 UN General Assembly Resolution on the World Charter for 
Nature, principle 11, states:  
“…Activities which might have an impact on nature shall 
be controlled, and the best available technologies that 
minimize significant risks to nature or other adverse 
effects shall be used; in particular (a) Activities which 
are likely to cause irreversible damage to nature shall be 
avoided…”
213
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The 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, principle 15, 
states:  
“…the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by 
States according to their capabilities. Where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation.”
214
 
Moving away form these early articulations of the precautionary principle 
– which, as international instruments have been forged on consensus with 
constructive ambiguity (for example, what constitutes ‘serious’ damage, or at 
which point is ‘full’ scientific certainty attained?) – to a more concrete 
application for risk management. Stirling points out that the precautionary 
principle is not a decision rule or a specific methodology:  
Instead, it points to a rich array of methods that reveal 
the intrinsically normative and contestable basis for 
decisions, and the ways in which our knowledge is 
incomplete. This is as good a ‘rule’ as we can reasonably 
get.
215
 
 Renn216 draws on Resnik’s work217  by differentiating three mental 
framings of the precautionary principle: the risk analysis frame, the 
precautionary frame, and the deliberative frame. (See figure 4 below) 
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The ‘risk analysis frame’ uses the traditional and reductive risk 
assessment tools, relying on ‘scientific’ estimates of probability and impact. 
Precaution applied here means that judgements of estimates are conservative, 
erring on the side of caution, in a ‘better safe than sorry’ fashion to avoid false 
negatives rather than false positives.218  
The ‘precautionary frame’ deals with the inherent uncertainty in risk as 
its main focus and “aims to ensure prudent decisions in situations where there 
is high incertitude about probabilities, outcomes or both, and a high 
vulnerability of the population at risk.” This frame advocates the use of 
regulatory instruments such as: “minimization requirements, diversification of 
risk agents, containment in time and space, and close monitoring”219  Renn 
contends that this frame does not necessarily entail the banning of “hazardous 
activities”. The deliberative frame also focuses on uncertainty, ambiguity and 
ignorance; but, rather than advocating specific set of tools, this frame sees risk 
from the perspective of complementing purely analytical approaches with 
deliberative methods of stakeholder involvement. Seen through the second 
and, in particular, the third frame, the precautionary principle is a 
complementary addition to scientific analytical approaches, allowing and 
embracing incertitude rather than advocating the banning of substances and 
hazardous activities outright. The suggestion is that 
 “precaution offers a way to be more measured and 
rational about uncertainty, ambiguity and ignorance. […] 
What is not tenable is that these inherently political 
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issues [are] concealed behind opaque, deterministic 
ideas of the role of science”.
220
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Figure 2: The precautionary approach. The precautionary approach starts with a screening 
stage, similar to the hazard characterization stage in formal risk assessment. Example criteria 
for the screening process are outlined in the flow diagram. The ‘appraisal’ box of the 
diagram, central section, corresponds to the three frames of precaution outlined, plus formal 
risk assessment. (Stirling, 2007)
221
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4 The Emergence of Policy Issues 
Introduction 
This chapter charts the rise of bioterrorism and pandemic influenza as 
salient policy issues in the UK. The aim is to set both cases into context and to 
illustrate and chart their path to becoming prominent policy issues. Therefore, 
specific attention is placed on “policy discourse”, which includes parliamentary 
discussion, publications by pertinent departments and agencies, as well as 
output from prominent institutions such as the Royal Society, academia and 
other non governmental organizations (NGOs). 
 Constructing these case study narratives in a methodologically rigorous 
way requires a measure of impact of certain events or publications on the 
policy discourse. A direct measure of impact or contribution to the policy 
discourse is sadly absent.222  Thus, proxies have to be used to identify 
pertinent and salient events. Such proxies include references to events in 
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official documents and speeches, as well as events and documents highlighted 
during interviews.  
In the case of bioterrorism secrecy is especially abundant. As discussed 
elsewhere in this dissertation much of the discussion, decision making process 
and general discourse of threat assessments and policy making are veiled in 
secrecy. This secrecy is not limited to discussion within government but 
extends to discussions outside of government, where mindfulness of possible 
adverse security implications – sometimes necessarily, sometimes habitually – 
curtails access and transparency.  
A case of pandemic influenza has been included as a heuristic device to 
illuminate British approaches to bioterrorism policy. Rather than to look 
towards another type of agent, or mode of attack, within the CBRN grouping, 
the decision was made to include a case study on pandemic influenza in this 
dissertation. The case of pandemic influenza is used to illustrate the 
difficulties of risk assessment and the accompanying institutional complexity 
to shed light on the case of bioterrorism.  
Both cases, the case of pandemic influenza and the case of bioterrorism, 
are, broadly speaking, similar in the approach taken by policy makers to 
confront the threat in terms of policy response. There are similarities in 
capabilities for surveillance, detection and mitigation work for both natural 
and man-made events. However, each case is idiosyncratic and thus each case 
attracts, and requires, a different mix of policy actors.223  The main difference 
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in the composition of the policy network is due to the intentional and criminal 
nature of bioterrorism, and thus the requirement for law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies to be involved.  
Nonetheless, both cases overlap substantially, despite being 
idiosyncratic. Both cases share key features which make them suitable for 
comparison. The threat of disease is at the heart of both cases; both cases 
have the potential to cause a high level of morbidity, mortality and economic 
disruption; both are framed as security issues; and both cases are complex and 
the policy discourse is led by expert knowledge.224  Both cases are also 
characterised by an abundance of uncertainty about the likelihood of 
occurrence and severity of the impact, although the policy discourse, as well as 
the public discourse, focus on high impact scenarios.   
The substantial overlap of shared key features of the two cases also 
extends to interactions between them, as well as their interaction with the 
wider policy context, neither case operates in isolation.225  Responsibilities are 
shared by the same departments and, in many instances, the same people.226  
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in response to pressures, and opportunities. 
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Policy making in the field of security is multi-layered and multi-causal, policy 
pathways are constantly constructed and reconstructed by an evolving 
context, internal and external pressures, interests, power relations, and 
shifting perceptions of threat and risk and their perceived significance. This 
complexity is conceptualised in this dissertation by the institutional model and 
the concept of narratives.227   
The separation of the two cases into discreet narratives is somewhat 
arbitrary because both narratives include references to events pertinent to, 
but external of the case being treated. For example, reference to SARS or Food 
and Mouth Disease (FMD) could be made in either case study section. FMD and 
SARS have had important impacts on the framing of each case study. 
Moreover, changes in the policy environment in the UK in response to crises 
such as BSE are significant in framing policy narratives and shaping 
institutions. Some of these factors are thus briefly outlined in a separate 
section. First, I am going to outline some context before turning to the policy 
narrative.  
4.1 Bioterrorism as a Policy Issue in the UK 
The following section looks at bioterrorism policy related events with a 
special regard to the UK. In terms of statements and assessments it is difficult 
to look at bioterrorism in isolation, separately from, especially chemical, but 
also a neat separation from radiological and nuclear terrorism is sometimes 
difficult. For historical reasons, as discussed in Chapter 3 (“Concepts and 
Theory”), biological, chemical and nuclear warfare issues have been, and 
continue to be, conflated under the banner of WMD. More recently, a number 
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of different collective abbreviations have entered the counter-terrorism 
literature: collections of, or variations on, two or three letters from the 
following collective abbreviation – CBRNE (chemical, biological, radiological, 
nuclear, and explosive; for example CB, RBC, NBC). Biological terrorism is 
rarely treated as a subject by and of itself. As well as the difficulty of 
separating the agents and means to attack, it is sometimes difficult to separate 
“terrorism” (subnational groups) from “warfare” (nation states). Many 
documentary sources and statements conflate these categories.   
The threat of bioterrorism has been looming large for several decades. 
The threat has been, and still is, pervasive in media, popular culture, and 
political, as well as, academic discourse. However, despite the ubiquity of 
warnings, bioterrorism has rarely manifested itself.  Historically, only a handful 
of authenticated episodes of deliberate release of pathogenic material by non-
state actors have been documented. None of these episodes have caused large 
numbers of fatalities, if any at all.  
A great number of terrorism chronologies have been assembled, for a 
wide variety of purposes. Writing a case study, or narrative, means that one 
has to discern which events count as terrorism, and which do not, which are 
important and which are not – value judgements have to be made. This is 
unavoidable, but it makes studies of this kind inherently political, subjective, 
and value laden. As described above in the introduction, the aim here is to 
chart events which have contributed to the rise of bioterrorism as a salient 
policy issue in the UK.   
The way the UK government and its policy makers and shapers address, 
and frame, the problem of bioterrorism is inextricably linked to the history of 
use and development of biological weapons by states. Although state 
programmes are not of primary concern in this dissertation, it is important to 
bear in mind that the discussion and framing of the biological weapons 
102 
problem is informed by former state programmes – the UK’s own programme, 
but also those of the United States, France, Japan, Iraq, South Africa and the 
Soviet Union, to list some prominent examples.228  In addition to past 
programmes are continued and new concerns over current state programmes.  
The focus here, however, is the threat posed by, and potential capability 
of, non-state groups, as outlined in the definitions in the preceding chapter. 
There are historical antecedents of bioterrorism, actual authenticated cases of 
deliberate releases of pathogenic biological material are, however, scant. As 
with (conventional) terrorism chronologies in general, constructing a 
chronology, or narrative, of biological terrorism is a matter of interpretation 
and definition, and thus subjectivity of the compiler. However, when 
disregarding individual assassinations, attempts at extortion, and hoaxes the 
number of actual and authenticated deliberate releases of pathogenic material 
is very small indeed 
In Britain concerns over deliberate release of pathogenic material pre-
dates the advent of the British biological warfare programme by some years 
and is closely linked to the experience of chemical warfare during the First 
World War which led to the British ratification of the 1925 Geneva Protocol in 
April 1930.229  An institutional response in Britain started in the inter-war 
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period with the solicitation of independent expert advice by the newly 
established Imperial Defence’s Subcommittee on Bacteriological Warfare. 
Advice, on the nature of a possible threat was drawn from a group of scientists 
of the Medical Research Council (MRC) in the 1920s. Although this group 
initially dismissed the idea of deliberate release of biological agents as a 
weapon of war, a biological threat was recognised as a by-product of 
conventional bombings which may disrupt water supply systems and sanitary 
provisions causing diseases like typhoid. Thus, during the 1930s expert advice 
from the MRC framed the biological warfare threat as any threat to public 
health from conventional warfare.230  The growing threat of war and suspicions 
surrounding biological warfare programmes in other countries led to numerous 
responses, including the setting up of a BW programme for defensive and 
retaliatory purposes. The institutional embodiment of the independent expert 
assessment provided by the MRC took the shape of the Emergency Public 
Health Laboratory Service, established in 1939, to improve public health 
provisions.231   
During World War II the concern was sabotage, during the Cold War the 
emphasis was state (or bloc) centric – sabotage and assassinations were the 
main concern – terrorist use of biological weapons was not seen as a threat of 
significance.  
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Although terrorism has a long history it became a regular feature of life 
in the 60s and 70s, with embassy hostage sieges, airline hijackings, and car 
bombings. In the UK, during a conflict which originated out of religious and 
ethno-nationalist tensions the IRA, and its off shoots, launched numerous 
bombing campaigns. The recent period of the ‘troubles’, fought mainly 
between Irish republicans, unionist paramilitaries and British security forces 
started in the 1960s and continued until the “Good Friday” Agreement of 1998. 
However, violence continued sporadically. During the conflict, between 1969 
and 2001, more than 3500 people died.232   
Concerns of state proliferation of chemical and biological weapons began 
to rise in the 1980s, following the confirmed use of chemical weapons by Iraq 
in 1984,233 the US started releasing previously secret documents at various 
times – gradually increasing the number of countries alleged to be in 
possession of chemical weapons from three (US, USSR, France) to at least 
thirty by the end of 1984.234  Amongst these countries was Libya. At the same 
time estimates of countries thought to be developing biological weapons was 
also increased – up to ten.235 
The Lockerbie bombing on 21st December 1988 is seen by some observers 
as the advent of indiscriminate mass-casualty terrorism and the advent of the 
‘new terrorism’ – the bombing of the Pan Am flight 103 over the Scottish town 
of Lockerbie by Libyan operatives, which cost 270 lives in total (243 
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passengers, 16 crew, and 11 people on the ground).236  Some time before the 
Lockerbie bombing it had become clear that Libya was producing chemical 
weapons, including speculation that it might supply chemical weapons to 
terrorists.237  The day before the bombing, the US ambassador for counter-
terrorism, Paul Bremer, said:  
“There is no evidence that the Libyans have exercised 
any self-restraint on themselves.  The fact you’ve got the 
Libyans with a chemical weapons capability, the historic 
ties and the propensity to turn heavy-duty stuff over to 
terrorists makes it a concern-raising situation”
238
 
The proliferation and possession of CBW capabilities by countries with 
ties to terrorist organizations, such as Libya and Iraq, gave rise to the spectre 
of state-sponsored terrorism, including the possible transfer of chemical and 
biological weapons. The possibility of terrorists using biological weapons, and 
non-conventional weapons in general, began to emerge as a topic of policy 
interest in the UK. At the end of the Cold War, rapid advances in science and 
technology, discovery of a massive covert biological warfare programme in the 
former Soviet Union239  strengthened this perception. The Lockerbie bombing 
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and the rise of mass casualty terrorism, coupled with the mantra that 
“terrorism is theatre”,240  may have led to the persistent belief that in order to 
make an impact terrorists have to ‘raise their game’ in terms of dramatic 
attacks – unconventional terrorism, primarily nuclear, but also chemical and 
biological terrorism were seen by some commentators as a possible next step 
to create the theatre necessary to deliver political messages.241   
Bioterrorism – policy discourse  
Between September and October 1984 a religious commune caused 751 
recorded cases of salmonellosis, in Oregon.242  The Rajneesh group was testing 
a plan to sicken local population in order to prevent them from voting in an 
upcoming election in an attempt to influence the outcome in their favour. The 
source and nature of the outbreak was not recognised as a clandestine attack 
– or more accurately a field trial for an attack – until more than a year later, 
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despite intensive investigation of the unusual outbreak by the US Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Although the investigators considered 
terrorism, or intentional contamination, as a hypothetical cause it was 
rejected on the grounds of no apparent motive, no one claimed responsibility, 
or issued any demands.243  The investigators stated that: 
“We assumed that if the motive was either extortion or 
terrorism, a public statement would have been issued to 
intimidate or create widespread fear. In fact, the 
incident was planned as a covert tactical strike […] On 
the basis of our experience in other investigations, we 
believed that other hypotheses, although more 
complicated, appeared more likely”
244
    
Informants, who came forward thirteen months after the outbreak, which 
was at the time seen as a natural food borne outbreak, testified which led to 
the indictment of two commune members in March 1986; these two pleaded 
guilty (April 1986), and were subsequently sentenced to prison (July 1986). 
This episode received little attention at the time, but became more recognised 
as time went on, the event, although a significant marker in the history of 
bioterrorism had no real impact on policy.245  
The 2004 Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
chaired by Lord Butler, and known as the “Butler Report”, sheds some light on 
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the evolution of the perceived threat from bioterrorism within the British 
intelligence community by examining the intelligence assessments of the Joint 
Intelligence Committee (JIC).246 
In 1989 JIC considered the possibility as unlikely:  
“We have no intelligence that any terrorist group makes 
CBW agents, possesses any such agents or is currently 
contemplating attacks using CBW agents or other toxic 
chemicals. The use of CBW agents by terrorists would 
generate widespread fear and could cause large 
numbers of casualties. The mere threat of such use 
could be sufficient to cause panic. [...] We believe that 
terrorist organisations could also readily obtain and 
handle without insurmountable difficulty, suitable 
bacteria, viruses and certain toxins. Although CBW 
proliferation undoubtedly increases the risk that CBW 
agents could be stolen by or even supplied to terrorists 
by state sponsors [...] this prospect must be viewed 
against a background where many suitable agents can be 
manufactured in small quantities using easily available 
materials. So as far as terrorism is concerned, 
proliferation (if it comes about) may not necessarily be 
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much affected by the actions of States with the relevant 
capability.”
247
   
The Butler Report states that the intelligence community did not consider 
the possession of CBRN by states to influence the risk of terrorist use at this 
time.248  The JIC assessment follows a few years after the only known 
bioterrorist attack that caused an outbreak of disease at the time – a 
politically motivated and deliberate contamination of at least ten food outlets 
with the bacterium Salmonella Typhimurium in the US. 
Following JIC’s 1989 assessment that there was no intelligence indicating 
that terrorist groups were possessing, making, or contemplating to make CBW 
agents the JIC issued its first specific assessment of terrorist use of CBRN in 
April 1992. In this assessment the JIC considered that terrorists may be 
deterred by “the danger to their own members, or by the risk of alienating the 
public and especially their own supporters.”249  This assessment, that terrorists 
are unwilling to use biological weapons, would prevail for some time.250  The 
focus was, first and foremost, on proliferation from states. Heightened 
awareness of groups with fanatical religious zeal gradually changed this 
position.251  First and foremost, however, remained a technocratic explanation. 
This explanation holds that with rapid advances in the biological sciences 
methods of acquisition and use become diffused and more accessible. The 
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technological barrier to obtain a biological weapon is thus lowered; and 
therefore the possibility of bioterrorism increased. So the threat was seen, at 
the time, as increasingly technologically possible but the motivation and intent 
to use was inhibited by a rational, goal oriented nature of terrorists.  
In 1994 the UK ‘Government’ confidentially urged a group drawn from 
the Public Health Laboratory Service (PHLS), the Security Service (MI5) and the 
Metropolitan Police to think about, and prepare for bioterrorism. Zoonotic 
diseases were seen as the main concern and thus the schedule from The 
Specified Animal Pathogens Order 1993 (SAPO) was initially used to frame the 
thinking about bioterrorism.252  Initially expertise was drafted in from the 
Ministry of Defence and the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment 
(CBDE). The early bioterrorism assessment exercises were framed with a 
bottom up approach based on battlefield scenarios – the assessments were 
practical with emergency preparedness and consequence management in 
mind.253 
In July 1994 the Royal Society published a report on the “Scientific 
Aspects of Control of Biological Weapons”.254  Although primarily concerned 
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with aspects of “effective control through international agreement” the report 
refers specifically to the threat from terrorism:  
“The potential danger from BW has increased in the past 
two decades for two main reasons. First, the advent and 
rapid progress of genetic manipulation has made it 
possible to produce new agents. Second BW are 
particularly attractive to some developing countries and 
terrorists because they can be produced cheaply and 
used for covert operations. The Gulf War raised public 
awareness of this particular aspect. The rapidly 
escalating danger must be controlled.”
255
 
The report goes on to state that: 
“Side by side with the advances in science, the 
international political situation has increased the 
possibility of covert use of BW either by terrorists or by 
small nations in pre-conflict situations. The oral route of 
administration, i.e. water contamination and food 
poisoning does not need the sophisticated means of 
delivery demanded by the aerosol route. It could, 
therefore, be especially attractive to small groups 
seeking to disrupt strategic centres.”
256
 
The report stresses the lack of an international control regime 
confronting biological terrorism. In the context of discussing the desirability of 
possible restrictions of technology transfer (intangible and tangible) the report 
mentions terrorism in terms of the potential production of agents on a small 
scale, in e.g. glassware:  
“a determined aggressor bent on terrorist activity 
would, if necessary, produce BW agents by a relatively 
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small scale glassware operation without sophisticated 
safety measures.”
257
  
Further, stating that:  
“a determined aggressor could obtain what he needed 
from third parties or would produce the BW he required 
using unsophisticated equipment without stringent 
safety precautions, the delay achieved by the above 
restrictions [of transfer of seed cultures, large scale 
production equipment and containment units] would 
probably be only months for small scale terrorist 
operations where production of the agent could occur 
for example in a university laboratory”
258
  
The 1994 Royal Society report thus framed the threat of terrorists using 
biological weapons as an increased possibility, an “escalating danger” due to 
three factors: international political climate, cheap production value, and ease 
of production of rudimentary agents. Around this time concerns were raised 
about citizens of certain countries working with pathogens in the UK. The 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) started to involve the Royal Society 
to engage with University Vice Chancellors to find out how many individuals 
(students) from so called “countries of concern” were working with pathogens 
in university laboratories. This marks the beginning of the Voluntary Vetting 
Scheme.259  
                                                     
257
 Ibid. p.45 
258
 Ibid. p.46 
259
 Interview, Senior HPA Official, 9th October 2008, London & Personal communication with 
Sir Paul Lever, 25
th
 June 2008 at RUSI conference, London. Lever, who was Assistant 
Under Secretary for Defence and Security Matters in the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office in 1994, initiated VVS. Initially conceived as a non-proliferation tool, preventing 
the transfer of technology related to weapons of mass destruction and was replaced 
with the Academic Technology Approval Scheme (Atas), in 2008. 
113 
At the same time, in 1994, two features were to become a cornerstone of 
JIC assessments of the terrorist CBRN threat: for most terrorist purposes 
conventional weapons are better, and the danger of alienating support. This 
attitude persisted to the mid 1990s, writing in October 1994 the JIC stated:  
“Attacks involving chemical or biological agents are also 
unlikely, though use of toxic chemical substances (for 
which there are some limited precedents) remains a 
possibility.”
260
   
The October 1994 assessment followed a few months after a release of 
what is said to be Sarin gas in Matsumoto, Japan by the Aum Shinrikyo cult (27 
June 1994). Seven people died, and 144 were injured, after Aum cultists 
vapourized Sarin in a residential area in an attempt to kill three judges who 
were expected to rule against the cult.261  The event received relatively little 
media attention outside of Japan; it is unclear if the JIC was aware of the 
release at the time of writing the October 1994 assessment.262  Although the 
release of Sarin does not constitute biological terrorism, the subsequent Sarin 
attack on the Tokyo subway by the Aum group on 20th March 1995 had a 
significant impact on the discourse and perception of unconventional 
terrorism.263   
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A Shift in Threat Perception – Sarin Attack in Tokyo 
The 20th March 1995 Aum Shinrikyo attack on the Tokyo subway system 
caused a shift in the way unconventional terrorism was perceived. On that day 
five Aum cultists released a Sarin dilution during the morning rush hour on 
three major commuter lines in central Tokyo. 11 people died as a direct 
consequence of the attack, a twelfth later died of the injuries sustained during 
the attack. Japanese prosecutors put the official number of casualties at 3,938. 
More than 5,000 people presented themselves to the emergency services – 
most showed no real symptoms of Sarin poisoning.264 
A potential desire of certain groups to cause mass casualties, and a 
willingness to use unconventional means was recognised. Tucker puts the 
newly recognised magnitude of threat into stark words: 
“The Tokyo subway incident has demonstrated the 
devastating potential of C/B terrorism. Aum Shinrikyo 
broke the monopoly that the nation-state has previously 
held over the most powerful means of organized 
violence […] the diffusion of mass destructive power to 
subnational groups undermines the ability of the nation-
state to protect the security of its citizens – the 
fundamental source of its political legitimacy”
265
  
In the United States of America President Clinton issued a classified 
directive which states that the United States should “deter, defeat and 
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respond vigorously to all terrorist attacks on [US] territory and against our 
citizens”.266  The 9-11 Commission reported that: 
“alarmed by the [Sarin] incident in Tokyo, President 
Clinton made it the highest priority for his own staff and 
for all agencies to prepare to detect and respond to 
terrorism that involved chemical, biological, or nuclear 
weapons”
267
  
Following this prioritisation of NBC terrorism by the US, the Australia 
Group268  “agreed to a United States proposal to ensure the AG export controls 
and information-sharing adequately address the threat of CBW terrorism”, 
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adding: “This US initiative was the AG’s first policy-level action on CBW 
terrorism”269 
In November 1995, the UK staged a large scale bioterrorism emergency 
planning exercise in Manchester, involving senior police officers from several 
regional authorities, military figures, and personnel from Chemical Biological 
Defence Establishment (CBDE) Porton Down. The exercise, named Firestorm, 
was the largest of its kind since WWII.270  
In December 1995, the G7 Ministerial Meeting271 issued a communiqué on 
countering terrorism after a meeting in Ottawa noting an increase in 
“indiscriminate violence by religious extremists and apocalyptic groups which 
practice terrorism”, further noting that: 
“developments have been accompanied by a continuing 
use of conventional weapons, in particular those 
designed for massive explosions, and by a new and 
worrying use of non-conventional, for example chemical, 
weapons”
272
 
The communiqué referred to the Tokyo incident “with deep concern” and 
urged all Governments: 
“to take the strongest measures to prevent toxic 
chemicals and biological agents from getting into the 
hands of terrorists and to adopt appropriate national 
legislation and controls in line with the Chemical 
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Weapons and Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Conventions”
273
 
In March 1996, a year after the Tokyo incident, the House of Commons 
Defence Committee made the following recommendation:  
“If chemical and biological weapon proliferation cannot 
be controlled – and production is not particularly 
difficult – the current low risk of attack may increase 
substantially in future years.  We recommend that NATO 
countries should pay close attention to the long term 
threat of terrorist use of biological and chemical 
weapons and should develop appropriate counter 
measures”
274
 
In July 1996, responding to a G7 declaration on terrorism which stated 
that: “Special attention should be paid to the threat of utilization of nuclear, 
biological and chemical materials, as well as toxic substances, for terrorist 
purposes”275, the JIC assessment thus included the following statement: 
“There is no indication of any terrorist or other group 
showing interest in the use of nuclear, biological or 
chemical (NBC) materials against the UK. For a number 
of reasons, conventional weapons are likely to remain 
more attractive for terrorist purposes. But last year’s 
nerve agent attack in Tokyo will have heightened 
interest and, with ever more NBC information publicly 
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available, hoaxes threatening NBC use are likely to 
become more difficult to assess”
276
 
Whilst the perception of threat increased substantially since the Tokyo 
Sarin attacks the JIC assessment shows that these concerns are mostly 
unfounded – or at least not based on evidence. Despite the possibly 
heightened interest in NBC agents, and ubiquitous information, there is no 
indication of interest from the side of known terrorist groups. 
In March 1998 the Home Secretary Jack Straw made a statement in the 
House of Commons on biological terrorism, following questions over a plot to 
smuggle anthrax bacteria into the country by Iraqi agents.277  Straw’s 
statement in the Commons first dismisses the plot saying that “A number of 
countries have received intelligence about possible threats by Iraq to smuggle 
anthrax […] [t]here is no evidence to suggest that any attempt has actually 
been made to smuggle anthrax into this country”278, but he goes on to outline, 
in vague terms, the governmental strategy on dealing with biological terrorism 
as a reassurance. In the absence of a published policy on strategy this allows a 
glimpse into the UK strategy at the time, however cursory it may be:  
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“we monitor the terrorist threat to the United Kingdom 
very closely, and we remain vigilant, taking all the 
necessary precautions. In doing so, we bear in mind the 
need both for prudence and for a measured, 
proportionate response that does not generate 
unnecessary public alarm”  
 
“[the information about the anthrax plot] was assessed 
thoroughly alongside all other relevant information and 
our assessment of Iraqi intentions. In the light of all 
that, detailed guidance was subsequently given to 
operational staff at all our ports on the detection of any 
such attempted smuggling. Let me emphasise that this 
warning was a prudent, precautionary measure”
279
 
He continues with the strategic priority: “[o]ur first aim must be to 
prevent terrorism, but, if necessary, we have the means to deal swiftly and 
expertly with its consequences.” Mr Straw stresses the review process of the 
plans: 
“Our plans are well prepared and continually reviewed. 
They are tested often and at all levels. Our preparations 
cover all forms of terrorism, including chemical and 
biological threats.”
280
 
Also drawing attention to the multilateral aspect of terrorism 
preparedness:  
“As part of our European Union presidency, we 
organised an expert seminar on biological and chemical 
terrorism which, coincidentally, is being held in the 
south of England today.”
281
  
                                                     
279
 Ibid.  
280
 Ibid.  
281
 Ibid. No further reference could be found to the expert seminar. 
120 
The Home Secretary’s statement, despite being superficial and sweeping, 
allows some insight into the thinking on counter-terrorism. The statement 
indicates that prevention is a priority; that the plans are subject to continual 
review; and that preparations and responses to biological threats are treated 
as a subset of general counter-terrorism measures. It also appears that the 
terrorism threat is seen as an external threat – “we monitor the terrorist 
threat to the United Kingdom […] guidance was subsequently given to 
operational staff at all our ports” – this, however, may be simply a function of 
the statement being prompted by possible Iraqi smuggling, rather than a 
domestic source.  
In November 1998, following the US Embassy bombings in East Africa282, 
the JIC assessment first mentions Osama bin Laden283  in relation to biological 
terrorism in: 
“[Osama bin Laden]has a long-standing interest in the 
potential terrorist use of CBR [chemical, biological & 
radiological] materials, and recent intelligence suggests 
his ideas about using toxic materials are maturing and 
being developed in more detail […] There is also secret 
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reporting that he may have obtained some CB 
material”
284
  
In an assessment from June 1999, the JIC reassesses the threat posed by 
Osama bin Laden’s organization (which remains nameless), stating that the 
organization:  
“continues to seek chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear material and to develop a capability for its 
terrorist use. There is insufficient evidence to conclude 
that he has yet acquired radiological or nuclear material. 
In contrast, we now assess that his followers have access 
to some unspecified chemical or biological material. 
Some have received basic training in its use against 
individuals or in confined spaces. In April a leading 
Egyptian terrorist, apparently believing the information 
was already known to the authorities, told an Egyptian 
court that UBL [Osama bin Laden] had CB ‘weapons’ 
which he would use against US or Israeli targets”
285
 
The JIC assessment refers to a court trial of one hundred and seven 
militants in the Egyptian Supreme Military Court. Amongst the defendants is 
the head of military operations of al-Jihad Ahmed Salama Mabruk. Mabruk told 
the London Al-Hayat newspaper, prior to his sentencing, that Jihad and/or the 
coalition of groups led by Osama bin Laden possessed chemical and biological 
weapons. The Jihad group “bought these chemical and biological weapons 
from eastern European countries and the former Soviet Union in the last two 
years”286. Egyptian security agencies report that defendants in the trial have 
confessed that: 
                                                     
284
 JIC, 25 November 1998, cited in: Lord Butler (2004) Review of Intelligence on Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, HC 898. London: The Stationery Office (14 July 2004) p. 31 
285
 JIC, 9 June 1999, cited in Ibid. p. 32 
286
 AFP from Cairo, as in Arabia Online, 19 Apr 1999, “Islamic Jihad threatens chemical 
warfare”; DPA from Cairo, 1609 hrs CET 19 April 1999, “Egyptian militant says Bin 
continued… 
122 
“elements loyal to Bin Ladin have obtained germ and 
biological weapons by post in return for a small sum […] 
Factories in the former [Soviet bloc] eastern countries 
are supplying whoever wants them viruses causing 
deadly diseases, such as ebola and salmonella, without 
verifying the identity of the importer.  Thus a member of 
the organization has managed to obtain an offer for the 
supply of samples of anthrax and other poisons from a 
factory in one of the East Asian countries”
287
 
The information cited by the Egyptian security agencies from confessions 
of some of the trial defendants bears a striking resemblance to an undercover 
investigation by London Sunday Times reporters a year previously.288  The 
reporters claim to have had positive responses from two cell culture 
collections to requests for Clostridium botulinum, Brucella spp., and Bacillus 
anthracis.289   
The JIC summarises previous assessments on bioterrorism in July 1999, 
with an emerging emphasis on mass casualties and religious fundamentalism:  
“Over the 1990s there has been a significant increase in 
the quantity and quality of intelligence that some 
terrorists are interested in CBRN – and particularly in 
chemical and biological – materials as weapons. The risk 
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of a CBRN terrorist incident has risen, albeit from a low 
base. In part this increase reflects the rise of Islamic 
extremism and ethnic hatred as terrorist motivations: 
some of the terrorists thus motivated are less 
constrained by considerations such as public support, 
casualties among innocent bystanders, or the prospect 
of retaliation. It may also reflect the increasing 
availability of information about making and using CB 
materials, and the publicity attracted by major incidents 
and hoaxes. Whether the attacker’s aim is political or 
economic blackmail, or severe disruption, society’s 
vulnerability to terrorist attack from CB or radiological 
materials is high, exacerbated by the lack of a tried and 
tested CB counter-terrorist response in some 
countries.”
290
 
The JIC goes on to say that: 
“There have been important developments in (Islamist 
extremist) terrorism. It has become clear that Usama Bin 
Laden has been seeking CBRN materials […] His wealth 
permits him to fund procurement, training and 
experimentation to an extent unmatched by other 
terrorists […] Given the quality and quantity of 
intelligence about his interest in CB materials, the length 
of time he has sought them, and the relative ease with 
which they can be made, we assess that he has by now 
acquired or made at least modest quantities of CB 
materials – even if their exact nature and effectiveness 
are unclear. The significance of his possession of CB 
materials is that, in contrast to other terrorists 
interested in CB, he wishes to target US, British and 
other interests worldwide. […] That said, Bin Laden’s 
attacks remain more likely to employ conventional 
weapons than CB materials”.
291
 
Adding that for terrorism in general the situation has not changed 
significantly, and that these judgements will have to be validated by evidence: 
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“[…] the indications of terrorist interest in CBRN 
materials have yet to be matched by a comparable 
amount of evidence about possession and intent to use 
CBRN. Most terrorists continue to favour conventional 
weapons, as easier to use, more reliable, safer and more 
controllable than CBRN materials”.
292
  
The JIC assessment appears to increasingly lean towards mass casualties 
and “Islamic extremism”, in which Osama bin Laden’s aspirations feature 
prominently, although other threat sources were considered. Thus stating in 
January 2000: “Our assessment remains that [Osama bin Laden] has some toxic 
chemical or biological materials, and an understanding of their utility as 
terrorist weapons”293.  Although assessments have ascribed possession, 
however vague, of CB materials to terrorists – mainly Osama bin Laden, but 
also others – the emphasis is on “interest” in CB materials.294  
The Royal Society published a second report on biological weapons, 
entitled Measures for controlling the threat from biological weapons. This 
report is the result of a two day expert meeting held in May 1999 with the 
National Academy of Sciences (US), and the Acadèmie des Sciences (France). 
The report, authored by 12 members of the Royal Society’s working group on 
BW, addresses the UK perspective of the biological weapons threat, albeit in 
less technical detail than the 1994 report (see above). The report notes that: 
“there is increasing concern about the possible use of BW because terrorists 
                                                     
292
 JIC, 15 July 1999, cited in: Ibid. p. 33 
293
 JIC, 12 January 2000, cited in Ibid. p. 33 
294
 An assessment from August 2000 states: “Some [Islamist extremist groups] are interested 
in exploring the use of chemical or biological materials as weapons. In the forefront is 
[Osama bin Laden]” JIC, 9 August 2000, cited in Ibid. p. 33 
125 
and poor nations seeking an alternative to nuclear arms may find them 
attractive”295 however,  
“BW are potentially a serious threat, but mercifully the 
scale of their effectiveness against human populations in 
war and by terrorist attack has not been proven in 
practice. Observations from natural infectious disease 
indicate that BW are unlikely to have as devastating an 
effect on human populations as nuclear weapons”
296
  and 
“the main deleterious effect of a BW attack may be 
panic with consequent disruption of civilian services”
297
 
The report advised that “a scientifically sound and realistic assessment of 
these effects should be made by a panel of government and independent 
scientists”298  the report goes on to explain what such an assessment should 
entail: 
“[…] the number of different BW agents likely to be 
deployed by a particular perpetrator is not infinite, nor 
are the circumstances in which each might be deployed. 
Risk assessment should aim to determine: 
• the agents that are most likely to be used by each 
probable aggressor country or known terrorist group; 
• the means of delivery each might use;  
• the probable effects of an attack with these agents and 
of the measures applied in response, even though, in the 
absence of hard data, estimates of the effects may be 
subject to uncertainty; and 
• the probable intent of the attackers. 
 
Such analyses might show that, in contrast to the many 
theoretical BW agents that could be listed, the number 
likely to be deployed in practice by each potential 
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aggressor would be sufficiently small to make the 
preparation of tailored contingency plans feasible.”
299
  
The House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee in a report on 
weapons of mass destruction300  describes the use of biological weapons by 
terrorists as being of “utmost concern” with “horrific potential” and illustrates 
this with the example that: “one hundred kilograms of anthrax released from 
the top of a tall building in a densely populated area could kill up to three 
million people.”301   
In July 2000 a cross government exercise is held over two days. Exercise 
Trump Card simulates nerve agent releases, one during festivities and a 
following one in the Underground system. The exercise is designed to test the 
response to a terrorist chemical attack in the capital – and involves 1,500 
people from the Metropolitan Police, London Ambulance Service, Fire Brigade, 
Health Authorities, Hospital Trusts, Local Authorities, Chemical Incident 
Response Service, the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA) Porton 
Down and others take part.302  Redacted evidence from the House of Commons 
Defence Committee suggests that the police tends to lead, but “A range of 
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government agencies appropriate to particular scenarios [for which they have] 
have statutory responsibilities”303 
The JIC is explicit about its assessment of threat from bioterrorism in 
January 2001 cautioning, in similar fashion to the Royal Society304, against 
exaggerating the threat:  
“The actual threat does not match the media hype. 
Almost all the available intelligence refers to terrorist 
interest in CB materials, rather than to specific attack 
plans. […] Terrorists interested in CB are generally those 
least constrained by public opinion or their members’ or 
supporters’ sensitivities. Their resources and targets 
tend to be abroad rather than in Britain, so the risk of 
attacks using toxic materials has always been greater 
overseas.  
 
[Osama bin Laden] has sought CBRN materials for use as 
terrorist weapons [...] From his public statements and 
interviews it is clear that he believes it is legitimate to 
use them as weapons and his wealth has allowed him to 
fund procurement, experimentation and training. There 
is plentiful intelligence that this interest is sustained, 
mostly relating to toxic materials.  
 
In 1999 he sought equipment for a chemical weapons lab 
in Afghanistan, and claimed already to have […] experts 
working there”
305
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The Chief Medical Officer, writing about combating infectious disease and 
aspects of public health in 2005, states that prior to 11th September 2001 most 
RBC preparedness:  
“included consideration of the use of such agents in 
warfare which could affect both troops and civilians; 
assessed the challenge of creating an infectious agent 
for deliberate release as an aerosol as technically very 
difficult; acknowledged the possibility of an attempt to 
infect or poison large numbers of people by the 
deliberate release of such agents but considered it 
unlikely to be successful.”
306
 
The CMO continues by stating that the terrorist attacks in 11th September 
2001 and the anthrax letters that followed that autumn “have led to revisiting 
of these assumptions”.  According to the CMO the possibility of more 
extensive operations, absence of warnings, the terrorists’ disregard for 
personal safety or survival and possible multiple simultaneous releases “must 
now form part of the planning for countermeasures”  
A Shock to the System – 11 September 2001 
The events of 11 September 2001307 represent a major turning point in 
thinking about terrorism308; it “changed the calculus of the threat”309. Former 
                                                     
306
 Department of Health - Chief Medical Officer (2002) Getting ahead of the curve: a strategy 
for combating infectious diseases (including other aspects of health protection). London: 
Crown, 10 January 2002, pp.52 
307
 2,985 people die after Al Qaeda operatives hijacked 4 planes; two were flown into the 
World Trade Center causing its collapse, 1 crashed into the Pentagon, and 1 crashed in a 
field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. 9-11 Commission (2004) The 9/11 Commission Report: 
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 
New York: W.W. Norton & Company 
308
 In addition to a whole raft of legislation enacted in the UK, organizational and 
institutional reconfigurations, research output on terrorism exploded, more than 150 
books alone on terrorism were published in the first 12 months following 11 September 
continued… 
129 
Prime Minister Tony Blair described the effect of 11 September in the 
following way:  
“Straight after 9/11 [...] this is what really changed my 
perception of risk, the calculus of risk for me: if those 
people, inspired by this religious fanaticism could have 
killed 30,000, they would have. For those of us who 
dealt with terrorism from the IRA [...] [what] an 
organisation like the IRA were engaged in was terrorism 
directed towards a political purpose, maybe unjustified, 
but it was within a certain framework that you could 
understand. [...] after that time, my view was you could 
not take risks with this issue at all, and one dimension of 
it, because we were advised, obviously,  that these 
people would use chemical or biological weapons or a 
nuclear device, if they could get hold of  them – that 
completely changed our assessment of where the risks 
for security lay, and just so that we make this absolutely 
clear, this was not an American position, this was my 
position and the British position, very, very clearly, and 
so, from September 11 onwards...”
310
 
Following the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, 
letters containing anthrax spores were sent to individuals in the US media and 
US Senate. Between 4th October 2001 and 21st November 2001 twenty two 
people were diagnosed with anthrax, half of them contracted the cutaneous 
form of the disease, the other half contracted the inhalational form of the 
disease, five of whom died, all others recovered. The powdered agent is said to 
be of “extraordinarily high quality”311, the perpetrator(s) remain unknown.312 
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Approximately 32,000 persons started prophylactic treatment with antibiotics 
following potential exposure  to B. anthracis, 5,000 of whom were advised to 
take a 60-day course of antibiotics.313  In addition to the 22 victims, a further 
45 people tested positive, but remained asymptomatic, and a further case was 
reported in a CDC lab technician who became infected during the 
investigation.314  Parts of the US Senate building was closed and vacated for a 
number of months and the US postal system severely disrupted during de-
contamination. The anthrax letters – although their origin has not been 
unambiguously established nine years after their sending, and their actual 
consequences in terms of morbidity and mortality have been low – in 
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conjunction with the massive and seemingly random nature of the attacks of 
September 11 have had a dramatic impact on the policy discourse. The 
combined magnitude and novelty together with the close temporal association 
of the two events lead to a shift in the way terrorism was, and still is, 
perceived.   
In October 2001 the Security Service (MI5) established a Counter-
Terrorist Analysis Centre to handle and disseminate the increasing volume of 
terrorist intelligence in the aftermath of September 11. The centre includes 
representatives from relevant departments to co-ordinate intelligence 
gathering and sharing across Whitehall.315  The centre provides regular risk 
assessments to departmental “customers”, who use the assessments to make 
strategic spending decisions.316  The centre thus leads the multi agency 
response to CBRN attacks on a strategic level. This cross departmental centre 
was formally established as the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) in June 
2005.317   
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The Home Office set up a police training unit. The Police National CBRN 
Centre (PNCBRNC) was established in October 2001 at the Defence Nuclear 
Biological Chemical Centre, Winterbourne Gunner, Salisbury. The PNCBRNC 
delivers command training to ensure that police officers are trained in CBRN 
responses.318  The centre leads the multi-agency preparations for responses to 
CBRN attacks on an operational and tactical level.  
In November 2001 the Parliamentary Office on Science and Technology 
(POST) published a briefing note on bioterrorism.319  The note cites two worst 
case scenarios. The first, taken from the 1970 WHO guidance Health aspects of 
chemical and biological weapons, outlines the expected casualties following a 
theoretical release of 50kg of anthrax spores from an aircraft over an urban 
population of 5 million people – 250,000 casualties, of which 100,000 would 
die without proper treatment. The second, taken from the 1993 US 
Congressional Technology Assessment study, a scenario involving release of 
100kg of anthrax aerosol upwind of the Washington DC area, estimating that 
this would cause at least 130,000 deaths and possibly as many as 3 million. 
However, in conclusion the Briefing Note states:  
“While the deliberate release of BW agents is a 
frightening prospect, it is important to keep the likely 
consequences in perspective. So far, the attacks in the 
US [anthrax letters] have led to few deaths, and only a 
handful of confirmed cases of infection. But they have 
led to disruption of the US Congress and postal service, 
and caused widespread alarm around the globe. While 
the prospect of a large scale release of a highly 
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contagious pathogen cannot be discounted, the evidence 
to date suggests that continued small-scale anthrax 
attacks targeted at individuals are unlikely to cause 
significant numbers of fatalities.”
320
 
This briefing note is cited in a House of Commons Defence Committee 
report of 12 December 2001.321  On the nature of the threat, and terrorism in 
general, the report states: “The position continues to be that there remains no 
intelligence of any specific threat to the UK at present”, qualifying this 
position:  
“But the absence of intelligence about a specific threat 
is not the same as the absence of a threat. The 
government clearly believes that the general level of 
threat has increased.”
322
  
The report’s authors conclude:  
“although the government may not have intelligence of a 
specific threat, they are persuaded that the general level 
of threat to the UK is substantially greater than it was 
perceived to be prior to 11 September.”
323
  
On examining biological weapons, citing Graham Pearson’s324 evidence:  
“it is clear that biological weapons present the greatest 
danger today […] as they are the easiest to acquire, have 
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the weakest regimes [controlling them] and yet have 
effects comparable to nuclear weapons.”
325
  
However, after briefly considering low casualties from historical episodes 
– accidental anthrax release in Sverdlovsk: 65,000 exposed, 68 reported 
deaths;326  US anthrax letters resulting in “just a handful deaths” – the report 
considers the evidence again:  
“There seems little doubt that terrorist organisations 
could obtain the necessary materials for chemical, 
biological or radiological weapons […] Biological agents 
may be more difficult to obtain or grow, but the 
international controls over them are weak.”
327
  
Concluding on the possible use of biological weapons the report states:  
“Although we have seen no evidence that either al 
Qaeda or other terrorist groups are actively planning to 
use chemical, biological and radiological weapons, we 
can see no reason to believe that people who are 
prepared to fly passenger planes into tower blocks 
would balk at using such weapons. The risk that they will 
do so cannot be ignored.”
328
  
  The same month, December 2001, in direct response to September 11 
sees the rushed enactment of terrorism legislation to update and extend 
previous Acts.329  The Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA) 
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includes provisions on biosafety and biosecurity330 including an extensive list 
of pathogens and toxins – Schedule 5.331  The list of pathogens and toxins 
contained in Schedule 5 comes under scrutiny during a House of Commons 
Science and Technology Committee inquiry into the Scientific Response to 
Terrorism. From the inquiry it emerged that the list of substances controlled 
under the ATCSA was originally taken from the Australia Group’s list of 
biological agents for export control332; however police counter terrorism 
officers333  who liaise with universities and commercial laboratories to 
implement the provisions of the ATCSA distribute a second, more extensive 
list, the so called “Salisbury list”. The Salisbury list was drawn up “by a group 
of experts involving the Security Service, DSTL (Porton Down), public health 
experts and HSE staff”.334  The list, although confidential, was distributed 
widely amongst laboratory health and safety officers. The use of two lists 
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caused confusion. The Australia list, contained in Schedule 5, is a legal 
requirement; whilst the Salisbury list, distributed by police officers carries an 
expectance to be implemented in the laboratories. The Committee notes:  
“The confusion over the emergence of a second list of 
agents not covered under the Act is unfortunate, 
however. The Government seems to be under the 
impression that it can have one list of agents laid down 
in the Act, yet enforce another list which is beyond the 
scrutiny of Parliament. We recommend that the 
Government decide which organisms it wishes to control 
and amend the Act accordingly”
335
 
The government responds:  
“When the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 
(ATCSA) was drawn up it was decided to use the 
Australia Group List as the basis of Schedule 5. This was 
a familiar and logical starting point for this piece of UK 
counterterrorism legislation, and used in the absence of 
any other considered criteria. The Australia Group List 
primarily addressed State proliferation of chemical and 
biological weapons. A second list of agents (known 
internally as the Salisbury List) sought to identify those 
substances that were not captured by the Act but might 
be applicable in a terrorist context. The Salisbury List is 
currently not subject to enforcement under ATCSA, but a 
strengthening of protective security measures at sites 
handling substances on this List was taken forward 
effectively on a purely voluntary basis. The present 
situation in relation to the Anti-Terrorism Crime and 
Security Act is unsatisfactory and the Government is 
considering recommendations for extending the range of 
organisms that should be included in the legislation.”
336
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The Science and Technology Committee’s view on the list is echoed by a 
judicial review of the ATCSA “Some aspects of Part 7, which was subject to 
only very limited consultation, need to be urgently addressed.”337  Schedule 5 
was not amended until 2007.338  The modification of the Schedule introduces 
the Salisbury list to the Act. As a consequence of the modification “influenza 
viruses (pandemic strains)” were also added to Schedule 5.339   
In April 2002, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office published a Green 
Paper entitled “Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: 
Countering the threat from biological weapons”.340  The objective of the Green 
Paper was, inter alia, to outline the threat posed by BW to international 
security, and thus states:  
“For several years, especially in the United States, there 
has been significant public discussion of the threat 
posed by the possible terrorist use of biological agents. 
The threat is no longer theoretical. Although there have 
been previous recorded attempts of BW terrorism, the 
anthrax attacks in the United States, coming in the wake 
of the 11 September events demonstrated the inherent 
potential of such material to have massive psychological, 
political and economic/financial effects, as well causing 
illness or death, for relatively limited effort.”
341
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In June 2002, at the G8 Kananaskis Summit in Canada, the G8 launched 
the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass 
Destruction. The G8 leaders’ statement contains the following:   
“the attacks of September 11 demonstrated that 
terrorists are prepared to use any means to cause terror 
and inflict appalling casualties on innocent people. We 
commit ourselves to prevent terrorists, or those that 
harbour them, from acquiring or developing nuclear, 
chemical, radiological and biological weapons; missiles; 
and related materials, equipment and technology.”
342
  
This included six principles “to prevent terrorists, or those that harbour 
them, from gaining access to weapons or materials of mass destruction” and 
“Guidelines for New or Expanded Cooperation Projects”. The Chair’s statement 
includes the commitment “to raise up to US$ 20 billion to support such 
projects over the next ten years.”343 
On 24 September 2002, the UK Government publishes the controversial 
Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government 
dossier. This assessment builds the case for military action against Iraq, the 
dossier alleges, among other things, Iraq’s possession of biological and 
chemical weapons. The claims within the dossier turned out to be untrue, and 
thought to have been manipulated for political reasons, significantly harming 
the Government. The Butler report states unequivocally that the dossier was 
not explicitly intended to make a case for war. Butler is of the view that this 
broad document could support a range of policy options, and not intended to 
make the case for any particular course of action. The dossier does however, in 
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Butler’s view, lack important caveats and warnings which should alert the 
reader to the limitations of the assessment. Butler comes to the conclusion 
that the dossier is a fair reflection of the judgements of past Joint Intelligence 
Committee assessments, with the exception of the 45 minute claim.344  
Although the document itself does not make the case for military intervention 
it was still used as part of the justification – illustrating the threat posed – the 
document remains controversial.   
In October 2002, the House of Commons Defence Committee published a 
special report on aspects of defence and security. The report requested: “Now 
there is a real threat of a CBRN attack on a scale not previously planned for, 
the Government must provide the additional resources needed [for ambulance 
and fire crews].”345 
The Government response is revealing in terms of not only the 
investment in personal protective equipment but also the attitude to the 
threat of CBRN:  
“Additional resources have been made available for this 
purpose. DH [Department of Health] made available £5 
million for procurement of personal protective 
equipment (PPE) and training in its use, and 
decontamination units for Ambulance Trusts and major 
accident and emergency hospitals throughout the UK. 
For large-scale incidents, DH has agreed a Memorandum 
of Understanding with the Fire Service to provide a 
decontamination service. DH has also been developing 
education and training programmes to improve 
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capability of NHS staff to respond to CBRN incidents. The 
Committee will be aware that a Home Office Police 
Training Unit has been established, co-located with the 
Defence NBC Centre at Winterbourne Gunner. Personnel 
from all the emergency services attend courses at this 
centre. 
 
As part of the work to improve the UK’s resilience to a 
range of threats, including CBRN related incidents, a 
cross-government decontamination strategy is being 
prepared. One of the work streams within the strategy is 
to produce agreed high level guidance on procedures for 
decontamination. The guidance will specify the roles and 
responsibilities of the emergency services, local 
authorities and others and is intended to provide a 
common set of principles, establish common 
terminology, and a shared and agreed understanding of 
stakeholders’ roles and responsibilities. 
 
The Government does not accept that there is ‘a real 
threat of a CBRN attack on a scale not previously 
planned for’. But the Government is equally aware that 
there is always room for improvement in the state of 
preparedness and a great deal of work has already been 
undertaken to enhance the existing mechanisms. This 
work will continue.”
346
 
In December 2002 the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee 
published a report entitled The Biological Weapons Green Paper347  in response 
to a Foreign and Commonwealth Office Green Paper published in April of the 
same year.348  The FAC’s paper contains an indication of government’s position 
on the biological weapons threat:  
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“Although none of the mass casualty terrorist attacks of 
the recent past has involved biological weapons, and 
although the Government assesses that none of the 
terrorist groups threatening the United Kingdom has in 
fact succeeded in obtaining biological weapons, bio-
terrorism remains a possibility which must be addressed 
with the utmost seriousness”
349
  
The report continues with repeating an assessment from the earlier 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Green Paper:  
“the anthrax attacks which took place in the United 
States at the end of 2001 “demonstrated the inherent 
potential of such material to have massive psychological, 
political and economic/financial effects, as well as 
causing illness or death, for relatively little effort” ”
350
 
From September 2002 onwards the UK government was engaged in 
drafting the national counter-terrorism strategy which came to be known as 
CONTEST. The preparation of CONTEST was headed by Sir David Omand, the 
outgoing Permanent Secretary in the Home Office, when he became the first 
Permanent Secretary and Security Intelligence Co-ordinator in the Cabinet 
Office. The purpose of CONTEST was set in the context of 9/11 and the ensuing 
‘quick fixes’ in the UK and the realisation that an over-arching strategy was 
needed. CONTEST was launched sometime in early 2003, but made public only 
in July 2006. The strategy is law-enforcement driven, with an emphasis on 
Islamic fundamentalist ideologies, which later permuted to encompass 
concepts such as counter-radicalisation and preventing “terrorism by tackling 
its causes ... to diminish support for terrorists by influencing social and 
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economic issues.”351  The underlying logic is engendered in its four pillars, the 
four Ps – Prepare, Protect, Prevent, and Pursue. It aimed, and still aims, to 
‘join up’ the counter-terrorism approach across government departments, and 
to change the mind set between law enforcement and the intelligence 
community from competition to co-operation.352  The strategy recognises a 
long history of terrorism in the UK, but according to one senior law 
enforcement official its “greatest achievement is the recognition of a changed 
threat from the IRA – unconventional weaponry, mass-casualty and a lack of 
political motive” on behalf of the ‘terrorists’.353 
Augmenting the perception of threat 
On 5 January 2003, Police raid a flat in North Green in London.354  Police 
recovered castor beans, various solvents, crude recipes and apple and cherry 
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pips, allegedly for the production of ricin, cyanide and several other poisons. 
Initial tests were positive for ricin. The Home Secretary later explained the 
situation in the House of Commons: 
“Following the police raid on 5 January 2003, a pestle 
and mortar was found in the flat on 6 January 2003 and 
sent for analysis. An e-mail sent at 06:02 am on 7 
January 2003 from the Terrorism and Protection Unit 
(TPU) to the Home Secretary’s Office confirmed a 
notification received earlier that morning (no time, 
medium, source or recipient recorded) that the powder 
found inside the mortar was ricin – enough for one 
lethal dose.”
355
  
On 7 January 2003, in the immediate aftermath of the raid the Chief 
Medical Officer of the Department of Health, Pat Troop, circulated a letter 
nationally to health professionals, stating that:  
“A quantity of material and items of equipment were 
found at a residential premises [sic] in Wood Green, 
North London where one of the men was arrested. This 
material has been analysed at the Defence Science and 
Technology Laboratories at Porton Down. A small 
amount of the material recovered from the Wood Green 
premises has tested positive for the presence of ricin 
poison.”
356
  
Following this letter, Troop issued a joint statement with Metropolitan 
Police Assistant Commissioner David Veness repeating the announcement.357  
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Prime Minister Blair, on the day following the arrests, said that the threat of 
international terrorism is “present and real and with us now – and its potential 
is huge” and explicitly references the ricin plot.358  The ensuing weeks after the 
raid saw a total of 29 people arrested in connection with the ricin plot, 8 of 
whom were charged. In September 2004 five stand trial, only Kamal Bourgass 
is convicted of “conspiracy to cause a public nuisance by the use of poisons 
and/or explosives to cause disruption, fear or injury”.359  During the trial it 
transpired that the initial test during the raid was a false positive. After the 
trial, in September 2004, Duncan Campbell, an expert witness for the defence, 
wrote an account of the trial in the Guardian:  
“It is true that when the team from Porton Down 
entered the Wood Green flat in January 2003, their field 
equipment registered the presence of ricin. […] A few 
days later in the lab, Dr Martin Pearce, head of the 
Biological Weapons Identification Group, found that 
there was no ricin. But when this result was passed to 
London, the message reportedly said the opposite […]”
360
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In the House of Commons, 7 June 2005, the Solicitor-General is asked 
why the Crown Prosecution Service withdrew charges against Bourgass and the 
other defendants of conspiring to make chemical and biological weapons and 
substituted conspiracy to cause a public nuisance. The Solicitor-General 
replied:  
“I am advised that the initial charges of conspiracy to 
manufacture chemical weapons were based upon 
preliminary indications that traces of ricin were present 
on articles recovered during searches made of premises 
occupied by Mr Kamel Bourgass and others. However, it 
was later confirmed by scientists from Porton Down that 
the articles did not contain such traces. In any event, 
upon a full review of the case papers it was concluded 
that other offences properly reflected the totality of the 
alleged offending behaviour. Charges of conspiracy to 
murder and to cause a public nuisance were therefore 
substituted.”
361
  
On 27 June 2005, in the House of Commons, Home Secretary Charles 
Clarke was asked about the statements made about finding ricin in north 
London. He replied:  
“An initial test conducted by Dstl Porton Down on 6 
January 2003 on an exhibit taken by police from the flat 
occupied by Kamal Bourgass gave an apparent positive 
result for ricin. However, confirmatory tests which were 
conducted throughout the period from 7 January 2003 to 
28 January 2003 failed to detect the presence of ricin 
[…]  
 
The Prosecuting Counsel (Mr. Sweeney QC), Crown 
Prosecution Service, was verbally informed of the ricin 
test result at a case conference on 20 March, 2003 by 
Dstl. The Metropolitan Police Anti-Terrorist Branch was 
also represented at the meeting where the information 
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was provided. The result was also provided in a written 
statement which was made available to the Crown 
Prosecution Service and the metropolitan police at that 
time. 
 
We do not have a record of the date this information 
was passed from the police to the Home Office and 
subsequently to Ministers.”
362
  
A Ministry of Defence spokesperson said that the delay in relaying the 
information was caused by “a breakdown in communications” between Porton 
Down and the Home Office.363  This breakdown in communications and 
subsequent delay created the persistent image of a UK poison cell, with far 
reaching, international consequences. Three weeks after the raid, 2 February 
2003, US Secretary of State Colin Powell refers to the “Ricin Plot” in a speech 
to the UN Security Council, whilst building the case for military action against 
Iraq.364  A day after Powell’s UN address, addressing parliament, Blair stated 
that in the context of Iraq:  
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“Over the past few weeks, we have seen powerful 
evidence of the continuing terrorist threat: the 
suspected ricin plot in London and Manchester; al-Qaeda 
experiments in Afghanistan to develop chemical, 
biological and radiological weapons; the arrests of those 
linked to al-Qaeda in Spain and France; and further 
arrests just a few days ago in Italy.  
 
What is more, many of these arrests show the terrorist 
groups actively seeking to use chemical or biological 
means to cause as much death and injury and suffering 
as they can. We know too from 11 September that these 
terrorists have no demands that could ever be 
negotiated upon, no constraint in terms of finance and 
numbers to carry out terrorist acts, and no compunction 
in taking human life.”
365
  
The way the plot was initially perceived, and the way it slotted into the 
threat narrative “not if but when” may have augmented that position. Later 
correction of the information changed little, as the persistence of the “ricin 
plot” shows.366  Furthermore, despite the delusion of grandeur, small scale and 
                                                                                                                                                           
Italy]”. Four of his 45 slides featured the “UK Poison Cell”. Iraq was invaded on 20 March 
2003. Most of Powell’s statements, amongst these are the mobile biological weapons 
labs and the UK ricin plot, have now been discredited and Powell himself has stated that 
he regretted making the speech. Powell, C. (2003) Transcript of presentation to UN 
Security Council, 5 Feb 2003.  US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, 5 
February 2003, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov; and Weisman, S. R. (2005) 
Powell Calls His U.N. Speech a Lasting Blot on His Record The New York Times 9 
September 2005. 
365
 Blair, T. (2003) Iraq. 3 February, vol. 399, part 340, col. 22-3: Hansard (Commons). Blair 
mentions “the suspected ricin plot in London and Manchester” – some of the suspects 
were arrested in Manchester after the raid in North London. During the arrest in 
Manchester a tussle between police and suspects results in the fatal stabbing of PC 
Stephen Oakes by Bourgass. 
366
 For example: On 13 April 2005, following the court trial of the plotters, and two and a 
quarter years after the raid, Deputy Assistant Commissioner Peter Clarke, head of the 
Metropolitan Police Anti-Terrorist Branch said that “It would be hard to underestimate 
the fear and disruption this plot could have caused across the country. The public have 
been spared from a real and deadly threat.” Metropolitan Police Service News Bulletin 
(2005) Man convicted of plotting to manufacture homemade poisons and explosives. 13 
April 2005. And, in January 2007, more than four years after the raid in North London, 
during a Westminster Hall Debate Conservative MP Greg Hands, talking about 
radicalisation, admissibility of intercept evidence and radical cleric Abu Hamza, 
continued… 
148 
primitive nature of the plotter’s operation, there was an interest in and intent 
to use unconventional weapons. This intent, aspirational rather than 
operational, does not equate capability but has kept this story alive.  
On 17 June 2003, more than four months after the identification of the 
false positive sample, the head of MI5, Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, says 
the following:  
“we are faced with the realistic possibility of some form 
of unconventional attack. That could include a chemical, 
biological, radiological or nuclear attack. Sadly, given the 
widespread proliferation of the technical knowledge to 
construct these weapons, it will be only a matter of time 
before a crude version of a CBRN attack is launched at a 
major Western city.  
 
The discovery of traces of ricin in the UK demonstrates 
that interest in unconventional weapons. But before we 
become unduly alarmist it would be worth noting that 
the bomb and the suicide bomber remain the most 
effective tool in the terrorist arsenal.”
367
  
2003 was a significant and turbulent year for all things WMD and events 
relating to, and impacting upon, bioterrorism policy in the UK. “Ricin plots” in 
London and Paris (findings of “ricin” in Paris at Gare de Lyon in March 2003 
were linked to al Qaeda, Chechen rebels and Iraq. The find turned out to be 
ground barley and wheat);368  the US led invasion, and subsequent regime 
change, in Iraq justified by claims that Iraq operated a WMD programme and 
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the possibility that Iraq may be supplying terrorists with CB material;369  the 
announcement of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) by US President 
Bush in May to stem the flow of WMD material in response to the inability, 
under international law, to interdict a North Korean shipment of missiles to 
the Yemen, but which is more widely framed as a global effort to stop 
trafficking of WMD related materials to and from states and non-state actors 
of proliferation concern;370  and Libya’s decision to rollback and renounce its 
weapons of mass destruction programme.371  
The House of Commons Science and Technology Select Committee 
published a report in November 2003 entitled The Scientific Response to 
Terrorism.372  The committee set the following remit for the inquiry:  
“to determine how science and technology can be 
harnessed to develop countermeasures to chemical, 
biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) devices 
employed by terrorists, how science and technology is 
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informing the response to terrorism and what measures 
are required to discourage the use of science and 
technology to develop such weapons.”
373
  
The evidence gathered in six sessions covered: medical and health 
response; government research; research security and conduct of scientists; 
protection of food and water supplies, fire service response; and the response 
of the Home Office and the Department of Health.  
The evidence gathering sessions of the committee led to sharp exchanges 
between the S&T Committee and the Government over access and approaches. 
The committee said that:  
“The Home Secretary has been unnecessarily sensitive 
about this inquiry. It is perplexing and disappointing that 
he took steps, belatedly, to prevent us hearing from 
certain witnesses from his department and that he 
apparently sought to instil this uncooperative attitude in 
other Departments”
374
 
The committee’s sharp tones led to the government rejecting a number 
of the recommendations outright. Responding to the S&T Committee report 
Home Office Minister Beverley Hughes said: 
“The Government and the Home Secretary have a duty 
to protect secret material, a duty we take very seriously. 
We reject entirely the suggestion that the Government is 
being less open than it need be or that fear of alarming 
the public is putting a brake on improving protection. 
During the inquiry, a disagreement developed between 
several Government departments and the STC on the 
remit of this investigation and the access that the 
Committee should be given to sensitive material […] an 
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agreement was reached that the Committee would avoid 
straying beyond its remit in future […] We remain of our 
view that the STC is not the appropriate select 
committee to take on a broad scrutiny role when it 
comes to access to top secret material.”
375
 
During 2004 two prominent reports were published – the Hutton Report 
and the Butler Report, both investigate different aspects of the circumstances 
and evidence which led to the invasion of Iraq in 2003.376  What emerged from 
these inquiries, as well as the Chilcot Inquiry377, is that the war in Iraq was 
motivated by a number of factors: (i) a perceived threat from WMD, including 
biological weapons, (ii) a claimed potential propensity of the Iraqi regime to 
pass these weapons onto non-state actors, (iii) continuous defiance of the UN 
Security Council resolutions, and by extension of the international community. 
The threat of “weapons of mass destruction” and biological weapons in 
particular, as well as, to a certain extent, the potential transfer of weapon 
systems to terrorists, feature prominently in the justifications for military 
action against Iraq. Despite this apparent overlap with the subject under 
investigation here, there are incisive differences, the most notable being that 
the military intervention is a matter of foreign policy, on which grounds an in 
depth discussion of the military action against Iraq has been excluded here. 
However, the inquiries, the Butler report in particular, shed some light on the 
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inner workings of the intelligence machinery and other aspects pertinent to 
this discussion, as noted in various parts of this dissertation.  
The Butler report criticised the reliability of the intelligence used for 
making a case for the military action, including the ‘high proportion’ of human 
intelligence sources, weaknesses in the way MI6 carried out its checks on 
sources, and third hand reporting of information about Iraqi chemical and 
biological weapons. The report concluded that the decision to go to war was 
not so much intelligence led but a shift in the policy following 11th September 
2001, rather than the pace of Iraq’s weapons programmes. The report further 
states that:  
“in translating material from JIC assessments into the 
dossier, warnings were lost about the limited 
intelligence base on which some aspects of these 
assessments were being made [...] judgements in the 
dossier went to (although not beyond) the outer limits 
of the intelligence available”
378
 
It should be noted that the removal of cautionary language, which 
indicated the limitations of the provided analysis, may yield a different 
representation of a threat. However, the Butler inquiry found “that the 
original intelligence material was correctly reported in JIC assessments”, with 
the exception of the 45 minute claim and  
“that the reliability of the original intelligence reports 
was fairly represented by the use of accompanying 
qualifications [and found] no evidence of deliberate 
distortion or of culpable negligence […] in general that 
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the intelligence community made good use of the 
technical expertise available to the Government”
379
 
However, Butler also took exception at the informal style of decision 
making process, especially for decisions on “vital matters of war and peace”: 
the inquiry committee stated that it was:  
“concerned that the informality and circumscribed 
character of the Government’s procedures which we 
[the inquiry] saw in the context of policy-making 
towards Iraq risks reducing the scope for informed 
collective political judgement. Such risks are particularly 
significant in a field like the subject of our Review, 
where hard facts are inherently difficult to come by and 
the quality of judgement is accordingly all the more 
important.”
380
 
The width and breadth of both inquiries into the use of intelligence, 
technical and scientific expertise and the workings of the government in terms 
of threat assessment make these inquiries significant documents. It is however 
unclear how much of the insight into these processes are generalizable to 
other areas of government, policy, procedures and intelligence – away from 
the peculiarities of the decision to go to war with Iraq in 2003, and in 
particular the difference between a foreign policy process and a domestic 
counter-terrorism policy process. 
On 28th April 2004 the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 
1540.381  The resolution focuses on non-state actors as “sources of threat and 
as sources of technological capabilities”.382  The resolution obliges states to:  
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“adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which 
prohibit any non-state actor to manufacture, acquire, 
possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, 
chemical or biological weapons and their means of 
delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes”
383
 
The resolution defines a non-State actor as an “individual or entity, not 
acting under the lawful authority of any State in conducting activities which 
come within the scope of this resolution.”384  The resolution imposes binding 
obligations on all states.   
On 24 February 2004 CIA Director George Tenet presented the annual 
threat assessment to Congress. In his testimony before the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence he stated:  
“I have consistently warned this committee of al-Qaida’s 
interest in chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear 
weapons.  Acquiring these remains a ‘religious 
obligation’ in Bin Ladin’s eyes, and al-Qaida and more 
than two dozen other terrorist groups are pursuing CBRN 
materials. We particularly see a heightened risk of 
poison attacks. Contemplated delivery methods to date 
have been simple but this may change as non-al-Qaida 
groups share information on more sophisticated 
methods and tactics. Over the last year, we’ve also seen 
an increase in the threat of more sophisticated CBRN.  
For this reason we take very seriously the threat of a 
CBRN attack. Extremists have widely disseminated 
assembly instructions for an improvised chemical 
weapon using common materials that could cause a 
large numbers of casualties in a crowded, enclosed area. 
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Although gaps in our understanding remain, we see al-
Qaida program to produce anthrax as one of the most 
immediate terrorist CBRN threats we are likely to face. 
Al-Qaida continues to pursue its strategic goal of 
obtaining a nuclear capability.  It remains interested in 
dirty bombs. Terrorist documents contain accurate views 
of how such weapons would be used.”
385
 
On 11th March 2004 ten bombs exploded on four commuter trains in a co-
ordinated attack in Madrid. 191 were killed, 1800 injured. This is the first large 
scale terrorist attack since the 11th September 2001.386  
Nineteen days later, on 30 March 2004, with heightened awareness of 
terrorism following the Madrid bombing seven men were arrested in West 
Sussex as part of Operation Crevice. Alleged to have plotted attacks on the 
Bluewater shopping centre in Kent and the Ministry of Sound nightclub in 
London they had sourced more than 600kg of ammonium nitrate fertilizer, the 
plot is thus known as the “Fertilizer bomb plot”. Five of the seven were 
convicted of terrorism offences in April 2007.387   
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On the 22nd April 2004 Members of Parliament debated security 
measures in the House of Commons, mainly the permanent installation of a 
security screen between the chamber and the visitors’ gallery in the House of 
Commons. A temporary screen had been installed a few weeks before the 
debate following advice given by MI5. This remarkable debate reveals a 
number of interesting perceptions about terrorism and biological weapons in 
parliament, although there are dissenting voices from the prevailing view. 
During the debate the Leader of the House, Peter Hain explained that the 
threat had evolved: 
“In 1970, a CS gas canister was thrown into the 
Chamber, requiring evacuation. We have moved on, as I 
will explain shortly, to a different level of terrorist 
threat, which is not necessarily as visible as a CS gas 
canister.”
388
 
Hain said that the decision to install a temporary screen was based on 
“clear intelligence” from the Director-General of the Security Service who:  
“made an unequivocal recommendation that the screen 
be installed […] based on an analysis of the threat 
vulnerability and the impact of possible chemical or 
biological attack in the Strangers Gallery. In recent years 
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there have been several indicators that al-Qaeda and 
associated networks have shown the intent and 
capability to mount attacks using toxic chemical and 
biological materials. Using such materials in confined 
spaces is a good way of maximising impact. […] 
 
If an al-Qaeda group managed to throw a phial of 
anthrax or ricin into the Chamber or, even worse, if a 
suicide agent released the substance without anybody 
noticing – we have been advised that that is quite 
feasible – the particles would immediately begin 
spreading throughout the Chamber. Because of the way 
in which air flows work, total contamination could occur 
within minutes.”
389
  
The Shadow Commons Leader Oliver Heald added to the debate: 
“let us bear in mind the fact that we were able to cross-
examine the head of the Security Service at great length 
about these issues, as were many senior colleagues in 
this place. She convinced me that there was a very 
serious threat, and many colleagues reached the same 
view.”
390
  
Conservative MP Angela Browning showed a make up item from her 
handbag, assured the House that it would not have been removed by even the 
most stringent security screening and added: 
“it could contain anything sufficient to kill everybody in 
this Chamber and in the Galleries […] it is its [the 
house’s] duty to listen to the expert advice that it is 
given and to implement it.”
391
 
Labour MP Stuart Bell sees the need for protection from “worldwide” 
terrorist attacks: 
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“I could bring a map before you […] which shows 
terrorism with its global reach in all the countries of the 
world […] These terrorists are no respecters of persons. 
To attack and destroy this House would be a major gain 
for them and a massive blow to our democracy and to 
democracies around the world […] We are talking about 
the threat of an imminent and serious attack”
392
 
There were, however, also dissenting voices, for example Labour MP 
Colin Challen challenged Bell if he envisaged “that this siege-like situation will 
continue in perpetuity” and that it might “have been more appropriate for [the 
House] to consider these measures after the sarin gas attacks on the 
underground in Japan”. Labour MP Kate Hoey calls the screen a “pathetic 
knee-jerk reaction, which simply plays into the hands of terrorists.”393  
Following the debate, the House voted in favour of the installation of a 
permanent screen, with 112 ayes to 76 noes.394  The screen was fitted in 
summer 2005 at a cost of £1.3 million. A month after the installation of the 
screen two protesters from ‘Fathers 4 Justice’ threw condoms filled with self-
raising flour, stained with purple dye into the Chamber, hitting the Prime 
Minister with one of the missiles.395  
In November 2004, the Director General of the Security Service, Dame 
Eliza Manningham-Buller gave a speech to the business community re-stating 
that:  
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“There is a serious and sustained threat of terrorist 
attacks against UK interests at home and abroad, 
including against the business community. There might 
be major attacks like Madrid earlier this year. They 
might be on a smaller scale. The terrorists are inventive, 
adaptable and patient; their planning includes a wide 
range of methods to attack us […] the threat is current 
and real; it affects us all and you, supported by us, have 
a key role to play.”
396
 
The Home Office stated that between 2003 and the end of 2004 six large-
scale live exercises and 32 tabletop exercises were held within the Home 
Office national counter-terrorism exercise programme.397 
In early 2005, between February and March the Prevention of Terrorism 
Bill was rushed through parliament and given royal assent after just eighteen 
days.398  In March Interpol held its first conference on bioterrorism, attended 
by more than 500 delegates from 155 countries, the conference aimed to 
improve co-operation between law enforcement agencies. To this end Interpol 
created a dedicated unit, created in June 2004, and programme on 
bioterrorism, which was launched at the conference.399  In the conference’s 
opening address, Secretary General Ronald K. Noble said:  
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“there is no criminal threat with greater potential 
danger to all countries, regions and people in the world 
than the threat of bio-terrorism [...] What is the source 
of this threat? Highly motivated terrorists such as Al 
Qaeda, or groups that are like Al Qaeda or inspired by Al 
Qaeda [...] [Al Qaeda’s] public spokesperson has stated 
that it has the right to kill four million people using 
biological or chemical weapons. Al Qaeda has posted on 
its website instructions on how to make chemical 
weapons and biological weapons. Police and intelligence 
services in the UK have disrupted terrorist plots to use 
ricin as a biological weapon.”
400
 
 
In April 2005 the Home Office took part in a counter-terrorism exercise – 
Atlantic Blue – together with the US and Canada, where the exercise was 
known as TopOff 3 and Triple Play, respectively. This command post exercises 
– involving the creation of a real incident control room to co-ordinate 
responses, but does not involve live action on the ground, simulated two 
terrorist attacks: the release of a biological agent and the collapse of a five 
storey building in the US attended by officials from both the UK and Canada, 
and involves 275 government and private organizations, and more than 10,000 
people.401 
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London bombings 
On 6th July 2005, 24 hours before four bombs detonated in London, Dame 
Eliza Manningham-Buller, Director-General of the Security Service assured 
senior Labour MPs at a private meeting at the House of Commons there was 
“no imminent terrorist threat to London or the rest of the country”.402  During 
an interview on the BBC’s Today Programme on 7th July Sir Ian Blair, 
Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service, said, in response to a 
question about the likelihood of terrorist attacks in London: “It is difficult to 
calculate whether it is inevitable that [terrorists] will get through”403.  Hewitt 
claims that: “in making these comments, the heads of two domestic security 
agencies reflected a wider institutional belief that the threat of terrorism has 
subsided by the summer of 2005.”404   
Later that morning, on 7th July 2005, four home made explosive devices 
were detonated in a co-ordinated suicide attack on the public transport system 
during rush hour. Three bombs detonated at 8.50am in different locations on 
the London Underground system, and another, one an hour later, at 9.45, in a 
bus on Tavistock Square. Fifty-six people (including the bombers) were killed, 
more than 700 people injured.405   The attacks ensured that counter-terrorism 
remained a policy priority.  
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A report by the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) into the attacks 
acknowledged with hindsight that the response prior to the attacks was too 
slow and that: 
“better appreciation of the speed and scale with which 
the threat against the UK could develop might have led 
the [Security] Services to achieve a step change in 
capacity earlier despite the risks involved in rapid 
expansion. The story of what was known about the 7 July 
group prior to July indicates that if more resources had 
been in place sooner the chances of preventing the July 
attacks could have increased.”
406
  
The lowering of the threat level prior to the attacks caused a rethink of 
the threat level system to develop a clearer and more useful threat system 
which enables better “risk-based decisions” with more transparency to better 
inform the public. The ISC’s report into the attacks states: 
“The reduction is unlikely to have altered the alertness 
of responders (including the emergency services) or to 
have affected the chances of preventing the 7 July 
attacks. However, we question the usefulness of a 
system in which changes can be made to threat levels 
with little or no practical effect”
407
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The ISC further urges acknowledgement of the “limits of the intelligence 
on the threat” to “avoid the oversimplification of the UK threat picture and the 
potential for giving inappropriate reassurance about the threat.”408 
4.2 Pandemic Influenza Case Study 
“people have long since ceased to regard influenza as a 
joke; and the [medical] profession is coming to realise 
that it ranks among the more serious maladies with 
which we have to deal” G.E. Crawford, 27 January 
1900
409
  
The pandemic flu case study requires a similar approach to that used in 
the case of bioterrorism. The bounding in time follows roughly that of the 
bioterrorism case study – focussing on the time between 1990 and 2005. The 
starting point is, as is the case with bioterrorism, not hard and fast. Neither of 
the two case studies can have a well defined starting point because of the 
importance of historical linkages, institutional knowledge and memory, and 
the path dependencies of responses; nor can the case studies be 
comprehensive historical accounts. Rather than attempting to present 
comprehensive historical account the following discussion charts the peaks 
and troughs of the policy agenda in the UK.  
Pandemics are, by definition, international events, here only the 
domestic response is considered. Technical aspects of the response to 
pandemic influenza is dominated and largely governed by international actors, 
first and foremost, the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and 
Agricultural Organization (FAO), and the Organisation International des 
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Epizooties (OIE) who advise states on response and preparedness. However, 
health security is a national prerogative and policy and responses vary 
between countries. China’s repeated reluctance to share outbreak 
information, and Indonesia’s and other countries’ claims to ‘viral sovereignty’ 
are just two examples of how different conceptions, responses and political 
value judgements influence national responses.410  The case study focuses on 
the policy response and the assessment process within the UK government in 
response to the risk of pandemic influenza. Risk is the key word here, as the 
case study considers public health preparations in terms of policy and 
institutional arrangement for the next pandemic. Responses to animal health 
are excluded here, although the likely zoonotic origin of pandemic influenza 
means that the human health responses are necessarily intertwined with 
veterinarian responses. No particular emphasis is placed on, or attention paid 
to, policy responses to pandemic influenza as a disease in animals, unless it 
impinges directly on human health responses. The culling of millions of fowl in 
Hong Kong in 1997 is an example of this, a veterinarian response to a potential 
public health problem. Another reason for not including animal health, which 
is in many ways central to the avian influenza story, is that the responses 
differ considerably. Although part of the picture and important to deal with, 
for example, animal reservoirs or wet markets, counter-measures differ 
considerably: 
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“birds can be culled, movements can be restricted and 
treatment enforced, whereas for humans draconian 
interventions are all a bit more difficult”
411
 
Pandemic Influenza as a Policy Issue in the UK 
The pandemic influenza threat is, to a certain extent a known quantity – 
here, at least, the aphorism “not if but when” holds true.412  Influenza 
pandemics are cyclical, recurring periodically, every ten to forty years. But a 
quantitative estimate of the probability of a pandemic, or of any particular 
influenza virus causing a pandemic can not be made.413  Seasonal flu, on the 
other hand, is quite predictable. Seasonal influenza strains infect ten to fifteen 
percent of the UK population and cause around twelve thousand annual 
fatalities, mainly in the risk groups – that is the elderly, young and already 
immunocompromised.414   
In March 1997 the Department of Health issued a document entitled: 
“Multiphase contingency Plan for Pandemic Influenza”.415  Referencing the 
pandemics of 1918, 1957 and 1968, the document anticipates the Far East as a 
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possible source of an influenza pandemic which may be caused by an unknown 
strain, which may spread more rapidly than the 1968 pandemic because of 
increased international movement of people, including more trade and tourism 
with China (assuming a Far Eastern origin). The estimated incidence of illness, 
as suggested by the WHO, was given as 25%, with a worst case scenario with 
100% of the population infected. The contingency plan considers the effects on 
hospital admissions, absenteeism including health care workers, and effects on 
schools by looking at the impacts of pandemics in 1957 and 1968. The 
objectives of the contingency plan were set out thus: 
to reduce the morbidity and mortality from influenza 
illness (immunisation, esp. priority groups as identified; 
anti viral drugs; pneumococcal vaccine; social 
interventions to slow spread) 
to be able to cope with large numbers of people ill, at 
home and in hospital, and dying (support for primary 
care by mobilising, conserving and reinforcing 
manpower; delay or suspension of non-urgent secondary 
care; triage; securing of drugs and equipment; plans for 
mortuary arrangements) 
to ensure that essential services are maintained (coping 
with absentees; etc) 
to provide timely, authoritative and up to date 
information for professionals, the public and the media 
at all stages (national and local level; telephone 
helplines; distribution of literature to public; avoiding 
unnecessary media scares)
416
 
 
The evidence-base used for the 1997 contingency plan is not available 
publically, and underlying assumptions are only tangentially mentioned in the 
text. However, the contents of the plan are public.417  The six-part plan is 
outlined in the document as follows: Phase 0: inter-pandemic period - 
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watchful waiting. Phase 1: emergence of a new virus outside Britain. Actions 
include establishing an advisory committee and preparing strains for possible 
vaccine manufacture. Phase 2: outbreaks caused by the new virus outside 
Britain. Intensified monitoring of flu-like illnesses, vaccines ordered from 
manufacturers. Phase 3: new virus identified in Britain; pandemic imminent. 
Health authority and hospital plans to deal with patients activated, non-
emergency admissions limited to keep beds clear, advice to public issued. 
Phase 4: pandemic flu in Britain. Plans to immunise and treat in full gear, 
pattern of epidemic followed, bacteria responsible for fatal infections as a 
result of flu identified and appropriate antibiotics selected, weekly death rates 
monitored. Phase 5: end of pandemic. Flu cases return to background levels, 
advisory committee reports on epidemic and lessons learnt, as do health 
authorities and trusts. 
At the time of the emergence of H5N1 the UK was one of the few 
countries to have a national response plan in place and the plan was widely 
seen as a model to follow.418 
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza – Hong Kong 1997 
Concerns over an impending influenza pandemic were raised two months 
after the publication of the contingency plan for pandemic influenza in May 
1997 following the death of a three year old in Hong Kong due to a novel 
influenza virus strain – influenza A H5N1, previously only found in birds.419  The 
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boy’s fatality satisfied two of the three conditions set out in the Department of 
Health contingency plan to suggest that a pandemic is imminent – the 
emergence of a novel virus strain (with a marked antigenic shift); a high 
proportion of susceptible people in the population; and evidence that the 
novel virus strain is readily transmissible and can cause human disease.  
In August 1997 Alan Hay, of the National Institute of Medical Research, 
which monitors flu strains for the World Health Organisation in London, said: 
“It is extremely unusual and has been of some concern to us”420 … “Our 
concern was whether it was a one-off or representative of something more 
sinister. We were worried”421. However during the weeks following the boy’s 
death no new cases emerged, ameliorating fears over an imminent outbreak. 
In October 1997 a PHLS spokesman said about the emergence of H5N1 in Hong 
Kong: “We do not consider this a threat to any communities, especially in the 
West.”422  
In November 1997 three more cases were confirmed, one of these was 
the second fatality in this outbreak; in December a further three infections 
were identified.423  This prompted the Chief Medical Officer (CMO) to initiate 
phase 1 of the UK’s pandemic influenza contingency plan’s plan. A meeting of 
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the UK Health Departments’ Influenza Advisory Committee resulted in 
informing all doctors and laboratories of the situation through the CMO, 
including leads to obtain further information, but no further precautions were 
advised.424   
Over the course of the month, infections in Hong Kong rose to a total of 
18, including a total of six fatalities, prompting the Chinese government to 
respond with the culling of Hong Kong’s poultry population, 1.2 million 
chickens and 400,000 other birds, which appeared to stop further outbreaks.425  
2003 - H5N1 returns 
Following an apparent successful containment of avian influenza in 1997 
H5N1 re-emerged in China in February 2003, for the first time since the 1997 
Hong Kong outbreak when it killed six of the eighteen infected.426  Two human 
cases of avian influenza H5N1 infection (one fatal) were confirmed in a Hong 
Kong family, another family member died of severe respiratory disease while 
in mainland China, but no samples were taken, and the cause remains 
unidentified. In November 2003, the G7 Ministerial Forum of the Global Health 
Security Initiative (GHSI) met in Berlin. GHSI was established in the aftermath 
of 11 September 2001 and tasked with health preparedness for CBRN terrorism 
related issues. At the meeting the GHSI widened its remit to include pandemic 
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influenza as a health security issue and agreed to the establishment of the 
Technical Working Group on Pandemic Influenza Preparedness.427   
Throughout 2003 and continuing into 2004 human avian influenza 
infections were confirmed in China, Thailand, and Vietnam. 46 Human cases 
were reported, resulting in 32 fatalities. The following year human cases were 
reported in Cambodia and Indonesia, 98 cases with a total of 43 fatalities.428  In 
2005, H5N1 was endemic in bird populations, causing wide spread and re-
occurring outbreaks and rising numbers of human cases in South East Asia 
were widely reported in the media. The Guardian newspaper, for example, 
reported on contingency plans being re-drafted to include inflatable 
mortuaries, quarantine facilities and the evacuation of big cities, and it cited a 
senior unidentified government source as stating that:  
“People think terrorist attacks are the most serious 
threat to us but influenza is currently regarded as the 
most likely. Our statisticians say an epidemic is overdue. 
Some of the details are graphic […] we started this with 
Sars in 2003 [...] The real plan is to prevent this getting 
into the country through border controls. That’s 
absolutely critical”
429
 
As reported, the UK Government re-drafted and elaborated on its 
contingency plan and institutional response in response to lessons learned 
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from SARS, and as part of obligation under the International Health 
Regulations (IHR), with the guidance of the WHO.430  
The influenza framework 
In March 2005, the Department of Health published a series of 
documents. The revised Influenza Contingency Plan and an explanatory guide 
on pandemic influenza. The accompanying press release stated:431   
“the Department of Health is to procure 14.6 million 
courses of oseltamivir (Tamiflu), an antiviral drug, as 
part of the UK’s preparedness for an influenza pandemic. 
The move came as Sir Liam Donaldson, the Chief Medical 
Officer, published the Government’s Pandemic Influenza 
Contingency Plan, setting out the steps being taken to 
prepare for a flu pandemic.”
432
 
                                                     
430
 The WHO maintained the Influenza Surveillance Network since 1948 to further 
understanding of influenza epidemiology and annually update vaccine formulations. 
WHO started a consultation on global priorities in influenza surveillance and control in 
July 2001 to raise awareness of the economic and public health significance, which led to 
the adoption of the “Global Agenda on influenza surveillance and control” by consensus 
at a meeting in Geneva in May 2002. Details on the development process as well as the 
Global Agenda can be found in: Stöhr, K. (2003) The global agenda on influenza 
surveillance and control. Vaccine, 21(16), 1744-8 
431
 Department of Health - Chief Medical Officer (2005) Pandemic Flu: UK influenza pandemic 
contingency plan. London: Department of Health, 1 March 2005; & Department of Health 
- Chief Medical Officer (2005) Explaining pandemic flu: A guide from the Chief Medical 
Officer. London: Department of Health, 25 March 2005. Both these documents were 
superseded by further revisions published October 2005 which took into account the 
rapidly evolving international (e.g. IHR, the updating of WHO pandemic phases) and 
regional context (e.g. ECDC), revised modelling, and other comments received by the 
secretariat. UKNIPC (2005) Meeting Minutes of the UK National Influenza Pandemic 
Committee. Department of Health, 18 July 2005 
432
 Department of Health (2005) Press Release: Improving preparedness for possible flu 
pandemic. 1 March 2005 
172 
In July 2005 the Department of Health invited manufactures to tender for 
contracts to supply two million doses of H5N1 vaccine as part of assembling a 
strategic stockpile. Health Secretary Patricia Hewitt explained the decision: 
“it would be prudent to purchase a limited quantity of 
H5N1 vaccine which could be used to help protect those 
that need it most, such as NHS workers […] alongside the 
purchase of 14.6 million doses of antivirals and the other 
public health measures we have in place, will help 
ensure that the UK continues to be at the forefront of 
international preparedness for a possible flu 
pandemic”
433
 
This invitation to tender for H5N1 vaccine contracts was followed two 
months later with the publication of the UK operational framework for 
stockpiling, distributing and using antiviral medicines in the event of pandemic 
influenza, stimulated, at least in part, by recommendations made in a House of 
Lords Science & Technology Select Committee report from 2003. The report 
urged the Government to:  
“develop and publish a strategy to ensure that there is 
secure access to supplies of vaccines in the face of 
national outbreaks of infectious disease […] given that 
there is little vaccine production capability in the United 
Kingdom”
434
 
The decision to stockpile only one type of antiviral was questioned and 
drew criticism from the Royal Society and Academy of Medical Sciences, 
because of concerns over possible resistance and transparency in the sourcing 
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of scientific advice. It was not certain how effective, if at all, this “pre-
pandemic” vaccine would be.435 
In October 2005, following consultations, input from the advisory bodies 
and testing of the March 2005 contingency plan the Chief Medical Officer, 
launched an updated version of the national contingency plan436, stating: 
“We can’t prevent a flu pandemic, but we can reduce its 
impact. We are constantly reviewing and improving our 
pandemic plans. […] Planning to combat pandemic flu is 
our number one priority. We regard pandemic flu as 
public health enemy number one and we are on the 
march against it.”
437
 
The new influenza plan was brought in line with updated WHO pandemic 
phases, otherwise the document did not substantially change although most of 
the wording was re-drafted to aid clarity. The new influenza contingency plan 
was accompanied by guidance documents for professional users and 
explanatory documents for a more general reader.438    
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At the time of the publication of the new influenza plan, the Chief 
Medical Officer invited manufacturers to tender for pandemic influenza 
vaccine contracts to produce 120 million doses of pandemic flu vaccine once 
the pandemic strain is known.439   
The first appearance of highly pathogenic H5N1 in the UK was reported in 
imported parrots four days after the publication of the updated contingency 
plans in October 2005. The animals died three days prior and were held in 
quarantine.440  The spread via migratory routes as well as imported birds was a 
concern at the time – the European Union imposed a ban on imported captive 
live birds in October. DEFRA and the Department of Health considered the 
vaccination of poultry workers with seasonal influenza vaccine to reduce the 
potential for reassortment of the viruses.441   
By late 2005, with avian influenza rapidly spreading to Eastern Europe 
and Turkey in wild and domestic birds, increasing human fatalities in the Far 
East, frequent and repeated reports of a possible pandemic human influenza in 
the media and its potential impacts led to heightened public awareness of 
avian influenza. Press reports of alleged delays and shortages in seasonal 
influenza vaccine supply prompted the Department of Health to instigate an 
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independent investigation into the arrangements for the seasonal influenza 
programme.442  
Despite a delay in supply, sufficient seasonal influenza vaccine was 
available to “match or exceed usual attainment levels”.443  The panel reviewing 
the arrangements for the seasonal influenza programme concluded that a 
number of factors were responsible for perceived shortages, among them local 
variation in supply and availability being misconstrued as a general shortage.444  
In November 2005, the Global Health Security Initiative (GHSI) met in 
Rome to agree actions to ensure a co-ordinated global response to health 
security issues, and to discuss the international response to deliberate actions, 
such as terrorism, and naturally occurring threats to global health, such as 
pandemic influenza. The GHSI has, from its inception, drifted further towards 
generic health care problems. Its initial focus was on bioterrorism, as well as 
chemical, radiological, and nuclear threats but by late 2005 the remit 
expanded to include natural as well as unnatural outbreaks of disease. 
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  The following month, in December, under the chairmanship of the UK 
the EU Health Council of Health Ministers met to discuss human health aspects 
of pandemic flu and to develop thinking on how the member states can work 
together to prepare for a pandemic following the EU-wide exercise Common 
Ground involving all 25 member countries, run by the HPA. The policy 
discussion on the human health aspects of pandemic flu focused on areas of 
EU co-operation in risk communication, the issue of increasing production 
capacity for both anti-viral drugs and vaccines and that the first and most vital 
step is the completion of national contingency plans in all member states.445   
At the end of 2005 in December the House of Lords Select Committee on 
Science and Technology published its report on pandemic influenza. The 
committee found that: 
 “Our witnesses generally agree that the United Kingdom 
remains among the best prepared countries in the 
developed world, and we have no reason to dissent from 
this view. The Pandemic Influenza Contingency Plan has 
been regularly reviewed and updated; advice has been 
issued to frontline healthcare workers; the Government 
have ordered sufficient antiviral drugs to treat one 
quarter of the population; work to expedite the 
manufacture of a vaccine is underway.”
446
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4.3 A changing policy environment – other factors  
As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter both cases are 
intertwined and overlap with one another. The following two sections contain 
material which is relevant to the discussion. A number of factors contributed 
to and influenced the policy context of bioterrorism policies in the UK. 
However, these developments do not neatly fit into either section above and 
are thus included in this section.  
The BSE and FMD crisis 
The BSE447  crisis and its repercussions had a significant impact on the 
wider policy environment in the UK. The Phillips Inquiry, an independent 
judicial inquiry into the Government’s handling of the BSE crisis, published in 
2000, questioned the “Government’s use of science, the Government’s use of 
expert committees and the Government’s approach to risk”448, and 
recommended, amongst other things, the Government’s use of scientific 
advice to be revised and improved because decisions were reached too slowly 
and key uncertainties not sufficiently acknowledged. The report stated that 
scientific advice needs to be transparent and accountable. This finding was 
echoed by the Anderson Inquiry into the lessons learned from the Foot and 
Mouth Disease (FMD) outbreak of 2001, published in 2002. Anderson 
identified three key areas for improvement: systems to handle epidemics, 
handling of outbreaks in a timely fashion, and basing interventions on “good 
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science” – advocating evidence based policy making in a transparent 
manner.449   
The FMD outbreak occurred in the UK between February and September 
2001450, the UK was declared free of Foot and Mouth in January 2002.  
Although FMD affects animals only and the UK response to it was exclusively 
economic agrarian (culling, travel and trade restrictions) it is worth mentioning 
this episode here briefly for its impact on health policy, institutions and policy 
makers. 
The 2001 outbreak was the first case of FMD in the UK since 1967. For 
221 days 2030 premises in the UK reported cases of FMD between 20 February 
and 30 September 2001. All livestock in these 2030 premises, as well as 
animals in a further 7500 premises were destroyed, around 11 million animals 
in total. The cost of the outbreak is difficult to estimate: closure of rights of 
way networks and images of burning pyres of dead animal adversely affected 
national, as well as international tourism, with possible repercussions on the 
value of the pound. Bans on trade and movement of livestock caused financial 
losses and wider disruption in the economy. The Government spent £2.79 
billion on direct costs of measures to deal with FMD. Overall costs to the 
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economy are estimated to be about 1% of the gross domestic product, around 
£10 billion.451  The UK was FMD free on 15 January 2002, confirmed at an OIE 
meeting on 22 January, EU trade restrictions were lifted on 5 February 2002. 
The importance of FMD is not so much its specific disease characteristics, but 
in the governmental handling, the timing and general policy impact. Systemic 
failings to tackle the crisis head on were at the heart of a response that 
seemed mismanaged – with a:  
“tendency towards paralysis through bureaucratic 
conflict and/or operational fragmentation […] a culture 
of departmentalism […] stubborn reluctance to listen to 
non-Whitehall expertise […] stagnation [was] evident 
throughout the crisis […] contingency plans mirrored 
work [from] before the 1967 epidemic […] the slaughter 
policy was justified in one press conference using a 
study from the 1950s […] many farmers expressed 
disbelief at MAFF officials trying to navigate 
unsuccessfully around the countryside using prewar 
maps. These outdated practices were a direct result of 
an insulated outlook that initially refused external 
expertise in epidemiological modelling as offered by 
numerous scientific centres of excellence […] and sheer 
fragmentation caused by a multiplicity of actors 
involved”
452
  
These failings forced the intervention of the Chief Scientific Advisor 
resulting in the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) being 
relegated to assistance with the delivery of policy and its former primary role, 
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the formulation of policy, being transferred to the Prime Minister’s Office, 
with the Cabinet Office arranging cross-departmental co-operation and 
soliciting scientific advice. MAFF was formally abolished by merging it with the 
Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) to form the 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA).453  This reshuffle 
indicated that the “outdated approach to crisis management would not be 
tolerated” and replacement of “departmentalism, defensive decision-making 
and secrecy” with “coordination and more transparent ‘joint-up’ decision 
making.”454  FMD, being a dominant policy issue at the time – as well as a 
media spectacle with footage of burning pyres of animal carcasses – impacted 
on the wider security and health policy discourse, on one hand, augmenting 
notions of vulnerability, economic vulnerabilities in particular; and, on the 
other hand, forcing a general rethink on the use of expert advice and scientific 
evidence in the policy formation process. The impact of Foot and Mouth 
Disease owes at least some of its policy impact to the legacy of the BSE crisis – 
another major disease driven policy disaster which dominated the policy 
discourse for 15 years, from the mid 1980s into the late 1990s, which also was 
inadequately handled by MAFF.455 
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Failing to respond adequately to either BSE or Foot-and-Mouth crisis has 
had substantial and enduring effects on the policy environment – in terms of 
the handling of scientific advice and general approaches to risk management, 
and public trust in government and its institutions. The institutional response, 
besides merging MAFF, DETR and parts of the Home Office into DEFRA, was the 
establishment of a crisis management unit – the Civil Contingencies Secretariat 
(CCS) within the Cabinet Office in July 2001 – to address serious deficiencies in 
the UK’s civil protection arrangements, which became apparent during the 
FMD crisis in 2001, as well as during serious flooding and the fuel protests in 
2000.456  CCS is tasked with developing resilience against high-impact risks, 
broad horizon scanning, running exercises through the Emergency Planning 
College, and establishing and re-evaluating a national risk register.457   
A One Stop Shop for Public Health 
In January 2002 the Chief Medical Officer, Sir Liam Donaldson, launched a 
new infectious disease strategy, within which he proposed a number of actions 
to create a “modern system to prevent, investigate and control the infectious 
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diseases threat and address health protection more widely.”458  Part of this 
new system was the creation of the Health Protection Agency (HPA) which:  
“will provide an integrated approach to all aspects of 
health protection including chemical and radiological 
hazards, as well as infectious disease control. This 
approach builds on experience of recent incidents such 
as the outbreak of foot and mouth disease and planning 
following the terrible events of September 11 2001. The 
agency will draw together a number of the bodies of 
expertise which currently provide health protection 
services including the Public Health Laboratory Service, 
the National Radiological Protection Board, The Centre 
for Applied Microbiology and Research and the National 
Focus for Chemical Incidents. The new agency will work 
closely with regional and local public health services and 
the expert government advisory committees.”
459
  
The HPA was set up as a special health authority in March 2003 and 
converted into a stand alone independent UK organization, a Quasi 
Autonomous Non-Governmental Organization (QUANGO) in April 2005,460  to 
provide an integrated approach to public health as well as unusual 
radiological, biological and chemical incidents – natural, accidental or 
deliberate in origin – as a ‘one stop shop’. The HPA subsumed and integrated 
existing agencies such as the Public Health Laboratory Service, the Centre for 
Applied Microbiology and Research, the National Radiological Protection 
Board, the National Poisons Information Service, and the National Focus for 
Chemical Incidents, and incorporates NHS public health staff responsible for 
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the control of infectious disease, emergency planning and other protection 
support.461  One week after the inception of the HPA Sir William Stewart, the 
Chairman of the HPA, said that “the biggest bio-terrorist threat remains that 
from Mother Nature”, after briefly outlining natural disease threats he turns to 
deliberately caused disease with a stark warning about the threat posed:  
“Bio-terrorism is low tech terrorism. Sophisticated 
equipment is not required to generate the organisms […] 
chemical terrorism is not difficult either: it is low tech. 
The nerve gas sarin and the toxin ricin are easily made 
and transported […] But all of us should think about the 
ease with which illicit substances are smuggled into 
Britain. In 2000, drugs with the street value of £789 
million were seized, which shows what might be done 
with the materials of bio-terrorism”
462 
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The need for an “integrated approach to all aspects of health protection” 
was underlined by a report published in July 2003 by the House of Lords 
Science & Technology Select Committee.  The report Fighting Infection follows 
an extensive consultation on “diagnosis, treatment, prevention and control of 
infectious disease.”463  The committee found an alarming lack of preparedness 
and co-ordination for dealing with major outbreaks of infectious disease which 
have not happened owing to “as much good fortune as to good management”. 
Further stating that:  
“infectious disease services in England (devolved 
administrations have separate arrangements), whilst 
better than those found in many countries, suffer from 
problems. The services expected to protect the 
population from both common and more unusual 
infection are under-resourced and over-stretched. If this 
country were to experience a major outbreak of an 
infection the services may not be able to cope: there is 
not enough surge capacity”
464
 
SARS 
The emergence of the first severe and readily transmissible disease of the 
21st Century, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), illustrated the 
economic, social and political repercussions of an internationally spreading 
                                                     
463
 House of Lords - Science and Technology Committee (2003) Fighting Infection (Session 
2002-03, HL Paper 138). London: The Stationery Office (2 July 2003), p. 8.  In July 2002 
the committee issued a call for evidence, attracting 117 written submissions. Forty nine 
individuals from thirty eight organizations gave evidence in person. In July 2002 the 
Committee organised a seminar, hosted by the Academy of Medical Sciences, to gain an 
overview of some of the main issues of infectious disease control. Over the duration of 
this inquiry the Committee visited health care institutions, research and surveillance 
centres and public health departments in England, Switzerland and the United States of 
America. (ibid.) 
464
 Ibid., p.6 
185 
novel disease. A deeply concerned World Health Assembly said, during the 
outbreak, that SARS   
“poses a serious threat to global health security, the 
livelihood of populations, the functioning of health 
systems, and the stability and growth of economies”.
465
   
This novel coronavirus emerged in China in November 2002, but Chinese 
authorities failed to officially inform the World Health Organization until 
February 2003, at which point the disease had reached Singapore. Within four 
months the disease spread rapidly to twenty-six countries, by July 2003 the 
number of probable cases rose to over 8000, of which 774 were fatal.466  After 
July 2003 the infection rate, as well as mortality rate went into sharp decline, 
WHO declared the SARS outbreak had been contained world wide on 5 July 
2003.467  SARS is worth mentioning here because of its rapid international 
spread, and economic impact.  
The outbreak has been used in presentations and documents outlining 
the possible dangers of bioterrorism as an oratory crutch in the absence of 
real life cases of deliberate use of contagious disease.468  The SARS outbreak 
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also set in motion renewed efforts to revise and update the WHO International 
Health Regulations (IHR).469  Chinese reluctance to share information in a 
timely fashion at the beginning of the outbreak and the subsequent rapid 
spread facilitated through international travel motivated the World Health 
Assembly to adopt a resolution urging members:  
“to use their experience with SARS preparedness and 
response to strengthen epidemiological and laboratory 
capacity as part of preparedness plans for responding to 
the next emerging infection, the next influenza 
pandemic, and the possible deliberate use of a biological 
agent to cause harm”
470
  
SARS was also the first instance in which the Global Outbreak Alert and 
Response Network (GOARN) of the WHO identified and responded to an 
outbreak, by collecting reports and co-ordinating a global network of 
laboratory scientists, clinicians, and epidemiologists electronically in real-time; 
thus aiding the implementation of strategies preventing nosocomial spread, 
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and providing impetus for international travelling advice, including airport 
screenings and areas which were to be avoided.471   
As well as the WHO, the British Medical Association (BMA) linked SARS 
with bioterrorism in terms of the response.472  At the BMA’s annual 
conference, in July 2003, doctors warn that the UK is unprepared to deal with 
the large outbreaks, or bioterrorism, and demand more preparation and 
resources to tackle potential large demands placed upon the health care 
system during public health emergencies.473   
The SARS outbreak has an effect on international as well as national 
disease surveillance, epidemic alert and response, and health security more 
generally. SARS was a “wake up call” to the policy community involved in 
health related issues. The rapid spread and identification in, “most OECD 
countries”, and the ensuing “economic tidal wave” evoked notions of 
vulnerability to communicable diseases.474   
4.4 Convergences – flu and bioterrorism 
Two types of convergences have been alluded to in the cases described 
here from a UK policy perspective: First, the emerging overlaps in the 
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institutional responses and, second, overlaps due to the nature of the threat. 
The former could be described as a utilitarian convergence because both 
threats are coming from the potential of disease spreading in populations, 
whereas the latter could be described as a normative convergence based on 
increasing recognition or perception of the threat as a fundamental challenge 
to national security. 
There are other, as yet unexplored, points of convergence between 
bioterrorism and influenza. First, there have been numerous occasions when 
influenza has been alleged to have emerged from, or been attributed to, 
biological warfare programmes. And second: where scientific research raises 
concerns.  
Influenza caused by malicious intent? 
The obvious connection between the bioterrorism and influenza is the 
use of influenza as a biological weapon. This is however rare, if it has been 
done at all. There are examples in the literature that influenza viruses have 
been considered as potential candidates for biological warfare programmes in 
the past, for example, during British efforts in the 1950s influenza was 
considered as a potential agent in one paper on research policy of the 
Biological Research Advisory Board475  whereas the French biological warfare 
programme in the 1960s considered influenza as a potential incapacitant.476  It 
appears plausible that other states with biological warfare programmes have 
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considered influenza viruses as well. However, there are no documented and 
verified cases of influenza virus ‘weaponization’ in the literature. A case of 
bioterrorism in which influenza may have been used among other diseases and 
methods of violence is in the Brazilian state of Matto Grosso, between 1957 
and 1963, in attempts by ‘landowners’ to displace and or eradicate indigenous 
tribal populations in order to free land of inhabitation for sale.477   
Apart from these documented cases of consideration of influenza viruses 
as biological weapons and its use in bioterrorism there are numerous 
occasions when influenza has been alleged to have emerged from, or been 
ascribed to, biological warfare programmes. These allegations can go both 
ways – the more common way is the perception or presumption that a 
naturally occurring disease may have had been manufactured in, and 
originated from “enemy labs”. Less common is direct allegation and accusation 
of states to be procuring or manufacturing influenza as a biological weapon.  
Each case is briefly illustrated with recent examples. There are many 
more examples to be found in the literature. These stories or narratives may 
reveal, at least to a certain extent, the perceived threat from biological 
warfare programmes or the difficulty in attributing deliberate disease releases.  
In November 2005, Vladimir Filippov, the Head of the Russian armed 
forces’ radiation, chemical and biological protection troops, revealed that for 
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over four months the troops investigated more than 200 biological samples 
from 12 regions in Russia to rule out the possibility that the outbreaks of bird 
flu resulted from an intentional release of the virus.478  It would not be 
surprising if other countries were equally suspicious, conducting similar 
studies, or assessments. This is, however, speculative.  
More serious are allegations of the type emerged, for example, in a 
report in May 2006.  Citing a “high ranking defector from North Korea’s 
Academy of Sciences” who alleged that North Korea assigned eight research 
centres to work on various aspects of the bird flu virus for hostile use, as a 
matter of priority.479  Various other examples can be cited to illustrate these 
sorts of reports or stories – these cases are, however, rarely substantiated, 
often speculative and involve statements from the extreme ends of the 
political spectrum. The North Korean example given above comes from a 
report which conflates a number of different issues – a report of a defector, an 
intelligence briefing in the US about avian influenza, and Al-Qaeda. It is 
difficult to prove or disprove these types of reports. It is equally difficult to 
assess the impact on policy, and policy makers’ perception. The invasion of 
Iraq in 2003 is an example of where it is difficult to disentangle hyperbole from 
fact, credibility of evidence and sources of intelligence, and the genuine 
character and sincerity of political motives. 
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Experiments of concern 
There are three often cited experiments which have caused concern 
because of their supposed or perceived potential to be misused, or 
misappropriated for nefarious purposes. In short these experiments exemplify, 
for some, the dual-use problem and problems with unintended consequences 
of scientific research.  
The first of these “experiments of concern” is a study published in the 
Journal of Virology by Jackson and others in 2001 on recombinant mousepox 
which suppresses and inhibits host immune responses and thus increases the 
fatality of the virus.480  The second study, published by Cello and others in 
2002 in Science, on the synthesis of an infectious poliovirus from scratch, 
which demonstrated: “that it is possible to synthesize an infectious agent by in 
vitro chemical-biochemical means solely by following instructions from a 
written sequence.”481  The third study which raised concern, which is most 
relevant for this dissertation, was the reconstruction of the 1918 influenza 
virus in a series of experiments, published in Nature and Science in 2005. It is 
an analysis of the final three genes of the 1918 human influenza virus, 
completing the genome sequence.482  The other sequences had been published 
previously. The study presents “sequence and phylogenetic analyses of the 
complete genome of the 1918 influenza virus, and propose[s] that the 1918 
virus was […] an entirely avian like virus that adapted to humans” this is 
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significant, according to the authors, because of differences between the 1918 
virus and subsequent human influenza viruses. The authors note that “a 
number of the same [sequence] changes have been found in recently 
circulating, highly pathogenic H5N1 viruses that have caused illness and death 
in humans”483 these changes are “likely to have an important role in human 
adaptation”.484  Science published a research article by Tumpey and others 
describing the reverse genetic engineering of 1918 pandemic influenza virus 
and its effects on mice. The virus was synthesised from genomic RNA obtained 
from unfixed tissue cultures from 1918 Spanish flu victims found in Alaskan 
permafrost and from archived formalin fixed lung tissue cultures. The study 
“generated a virus containing the complete coding sequences of the eight viral 
gene segments from the 1918 influenza virus […] to study the properties 
associated with its extraordinary virulence.”485  Non encoded sequences were 
substituted with corresponding segments from closely related H1N1 influenza 
viruses. Thus, the reconstructed virus is not necessarily representative the 
pandemic virus because it is “built into the backbone of a laboratory strain”, 
and the construct is only one strain – in a pandemic a diverse virus population 
is in circulation, containing different strains.486 
The publication of the studies was followed by questions raised about 
whether the benefits outweigh the risks posed by such research. The 
enumerated benefits in the long term include the early identification of an 
emerging pandemic and aiding vaccine and drug development; whereas the 
possible risks include accidental release of the virus from a research laboratory 
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potentially triggering a pandemic. Both publications were accompanied by 
editorials and special reports discussing these issues. The Science editorial by 
MIT Professor Phillip Sharp acknowledged the dual use nature and potential of 
misuse of the published information by “a terrorist group or a careless 
investigator”, but reassured readers’ concerns by reference to the papers’ 
approval by the US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) 
who “concluded that the scientific benefit of the future use of this information 
far outweighs the potential risk of misuse”.487  The Nature special report cited 
concerns voiced by various experts, for example, Richard Ebright who 
contended that “there is most definitely reason for concern […] Tumpey at el. 
have constructed, and provided procedures for others to construct, a virus 
that represents perhaps the most effective bioweapons agent now known”, 
Barbara Hatch Rosenberg added: “This would be extremely dangerous should it 
escape, and there is a long history of things escaping”. The report finished with 
a quote from Taubenberger, one of the authors, to stymie concerns over 
unintended consequences and misuse:  
“We are aware that all technological advances could be 
misused […] but what we are trying to understand is 
what happened in nature and how to prevent another 
pandemic. In this case, nature is the bioterrorist”
488
 
Conclusion and Discussion  
Both these cases – pandemic influenza and bioterrorism – are multi-
faceted and complex, operating on a variety of levels and incorporating a 
number of different concepts and policy areas, and accordingly the policy area 
is inhabited by an equally large number of actors. The case studies are used 
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here for a specific purpose: to explore the way in which ‘uncertain events’ are 
assessed, framed and responded to in the UK, with a particular view towards 
bioterrorism as such an event. The focus is on the policy response, on the 
national level, rather than local, regional, or international.  
Both case studies illustrate cases of ‘uncertain events’ – events with high 
degrees of scientific complexity and contingency – classically characterised as 
low probability and high impact. However, pandemic influenza and 
bioterrorism are perceived to be, or have come to be perceived, to have a high 
probability of occurrence, with a likelihood of occurrence nearing certainty 
(“not if but when”), and both cases are assumed to cause wide-spread 
disruption and destruction when they materialise. However, evidence is scant, 
in particular for bioterrorism. The last influenza pandemic to hit the UK was in 
1967, more than forty years ago, although a number of potential pandemic 
strains are in circulation, making an outbreak, at any time, plausible. On the 
other hand, bioterrorism has never occurred in the UK, and seldom 
elsewhere.489    
Policy formation and Biothreat 
As hinted at throughout this chapter the change in the perception of the 
threat of bioterrorism is a product of various processes and events, and is 
presented here to have occurred in a stepwise manner – a gradual, as well as 
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punctuated, transformation of a ‘threat logic’ or narrative within the UK 
government (policy makers), mediated through commentators as well as the 
intelligence community (policy shapers). The policy regime drawn up to 
counter bioterrorism has evolved in a complex and rapidly changing political 
environment.  
The threat from bioterrorism was seen as negligible during, and until the 
end of the Cold War. The JIC assessment from 1989, states that the Joint 
Intelligence Committee has: “no intelligence that any terrorist group makes 
CBW agents, possesses any such agents or is currently contemplating attacks 
using CBW agents” but maintains that “use of CBW agents by terrorists would 
generate widespread fear and could cause large numbers of casualties” and 
that “terrorist organisations could also readily obtain and handle without 
insurmountable difficulty, suitable bacteria, viruses and certain toxins”490  The 
focus at this time is on proliferation by states, although there is a recognition 
that states might pass on unconventional weapons to non-state actors. This 
recognition is most likely informed by proliferation concerns on one hand and 
terrorism on the other – Iraqi use of chemical weapons, and not only Libyan 
production capabilities of chemical and biological weapons but also their 
support in the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over the Scottish town of 
Lockerbie. In addition to concerns over proliferation of state capabilities, is a 
latent but steadily growing concern over increased ease of access to biological 
agents due to rapid scientific progress and with it a presumed erosion of 
technological barriers. The lowering of technological barriers is a trend which 
extends further back than the period described here, and continues to do so 
beyond the period described here. This lowering of the technological barriers 
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which may enable hostile exploitation has been theoretically assumed and is 
inextricably linked due to the ‘dual-use’ nature of the knowledge, and 
technology as a part thereof, necessary for the production of biological 
agents.491  The publication of the ‘experiments of concern’ – the synthesis of 
recombinant mousepox with increased virulence, the de novo synthesis of a 
poliovirus solely by following instructions from a written sequence, and the 
recreation of the 1918 pandemic influenza strain – have allegedly 
demonstrated the lowering of technological barriers enabling terrorists to 
undertake genetic manipulations. The lowering of technological barriers is, and 
has been, a constant source of concern. This trend has been cited as an 
enabling factor for the acquisition of biological agents for nefarious purposes 
in virtually every published assessment of the propensity of terrorist groups to 
use unconventional weapons over the past thirty years. However, most groups 
who engage in terrorism tactics have been technologically conservative, 
preferring to use tested and proven conventional explosives.492  In 2009 the US 
Director of National Intelligence made the following assessment of the groups 
who have shown interest in unconventional weapons: 
“Most terrorist groups that have shown some interest, 
intent or capability to conduct CBRN attacks have 
pursued only limited, technically simple approaches that 
have not yet caused large numbers of casualties.”
493
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This statement would have been equally true twenty years earlier. During 
the early 1990s the perception that conventional weapons suit the purposes of 
terrorists better prevailed, however there was the recognition that the use of 
CBRN is a remote possibility, considering it unlikely to be successful, and 
hypothetical.  
This perception changed with the sarin gas attacks in Matsumoto and 
Tokyo in the mid 1990s, although preparations were underway prior to the 
attacks. International co-operation on CBW terrorism was stepped up. Despite 
this changed perception, institutionally not much changed. Exercises were held 
to test and prepare emergency responders and decision makers. The most 
obvious impact that the Tokyo attacks have had was that the hypothetical use 
of CBRN weapons was now seen as a real possibility, which was seen as nigh on 
impossible to control. The rise of Islamic extremism was seen as problematic 
and the interest, although lack of evidence of actual acquisition, was noted in 
several intelligence reports. By the end of decade there is ‘increasing concern’, 
or ‘utmost concern’ over a ‘potentially a serious threat’, with ‘horrific 
potential’. At this time there is heightened awareness of emerging infectious 
diseases, and media attention to the possible use of CBRN by terrorists, 
prompting both, the Royal Society as well as JIC to state that “the actual threat 
does not match the media hype” although acknowledging that certain 
individuals are ‘interested’. 
Policy failures in response to first BSE and FMD forced an institutional 
response. The Civil Contingencies Committee and its Secretariat in the Cabinet 
Office, created in July 2001, took over responsibilities from the Home Office 
Emergency Planning Division, thus starting to centralise the emergency 
response.  
September 11, in particular, and the anthrax letters following it to a 
lesser extent caused a shake-up of the institutional arrangement. It jolted the 
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system. The calculus of risk changed, moving the hypothetical position that 
aggressors may seek indiscriminate destruction into an area of certainty – a 
statement by the House of Commons Defence Committee illustrates a wide 
held perception of the threat at the time: “Although we have seen no evidence 
[…] we can see no reason to believe that people who are prepared to fly 
passenger planes into tower blocks would balk at using such [CBR] weapons. 
The risk that they will do so cannot be ignored”494  The post 9/11 threat 
perception paradigm is that the terrorist threat is “real and present”, 
indiscriminate and capable of causing massive destruction.495   
September 11 also acted as a catalyst and precipitated changes in the UK 
that were in the offing prior to the attacks. Apart from legislation being rushed 
through Parliament, a multi-agency, cross-government, joined-up-thinking 
approach was embedded, involving most, if not all, governmental departments 
and agencies in preparations and contingency planning, as well as newly 
formed agencies (for example, JTAC, HPA, etc.). The impact of September 11 
did of course not just affect the UK’s governmental perception and policy, but 
reverberated internationally, culminating most dramatically in military action 
against Afghanistan and Iraq, which in turn caused, directly or indirectly a 
spate of terrorist attacks, in the UK as well as elsewhere. 
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Terrorist attacks, and plots, in the UK, as well as internationally, have had 
the effect of augmenting the perception of threat which was so dramatically 
raised in 2001. Most notably, the ‘ricin plot’, and the London bombings on 7th 
July 2005.  
Problems 
A re-occurring problem with the construction of the narratives is the 
problem of delineating the subject. Disentangling the issue of bioterrorism 
from other, related areas, for example, chemical and nuclear issues, or 
separating the domestic response from the wider international context is 
problematic. If a narrative had been written from a US American perspective, 
for example, it would have it would have been quite different. For example in 
the US the product tampering of Tylenol, laced with cyanide (in 1982, leading 
to product safety regulations), and the acquisition of Plague bacteria by white 
supremacist Larry Wayne Harris (leading to export control and transfer 
protocols), the Sarin gas attacks in Tokyo (20 March 1995), followed by the 
Oklahoma Federal building bombing by Timothy McVeigh (19 April 1995), have 
impacted policy thinking and discourse differently in the US than in the UK. 
Most prominent difference is the impact of the anthrax letters in 2001, when 
half of the US Senate and their staff had to vacate their offices for six months 
to allow for decontamination activities. There have undoubtedly been 
spillovers into the UK policy thinking – due to a close working relationship 
between the US and UK intelligence agencies. Despite this close relationship, 
and a number of similarities in threat characterisation and conceptualisation, 
there are significant differences in the response to bioterrorism. These may be 
due to a number of inter-related factors as well as fundamental differences in 
institutional set up, arrangements, and histories.  
Further, on the international level, apart from close bilateral 
relationships with the US, there are important multilateral relationships into 
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which the UK is embedded. These multilateral relationships have some 
relevance on the policy making process in the UK. For example, the G8, the 
World Health Assembly, the European Union, various international initiatives 
such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Australia Group, the Co-
operative Threat Reduction Initiative, the Global Health Security Initiative, as 
well as United Nations treaties, conventions and resolutions on proliferation 
and terrorism.  
 
  
201 
5 Institutional Arrangement & Policy Response 
Introduction  
Numerous approaches have been devised to respond to the challenge of 
biological terrorism, and biological weapons in general. Each approach 
addresses different aspects of the problem – approaching the problem from 
different angles, and perspectives, at a range of levels from individual to 
international. Collectively these approaches have variously been described as 
‘regimes’, ‘networks’, or ‘webs’; in recognition that to effectively control, 
prevent and deter the use of biological weapons a complementary set of legal, 
social, political measures is required, connected as well as unconnected. Each 
concept – regime, network, and web – has “different origins and different 
implications, they all have, at the root, the idea that there is no single solution 
to the challenges posed by biological weapons.”496  Likewise, at the heart of 
these responses is the recognition that there are challenges posed, which need 
to be addressed.  
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This chapter examines the institutional responses and arrangements 
drawn up to confront the threat of bioterrorism in the UK, as well as the main 
institutional players embedded in these arrangements. Exploring the 
institutional arrangement is the first step towards understanding how policy is 
made in the UK with regard to bioterrorism. This chapter seeks to answer the 
first research question: Who are the main actors in the policy making process 
with regard to bioterrorism? 
Institutional Arrangement and Main Actors 
The institutional response to bioterrorism as well as pandemic influenza 
in the UK is complicated. It is multi-layered, from local to national and 
international including the devolved administrations, from strategic to 
operational; bringing together a number of different actors: government 
departments, agencies, and other actors, such as first responders, academic 
and non-governmental organizations, and industry.497 
Strategic and overall policy decisions are made within the Cabinet Office 
in the UK. Specific policy areas are dealt with by Cabinet committees. The 
committees are supported by the Cabinet Office’s Civil Contingency Secretariat 
within the Capabilities Framework, which designates lead departments to 
specific policy challenges. The lead department in pandemic influenza is the 
Department of Health; in the case of counter-terrorism – of which CBRN is a 
subset – the lead department is the Home Office. The designation of lead 
departments can thus be used to characterise a distinct policy area in which 
each ‘case’ falls as defined by governmental designation – pandemic influenza 
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is a health contingency, whereas bioterrorism falls into the rubric of law 
enforcement. Both are framed as civil contingencies, requiring emergency 
responses. 
Emergency responses can be disaggregated by differentiating between 
three tiers of engagement with the perceived threats. These three categories 
can be defined as: operational “what needs to happen on the ground”, tactical 
“what people and emergency responders need to get their job done”, and 
strategic “the wider political agenda” including the international context. The 
focus of this dissertation is on the strategic level, rather than the operational 
or tactical response levels.498   
First I turn to the institutional arrangement adopted to confront 
pandemic influenza, followed by that of bioterrorism. 
Pandemic influenza 
In the case of pandemic influenza, decision making is limited to 
emergency response planning, the necessity of planning for, and assessment of 
the threat of pandemic influenza emergence is internationally ‘negotiated’ 
within the fora of the World Health Organization (WHO).499  Influenza 
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pandemics are thought to be cyclical and their emergence is therefore a 
question of when it will happen not if it will happen. This circumstance is 
reflected in the international, as well as national, institutional responses with 
an emphasis on early detection, surveillance and monitoring of virus subtypes 
in circulation in human and animal populations. 
In 1997 the response system to influenza pandemics was reshaped,500  
with the publication of the Chief Medical Officer’s new infectious disease 
strategy “Getting ahead of the Curve” which included, amongst other 
priorities, pandemic influenza and terrorism.501  In 2005 the response to 
pandemic influenza was updated, from its 1997 predecessor, with the 
publication of a new contingency plan in March 2005.502  The contingency plan, 
like its predecessor, is structured along the pandemic phases of the WHO, 
which define the evolution of an influenza pandemic.503  The contingency plan 
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provides an overarching framework for an escalating, integrated, multi-agency, 
UK-wide response to an influenza pandemic, setting out the aims and 
objectives, planning parameters, strategic policies and roles and 
responsibilities of the main organisations involved.504  This allows: “a step-wise 
escalating approach to preparedness planning and response leading up to 
declaration of the onset of a pandemic.”505  Each UK phase corresponds to a 
phase in the WHO plan. The WHO confirms disease progression and status and 
announces the progression to another phase of the WHO plan:  
“Once a pandemic has been declared [by WHO], UK 
action will depend on whether cases have been 
identified in the UK, and how extensively it has spread. 
For UK purposes, therefore, additional UK alert levels 
are included within the WHO pandemic phase”
506
   
The Department of Health has a central role in the health response to 
pandemic influenza. Health response planning and strategic decisions are 
made by the Department of Health, as the lead department, and by the 
Cabinet Office Ministerial Civil Contingencies Committee (CCC) with support of 
the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS). Within the CCC the work on 
pandemic influenza is co-ordinated and overseen by the cross-governmental 
ministerial committee (MISC 32) which was set up in early 2005.507  MISC 32 
                                                                                                                                                           
transmission in the general population. The final stage is the post pandemic period with 
a return to the initial inter-pandemic period. 
504
 Leese, J. (2006) Department of Health Perspective. Paper given at: Joint DH-DEFRA 
Workshop on transmission risks of avian influenza from birds to humans; Avonmouth 
House, London, 6 July 2006 
505
 Department of Health - Chief Medical Officer (2005) Pandemic Flu: UK influenza pandemic 
contingency plan. London: Department of Health, 1 March 2005, p. 15 
506
 Ibid. p. 15 
507
 The Ministerial Committee on Pandemic Influenza Planning (MISC 32) is sometimes 
referred to as MISC 32 Flu Working Group (FWG). The Cabinet Office does not “release 
information about cabinet committees other than their membership and terms of 
reference” (personal communication with CCS), so an exact date of MISC 32’s 
continued… 
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oversees the decision making of the response planning, whereas the 
Department of Health produces the strategic contingency plan, which is 
operationalized in the contingency plans produced by the Health Protection 
Agency (HPA). MISC 32 is chaired by the Secretary of State for Health, 
attended and advised by the Chief Medical Officer (CMO), and is challenged on 
the scientific basis of its decision making by the government’s Chief Scientific 
Advisor (CSA).508   
The Department of Health established two bodies in 2005: the Scientific 
Advisory Group (SAG) on Pandemic Influenza, to provide the scientific 
evidence base for health related pandemic influenza policies, and the UK 
National Influenza Pandemic Committee (UKNIPC) which is chaired by the CMO 
and tasked with the provision of specialist advice to the UK Health 
Departments on the health response during an influenza pandemic.509  
                                                                                                                                                           
establishment could not be gained. When asked in Parliament about how many times 
MISC 32 had convened Jim Murphy, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for the Cabinet 
Office, answered: “Information relating to internal meetings, discussion and advice and 
the proceedings of Cabinet and Cabinet committees is generally not disclosed as to do so 
could harm the frankness and candour of internal discussion” Murphy, J. (2006) 
Influenza Pandemic Planning. 2 February, vol. 442, part 74, col. 271: Hansard 
(Commons). However, information on MISC 32 was later volunteered by Derek Twigg, 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Minister for Veterans) for the Ministry of Defence – 
MISC 32 held 23 meetings between early 2005 and 12 December 2007, after this date its 
name changed to the Pandemic Flu Implementation Group (PFIG) to reflect a step 
change in its work programme from policy development to policy implementation. 
Twigg, D. (2007) Armed Forces: Influenza. 18 December, vol. 469, part 25, col. 1448W: 
Hansard (Commons) 
508
 Evidence given by the Department of Health and the Health Protection Agency to the 
House of Lords Science and Technology Committee: House of Lords - Science and 
Technology Committee (2005) Pandemic Influenza (Session 2005-06 HL Paper 88). 
London: The Stationery Office (16 December 2005); & Royal Society & Academy of 
Medical Sciences (2006) Pandemic Influenza: science to policy. London: Royal Society 
(November 2006) 
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 For information see: http://www.dh.gov.uk/ab/SPI/index.htm. In January 2008 the SAG on 
Pandemic Influenza was renamed Scientific Pandemic Influenza Advisor Committee (SPI) 
by Sir Gordon Duff when the scientific remit and client group was widened and he 
became the first independent chair. The new scientific remit widened to include, among 
continued… 
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Following the March 2005 publication of the contingency plan both advisory 
groups started their meetings, SAG met for the first time on the 22 June 2005, 
UKNIPC met for the first time on the 18 July 2005.510  
 
Figure 3: Pandemic Influenza Institutional arrangement 
This schematic (figure 3) represents pandemic influenza strategic 
response arrangements, including advisory structures. Although the policy 
process in terms of pandemic influenza is clearer and more transparent than 
                                                                                                                                                           
other disciplines, risk management. The inclusion of an independent chair is following 
recommendations found in a November 2006 Royal Society policy document on science 
and policy making in response to pandemic influenza. Royal Society & Academy of 
Medical Sciences (2006) Pandemic Influenza: science to policy. London: Royal Society 
(November 2006) 
510
 Minutes of the meetings are available online. The SAG met seven times until December 
2006, and UKNIPC met five times until September 2006. The discussions of the advisory 
groups included, inter alia: vaccine and antiviral availability, sourcing, distribution, novel 
approaches and other public health measures; pandemic measures and exit strategies; 
reviews of national and international preparedness, including situation updates; lessons 
from exercises; communication strategies; and modelling techniques and reviews of 
evidence. See: www.advisorybodies.doh.gov.uk/ 
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that of bioterrorism it still leaves room for improvement. The Royal Society 
thus lamented:   
 “The role of science in policymaking at the ministerial 
level in the lead departments is unclear from the 
evidence we received. In particular, the decisions 
relating to seeking advice, the source of advice, and 
whether the advice and available evidence are used, 
must all be more transparent. From the evidence we 
received, the basis for choosing a source of scientific 
advice also seems a closed matter. Although the quality 
of in-house government scientists is undoubtedly good, 
it is clearly difficult for these scientists to be expert 
across all of the issues of concern to their 
departments.”
511
 
Bioterrorism 
The policy response to bioterrorism is part of the wider CBRN response, 
which in turn is part of the overall counter-terrorism response. Terrorism is 
primarily seen as a law enforcement challenge – the published counter 
terrorism strategy of the UK is testament to that. The strategy focuses on four 
areas, the four ‘Ps’: Prepare, Prevent, Protect, and Pursue.512  These four areas 
are the primary responsibility of, and thus co-ordinated through the Home 
Office and the Metropolitan Police, supported by the Joint Terrorism Analysis 
Centre (the primary provider of intelligence to Whitehall customers). 
Terrorism is a central organizing theme and is pervasive in and around 
government.  
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 Royal Society & Academy of Medical Sciences (2006) Pandemic Influenza: science to policy. 
London: Royal Society (November 2006), p.28, Recommendation 34. 
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 Home Office (2006) Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom's Strategy 
(Cm 6888). London: The Stationery Office (10 July 2006) 
209 
The diagram below gives an outline of the organization around the 
bioterrorism threat, as established in the period following September 11, as of 
2005; and as far as could be discerned from the published literature, 
interviews, and disentangled from the wider terrorism response. 
 
Figure 4: Bioterrorism institutional arrangement as of 2005. Representation of the 
institutional response to bioterrorism. The smaller diagrams, bottom left (outlining the 
intelligence flow in the UK) and top centre (outlining the CONTEST strategy and delivery), are 
reproduced in full detail below 
This representation (figure 4) of the institutional response arrangement 
to bioterrorism concentrates on the national strategic level and thus lacks 
reference to the international context; each ‘box’ in the diagram (four shaded 
areas: Intelligence, National Strategy, Advice, and Response) has international 
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linkages.513  The diagram also lacks the multiple levels of inter-connectedness 
between different actors, for example the JIC is located in the Cabinet Office 
and is comprised of the heads of the secret intelligence agencies, senior 
officials from Offices of the Cabinet, Foreign and Commonwealth, and Home, 
and the Ministry of Defence and Treasury. The Cabinet structure and the 
Intelligence structure are outlined in greater detail below (see figure 5 & 6). 
The principal Government departments in the bioterrorism policy 
response are the Cabinet Office with a co-ordinating role and the Home Office 
as the lead department on CBRN as well as wider counter-terrorism efforts. 
Within the Cabinet Office is the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS), including 
numerous ministerial committees and sub-committees (figure 4).514  
The institutional response, in terms of the wider counter-terrorism effort 
has a long history in the UK. The Cabinet Office has maintained committees on 
terrorism since what became known as the troubles began in the late 1960s 
without interruption.515  The counter-terrorism strategy CONTEST, launched in 
early 2003, reshuffled the Cabinet Committee structure to reflect the counter-
terrorism strategy’s four ‘Ps’. The “CONTEST Committee structure” falls under 
the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, and is overseen by the sub-
committee Defence and Overseas Policy – International Terrorism (DOP (IT)) 
which is furnished with detailed work from the DOP (IT) Protection, Security 
                                                     
513
 For example, the Intelligence Agencies co-operate with international partners (see for 
example the evidence gained for the uncovering of the ‘ricin plot’ in Chapter 4 above); 
the Police interacts with Interpol, specifically on bioterrorism; and the Department of 
Health with the WHO (see pandemic influenza above). 
514
 CBRN or terrorism falls into the remit of dedicated committees set up for the counter-
terrorism strategy CONTEST. 
515
 Hennessy, P. (2007) From Secret State to Protective State. In: The New Protective State - 
Government, Intelligence and Terrorism, ed. Hennessy, P., London: Continuum Books & 
Mile End Institute, 1-41, pp. 26 
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and Resilience (PSR). The ministerial led DOP committees are supported by the 
‘TIDO machine’ (Terrorism International Defence and Overseas) which breaks 
down into eight separate parts. Three of these are concerned with terrorist 
equipment and techniques and cut across four CONTEST specific TIDOs – 
Prevent, Pursue, Prepare and Protect. The TIDO machine is directed by the 
TIDO (Strategy and delivery) under the chairmanship of the Security & 
Intelligence Co-ordinator.516 
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 The Security & Intelligence Co-ordinator is an important role in Cabinet and Intelligence, 
who reports to the Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Home Civil Service, and to whom 
the Chairman of the JIC reports. The SIC is also the Principal Accounting Officer for the 
Single Intelligence Account, and oversees the Civil Contingencies Secretariat as the 
deputy Chair of the Civil Contingencies Committee, supporting the Home Secretary in his 
role as Chair. This position was held from its inception by Sir David Omand (June 2002 – 
January 2005). Omand drafted the CONTEST strategy whilst in office. Prime Minister’s 
Office (2002) Press Release: Appointment of Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator and 
Permanent Secretary, Cabinet Office. 20 June 2002, Prime Minister’s Office (2005) Press 
Release: Security and Intelligence Coordinator, Cabinet Office. 4 January 2005 
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Figure 5: CONTEST Cabinet Committee Structure.
517
 
Moving down in the bioterrorism diagram (figure 4) into the ‘Responses’ 
box: the Department of Health has various roles in planning response levels, as 
well as in modelling effects of deliberate releases. The National Health Service, 
and by extension the Primary Care trusts, have a critical role in the 
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 Following Hennessy and Omand. Hennessy, P. (2007) From Secret State to Protective 
State. In: The New Protective State - Government, Intelligence and Terrorism, ed. 
Hennessy, P., London: Continuum Books & Mile End Institute, 1-41. Diagram adapted 
from p. 27. The structure presented here is constantly shifting, but generally accurate 
for the timeframe considered here. It should be noted that the Cabinet Committee 
structure has been reshuffled in 2009, replacing DOP with the Ministerial Committee on 
National Security, International Relations and Development (NSID). 
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bioterrorism response, in surveillance, identification and response.518  Police 
forces play a central role in the operational response in that it enforces 
terrorism legislation. With a specific regard to bioterrorism two police units 
are important: the National Counter-Terrorism Security Office, a unit which is 
co-located with the Centre for the Protection of the National Infrastructure 
(CPNI), is responsible for inspections of commercial and research laboratories 
under the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001.519  The second unit is 
the National CBRN centre which leads the multi-agency preparations for 
responding to Chemical, Biological, Nuclear and Radiological attacks. In a 
similar vein, the Emergency Planning College is a Cabinet Office unit which 
authors emergency scenario exercises and provides training for emergency 
response to local and central government.  
The decision making apparatus of the national strategy – that is the 
Home Office and Cabinet Office – receives, broadly speaking, three types of 
outside input. Two of these are indicated by horizontal arrows in the diagram 
(figure 4) – Intelligence and other ‘Advice’, the third input, indicated by the 
dotted line arrow, is feedback from the ‘response box’, which is generated 
through emergency response exercises staged by the Emergency Planning 
College, which involves ministers and civil servants.  
                                                     
518
 Primary Care Trusts, hospitals in particular are the first responders and first line of 
defence in a bioterrorism incident, especially if the release is clandestine. For example, 
the US anthrax letters of October 2001 were accompanied by notes stating that the 
letters ‘contain anthrax’; however it was emergency responders and medical staff in 
hospitals who raised the alarm and alerted appropriate authorities (the US CDC in this 
case) when patients presented themselves with unusual symptoms. Cole, L. A. (2003) 
The anthrax letters: a medical detective story. Washington, D.C.: Joseph Henry Press 
519
 See for example: McLeish, C. & P. Nightingale (2005) The impact of dual use controls on 
UK science: results from a pilot study (Report of the ESRC Science and Society Project: 
Dual-use Controls and Genomic Research). SPRU Electronic Working Paper 132: 
University of Sussex, April 2005 
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Other ‘Advice’, on the right hand side in the diagram (figure 4), comes 
from a variety of different sources. Research on CBRN related issues is 
stimulated or solicited from academia, think tanks and industry through direct 
tendering of contracts from the Home Office’s CBRN Science and Technology 
programme, or funding made available through the Research Councils.520  The 
Health Protection Agency (HPA) has numerous roles in response to 
bioterrorism, an advisory role, surveillance, as well as planning and executing 
exercises and responses to incidents. HPA is thus involved in responses as well 
as an advisory capacity which is represented in the diagram by straddling both 
areas. The Ministry of Defence plays a smaller role in these processes, and is 
involved through the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL).521  
The scientific advisory structures – the Departmental Scientific Advisors, as 
well as the Chief Scientific Advisor – are involved in advising on and 
challenging the scientific evidence base of decisions. However, the provision of 
advice, as well as the process of threat assessment in the area of bioterrorism 
as a whole, is not clear. Recalling the Royal Society critique of the pandemic 
influenza response – the same may hold in the case of bioterrorism as well:  
“the quality of in-house government scientists is 
undoubtedly good, it is clearly difficult for these 
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 Formerly the Office of Science and Technology of the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI) played a role in directing funding through the research councils. DTI was replaced 
by the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR) and the 
Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills (DIUS) on 28 June 2007. BERR and 
DIUS have been merged into the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), on 
6 June 2009. 
521
 DSTL Porton Down is involved in sample identification and research for defensive 
purposes. Initially established in 1916 as a proving ground Porton changed remit and 
function a number of times. Recently, in 1991 it became the Chemical and Biological 
Defence Establishment (CBDE); in 1995 became part of the Defence Evaluation and 
Research Agency (DERA) as the Chemical and Biological Defence (CBD) Sector; in 2001 
DERA split into two organisations: QinetiQ, a private company, and DSTL (Defence 
Science and Technology Laboratory), remaining an agency of MoD. See: www.mod.uk/ 
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scientists to be expert across all of the issues of concern 
to their departments.”
522
  
JTAC and the Cabinet Office, are at the heart of the cross Whitehall 
terrorism risk assessment process.  
“JTAC produces high quality, authoritative threat 
assessments that draw on information and advice from a 
wide range of relevant government and overseas 
partners. These assessments are regularly updated and 
communicated to all customer departments. It is then 
for departments to use their own expertise and 
experience together with JTAC’s threat assessment to 
produce a risk assessment that informs their strategic 
resource allocation decisions and prioritisation. This 
activity is being coordinated by the Civil Contingencies 
Secretariat in the Cabinet Office, which is responsible for 
developing and maintaining the Planning Assumptions 
that underpin the UK Resilience Capabilities Programme. 
The Planning Assumptions, which are based on an 
explicit and auditable risk assessment, will be used to 
derive targets for the various capabilities that underpin 
the resilience of the UK. In turn, the readiness of the UK 
to respond to major disruptive challenges will be 
assessed against these targets.”
523
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 Royal Society & Academy of Medical Sciences (2006) Pandemic Influenza: science to policy. 
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 Cabinet Office (2004) Government Reply to the Eighth Report From the House of Commons 
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The intelligence machinery, on the left hand side of the bioterrorism 
diagram (figure 4), is complex in its own right; inputs come from a variety of 
sources and agencies. The diagram below (figure 6) outlines the flow of 
intelligence in the British intelligence machinery. 
 
Figure 6: UK Intelligence Flow. The diagram outlines the British intelligence machinery and 
the flow of intelligence within it.
524
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 Following Hennessy and Omand. Hennessy, P. (2007) From Secret State to Protective 
State. In: The New Protective State - Government, Intelligence and Terrorism, ed. 
Hennessy, P., London: Continuum Books & Mile End Institute, 1-41. Diagram adapted 
from p. 31 
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Discussion 
The potential of high morbidity, mortality and economic, social and 
political disruption on the one hand and the complexities and uncertainties of 
the threats – pandemic influenza and bioterrorism – pose challenges for 
governance and policy response. The institutional arrangements (figures 3 & 4) 
have a number of actors in common, for example both are co-ordinated 
through the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS), and in both arrangements 
the Department of Health and the Health Protection Agency are responsible 
for advice and responses. However, despite the similarities in consequences, 
overlaps in response capabilities, and surveillance to a certain extent,525  
bioterrorism and pandemic influenza fall into separate (but overlapping) policy 
networks.  
The policy response to bioterrorism is part of the wider counter-terrorism 
effort, the responsibility of the Home Office, and ostensibly a law enforcement 
challenge.  
Pandemic influenza, is recognised as separate policy problem with its 
own ministerial groups at Cabinet level and separate from other infectious 
disease challenges, or indeed seasonal influenza considerations, is seen as a 
public health problem and thus the responsibility of the Department of Health.  
There appears to be greater clarity in the pandemic influenza 
arrangement, compared to the arrangement of the bioterrorism response. This 
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 Some surveillance capabilities overlap, or are the same. For example, responses to disease 
outbreaks fall under the remit of the Department of Health and the Health Protection 
Agency whether natural or un-natural in origin. However, in the case of bioterrorism 
much of the surveillance is related to intelligence and not health related. 
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may be because of secrecy, but it could also be because bioterrorism is 
institutionally bound up in the wider counter-terrorism effort, and thus more 
complex. Another explanation could be that the influenza policy space is 
governed more by international organizations such as the WHO, thus hollowing 
out decision making by reducing it to operational responses on the national 
level.526  Alternatively, it could be that the threat of bioterrorism is not seen as 
a high priority, as compared to other risks – or that it has been ‘dealt with’: 
and is seen as an arms control problem and a problem of governance in the life 
sciences, and accordingly a specific locus for bioterrorism policy decisions is 
diffused. However, the bioterrorism appears to be a salient policy area as 
described in chapter 4, and there is an extensive policy network as described 
in this chapter, although the institutional arrangement may have a broader 
remit bioterrorism is within this remit.  
Three main functions have been identified in regard to bioterrorism in 
the wider institutional arrangement: provision of advice and intelligence, 
setting of national strategy, and responses (figure 4). The main actors in the 
policy making process with regard to bioterrorism are the Home Office as the 
lead department, the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, and the intelligence 
machinery more widely, as provides of threat assessments. The Department of 
Health and the Health Protection agencies play an important but lesser role as 
providers of responses. The role of scientific advice, its use and impact, is 
unclear. 
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 See Chapter 3, section on “Policy, Governance and Government”. Rhodes, R. A. W. (1997) 
Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexitvity and 
Accountability. Maidenhead: Open University Press 
219 
 The schematics above (figure 3 for pandemic influenza & 4 for 
bioterrorism) represent interactions between the main institutional actors in 
terms of lines of accountability, or information provision. Viewed as a policy 
network these arrangements would need to be supplemented with arrows for 
information flow (rather than just provision). Moreover, the distribution of 
power, composition of the groups and institutions, the intensity of their 
linkages, and frequency of interaction between the actors residing in the 
network would yield a more complex picture. These are, however, closed 
matters and difficult to scrutinise. Furthermore, pressures from outside of the 
policy area (for example, competing resource intensive interests acting on the 
Home Office, Civil Contingencies Secretariat, or the Department of Health) are 
not transparent. As outlined in Chapter 3 the institutional arrangement only 
provides a partial explanation of policy formation processes. Mapping in this 
way can only give an insight into the structural arrangement, and does not 
sufficiently explain how the structure links to the policy outcomes.    
220 
6 Threat Assessments  
Introduction 
An assumption made throughout this dissertation is that specific 
understandings, framings, or conceptualisations, of the bioterrorism threat 
inform the policy response.527  That is, the way in which a threat is 
conceptualised has a direct effect on the response: other factors influence the 
response as well, but the framing of the threat has a fundamental and 
significant impact on the response. Thus, the way in which the threat is 
derived and assessed is of critical importance and has implications for the 
policy formation.  
This chapter is concerned with the construction and framing of the 
threat. So it takes up the second research question: How are the threats of 
bioterrorism assessed in the UK? 
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 That is understandings, perceptions and conceptualisations of policy makers – those 
actors within a policy network who make and shape policy decisions, not the ‘public’. 
The policy makers’ impression of the threat from bioterrorism is informed and shaped by 
advice given to them from various sources – from expert sources, intelligence, to 
popular media, and preconceptions.   
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Threat Assessment – The construction of threat 
“A ‘threat assessment’ is an analysis of the intent and 
capability of terrorists to carry out attacks, whereas a 
‘risk assessment’ combines the threat assessment with 
assessments of vulnerabilities and impact to inform 
prioritisation and resource allocation decisions. 
Government has recognised that a proportionate 
response to terrorism must be based on a thorough 
assessment of the terrorist threat and the best scientific 
advice, and has put the necessary structures in place to 
facilitate this.”
528
 
Threat assessments are often described as a function of two or three 
variables either derived from a likely perpetrator or the resilience of a system 
– a combination of likelihood, intent, capability, vulnerability, and impact. 
Threat assessments are invariably expressed as a simple function. The 
Government, for example, described threat assessments as ‘intent’ times 
‘capability’.529  Sir David Omand, who drafted the UK counter-terrorism 
strategy CONTEST, described threat in terms of ‘vulnerability’ times ‘likelihood’ 
times ‘impact’.530  Although, being described as a function the model is not 
used quantitatively,531  and serves as a heuristic for a qualitative assessment. 
The framing of the threat, that is the inclusion or exclusion of specific terms or 
                                                     
528
 Cabinet Office (2004) Government Reply to the Eighth Report From the House of Commons 
Science & Technology Select Committee, Session 2002-2003 HC 415-I (Cm 6108). London: 
The Stationery Office (January 2004), p.5. The Government’s reply to the House of 
Commons Science and Technology Committee report on The Scientific Response to 
Terrorism gives and insight into the way the government frames risk and threat, and the 
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 House of Commons - Science and Technology Committee (2003) The Scientific Response to 
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Stationery Office (6 November 2003) 
530
 Omand, D. (2008) A year in reflection. Paper given at: RUSI 4th Annual S&T Conference for 
Homeland Security and Resilience; London, 25 June 2008 
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 The terms of the equation are incommensurable; a reduction of these concepts to 
numerical values, or single metrics, to arrive at a threat value would be problematic and 
misleading. 
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parameters in the assessment of the threat, has ramifications for the outcome 
of the threat assessment.532    
Threat assessment and Cold War Legacy  
Threat assessments of bioterrorism in the post Cold War period have an 
increasing focus on terrorism. Informed by Cold War plans these assessments 
were drawing on potential state capabilities – the “battlefield paradigm” – 
which was superimposed on non-state groups. Assessments of the terrorist 
threat started off with strategic considerations: what needs to be done to 
prepare, and manage consequences, rather than starting from first principles. 
The starting point was given, and although intelligence led, it originated from a 
paradigm developed with battlefield applications in mind and thus Cold War 
defence preparations against potential Soviet attacks. These assessments were 
based on worst-case scenario assessments.533   
A technocratic explanation prevailed during this time. The technocratic 
explanation can be summarised as follows: due to advances in biological 
sciences the technological barriers are lowered and therefore the possibility of 
bioterrorism increased.  
The focus during this time was however still on state proliferation, with 
bioterrorism seen as a peripheral, if worrying, problem. The technocratic 
framing of the terrorist threat also served to remove the potential perpetrator 
from the threat equation – with the perception of technological feasibility 
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 Intent appears to be a staple in threat assessment equations, but is almost never found in 
risk assessment equations. It may be an actor’s agency which transforms a risk into a 
threat. 
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 Interview, Senior HPA Officials, 9th October 2008, London. 
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gradually, over time, becoming a certainty, whilst at the same time a 
perception of decreasing moral constraints to cause mass casualties 
completely removed the need to assess intent. 
The removal of intent from the threat assessment equation, by assuming 
it a given property of the threat function (the assumption that there are 
‘aggressors bent’ on using biological weapons, to use the wording of a 1994 
Royal Society report534) may have implications for policy. The removal of intent 
removes the focus from people. Of course, neither intent nor people are being 
excluded – they are explicitly included in the threat assessment equation, but 
as a constant not a variable. Robinson states that:  
“‘Assessing the threat’ means gauging the capabilities 
and intentions of people possibly determined to do us 
harm. It is people, not things, that have to be the focus 
of such assessment: inanimate objects can intend 
nothing and, in themselves, can therefore pose no 
threat.”
535
  
Thus, the assumption of intent as a given might limit or foreclose policy 
options for intervention, by shifting policy focus to things rather than people. 
This focus on things rather than people is evident, for example, in the 
expanding list of agents in Schedule 5 of the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security 
Act 2001. Although the arrests and convictions of Dhiren Barot (dirty bomb 
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 Royal Society (1994) Scientific Aspects of Control of Biological Weapons. London: Royal 
Society 
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 Robinson, J. P. (2010) Scientists and Chemical Weapons Policies. In: Assessing the threat 
of weapons of mass destruction: the role of independent scientists, eds. Finney, J. L. & I. 
Šlaus, Amsterdam: Ios Press, 79-91, p 79 
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plot) and Kamal Bourgass (ricin plot) suggest otherwise, both had ‘intent’ but 
no capability as such.536  
It would, of course, be wrong to posit that there is one overall threat 
assessment driving the UK’s institutional responses; there are numerous 
assessments of risks, threats, and vulnerabilities done for a variety of different 
objectives and reasons, by a number of different assessors. The assessment of 
intent and capability of people to deliberately spread biological agents falls to 
the intelligence community.  
Although there is a central understanding of threat that is used for 
decision making, this understanding is derived from numerous instrumental 
assessments (such as emergency preparedness scenario exercises), these in 
turn are based on the inverted threat model – not if but when.  
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 Dhiren Barot planned attacks, including attacks on the London Underground, and a 
radiological dispersal device from fire alarms, and exploding limousines filled with gas 
cylinders. He was arrested on 3
rd
 August 2004 and sentenced to a minimum of 40 years’ 
imprisonment after pleading guilty to conspiracy to murder. The plot received 
international media coverage. Home Secretary John Reid said at the time: “The outcome 
of this trial once again shows the extent of the very real and serious threat the UK faces 
from terrorism.” From Barot’s notebooks it becomes clear that he was far from having 
an operational capability – no materials were recovered apart from plans and a 
manuscript of notes. Barot's sentence was later reduced to 30 years on appeal. The 
appeal judge said that expert scientific evidence showed the “exploding limousines” 
project was superficially attractive although “amateurish”. BBC News – Online (2007) UK 
al-Qaeda cell members jailed 15 June 2007; & BBC News – Online (2007) 'Dirty bomb' 
man's sentence cut 16 May 2007. 
At the time speculation over “dirty bombs” was rife, in September 2004 police arrested four 
individuals under Section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000 on suspicion of their having 
attempted to purchase a kilogram of “Red Mercury” for an unnamed Saudi citizen 
following a sting operation by the News of the World. Red Mercury is a fictional 
substance purportedly developed by Soviet scientists for “briefcase nuclear bombs”. 
See: Burleigh, J. (2004) Four held after ‘sting’ uncovers alleged dirty bomb conspiracy 
The Independent (London, internet edition) 26 September 2004; BBC News – Online 
(2006) What is red mercury? (Chris Summers) 25 July 2006. 
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The traditional model of threat assessment, as presented in the literature 
and in official sources, is inverted – transformed from a (supposedly) 
extrospective threat assessment to an introspective calculus of vulnerability. 
Instead of looking outward at potential perpetrators, their capability and 
propensity to use biological agents as traditionally done in threat assessments, 
the gaze is directed inwards to identify vulnerabilities and planning for 
contingencies. Capability and propensity on behalf of the perpetrator are 
assumed, an attack is inevitable (“not if but when”), thus, in effect inverting 
the threat assessment and instead performing a vulnerability assessment. 
Jenkins warns exactly against this mode of assessment: 
“The analysis of “dream threats” is filled with pitfalls.  It 
is easy to begin by identifying vulnerabilities – they are 
infinite, positing theoretical adversaries – they are 
legion, then reifying the threat – a subtle shift of verbs 
from could to may happen. “Could” means theoretically 
possible while “may” suggests more.  So long as the 
reader and the policymakers understand the utility of 
what necessarily must be speculative, there is no 
problem. The danger arises when speculation becomes 
the basis for launching costly efforts to prevent “what 
ifs,” or worse, when policymakers believe that highly 
publicized preventive or mitigation efforts will deter 
such adversaries.  This is not to say the threat is not real 
[…] Terrorist use of chemical or biological weapons is a 
legitimate concern, although the evidence here is 
sketchier.  My intention is rather to point to the risks of 
fact-free analysis.”
537
 
Despite Jenkins’ warning of dream threats in a fact-free analysis 
generating infinite adversaries, the rise of the threat was soberly assessed by 
the JIC in 1989: although terrorists could “generate widespread fear and could 
cause large numbers of casualties” there was no intelligence indicating that 
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they would – no intelligence indicating acquisition, merely ‘interest’.538  This 
position was maintained within the intelligence community for most of the 
1990s, although slowly escalating.  
Cognizant civil servants have characterised the threat assessment process 
in the following way: Scenarios are used during the early parts of the 
assessment; scenario construction is intelligence-led and uncertainties are 
dealt with by invoking worst case scenarios. These scenarios are then turned 
into “concepts of operations” – which includes ‘what can be done’ about the 
threat or the situation, including “time line considerations”: what needs to be 
done first and second, and so on. This thus constructed ‘concept of operations’ 
is then “pushed through the cabinet – through its whole raft of expertise”, 
expertise on, for example, transport issues and resilience, etc. Decisions are 
consensual or arrived at through “team work … with challenges”, cost benefit 
considerations are political: “big decisions are ministerial”. The cabinet then 
produces a paper which is “science checked”.539   
According to this rough outline, the threat assessment process starts with 
an intelligence led scenario. The Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) is the 
primary provider of threat assessments. The Government clarifies the function 
of JTAC as a provider of threat assessments to its Whitehall customers:  
“JTAC’s threat assessments are used by customer 
departments to inform their own risk assessments, 
which then inform strategic spending decisions”
540
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JTAC’s intelligence led assessments are used to construct scenarios, as 
described above. These scenarios, or models, are instrumental in constructing 
a threat assessment.  
Models  
Models are used to assess effects of deliberate spread of diseases. 
Models are evocative, with their readily accessible imagery and figures – they 
can plant ideas, “[s]urreptitiously and insidiously these ideas have an impact 
on policy framing, such is the power (and simplicity) of modelling”.541  In this 
way models are simple unifying explanations providing a framework for 
understanding events and can be instrumental components of a threat 
narrative.542 
Models have to be treated with care when used for policy purposes; 
despite being methodologically rigorous in their own right, the model’s 
reliance on context dependent assumptions, and specificity, means that they 
can only serve an illustrative function, not a prescriptive one, without lengthy 
and careful qualification. 
Modelling of bioterrorism as well as for other security related policy 
areas is closely guarded – models and assessments are not available publically. 
One senior Home Office source stated: 
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228 
“derivation of the threat position is perhaps the most 
sensitive of all the activities that are carried out in 
government. Knowledge of even the process used could 
inadvertently give an advantage to an aggressor and 
hence is must be closely guarded”
543
 
There are some examples of such models being discussed in the literature 
on bioterrorism, or CBRN more widely, however none of these are indicative of 
models being used in decision making.544  A position of secrecy presents a 
problem for academic, or other, inquiry into the evidence base which supports 
policy decisions.545  Thus, I have to look towards pandemic influenza policy 
decisions where there is an emphasis on modelling. There are differences 
between pandemic influenza and bioterrorism, as discussed in preceding 
chapters, most notably in this instance is the absence of intentionality or 
agency in naturally occurring diseases. As discussed above, intent is a constant 
rather than a variable in the threat assessment equation of bioterrorism the 
models used in the assessment of pandemic influenza may give some insight. 
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Response and preparedness, in form and function, are comparable, as stated 
by the ministerial forum of the Global Health Security Initiative:  
“we recognize that preparedness for and response to 
bioterrorism have much in common with preparedness 
for and response to naturally occurring global health 
threats such as pandemic influenza”
546
  
Moreover, an overlap can also be seen in the institutional arrangement, 
where some key actors are shared by both policy areas, as outlined in chapter 
5.  
The UK model 
The UK Contingency Plan gives an outline of how the threat of pandemic 
influenza is assessed and conceptualised in the UK, albeit in vague terms:  
“For planning purposes, working estimates of the most 
likely subsequent spread and impact have been derived 
from theoretical modelling, informed by past 
experience, knowledge of the world today and expert 
advice […] Plans will need to be constructed which deal 
with a wide range of possibilities. To simplify 
presentation this document concentrates on a ‘most 
likely’ base scenario following WHO advice – but the 
possible ranges are also considered. These are working 
estimates for planning purposes, and not predictions of 
the next pandemic.”
547
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The 2005 report of the House of Lords inquiry into pandemic influenza 
contains a memorandum by the Department of Health within which the 
question of how the risk of pandemic influenza emerging and spreading is 
assessed is answered in the following way: 
“This risk is assessed on the basis of: the extent and 
geographic spread of the current H5N1 outbreaks in 
poultry and in migrating aquatic and other birds; the 
extent, severity and geographic incidence of avian flu in 
people; the extent of antigenic change in current H5N1 
viruses, compared to the viruses which first emerged (in 
1997); historic knowledge of the evolution of influenza 
viruses and of previous influenza pandemics; the 
demography of the region and opportunities it provides 
for interchange of genetic material between influenza 
viruses from different species. […] The epidemiological 
and virological information for assessing the risk is 
collected and interpreted by the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) and World Organisation for Animal 
Health (OIE). The European Commission (EC) undertakes 
assessments on behalf of Member States of the 
European Union and assessments are also undertaken by 
HPA and by the Veterinary Laboratories Agency to 
inform contingency planning by the DH and the 
Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs 
(Defra)”
548
  
The overall assessment of risk from pandemic influenza emerging is 
ostensibly done by the WHO, FAO and OIE. National assessments are then a 
function of surveillance and contingency planning.549  This contingency 
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planning relies upon modelling to estimate numbers of morbidity and mortality 
to assess and develop effective mitigation strategies. The models are fitted to 
historical data of previous pan- and epidemics.550  Modelling is done by the 
HPA and the pandemic influenza Scientific Advisory Group (SAG), in a 
collaborative effort with international partners.   
“UK modellers are amongst the international leaders in 
using mathematical modelling to assess the risk of the 
emergence of pandemic influenza […] Projections of the 
likely impact of a pandemic are included in the UK 
Influenza Pandemic Contingency Plan. Those are the best 
available based on current knowledge, previous 
experience and mathematical modelling…”
551
  
However, models are problematic, especially when modelling an 
influenza strain yet to emerge with unknown characteristics – such as the 
virus’ basic reproduction number552  and efficacy of counter-measures (social 
as well as medical).553  The model used for pandemic influenza planning is 
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complex, with wide ranges of morbidity and mortality. It is under constant 
review, and open to scrutiny from the scientific community.554   
The situation is different in the case of bioterrorism. The assessment 
process is secret, not transparent and the level of independent scrutiny is 
difficult to ascertain. More than 75 agents are listed in the Anti-Terrorism 
Crime and Security Act 2001555  whereas in the pandemic influenza case only 
one virus type has to be assessed. This complicates the assessment 
considerably.556 
Exercises 
Another possible avenue to get to the threat assessment are the planning 
assumptions used in emergency response exercises. There is little published 
information available on the specifics of the exercises. And the purpose of 
exercises is to test responders – operationally, tactically, or strategically. 
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Exercises are necessarily artificial and possibly inflated in scope to test 
responders.  
Chapter 4 lists a number of exercises: Firestorm in 1995, Trump Card in 
2000, Magpie in 2004, a Home Office statement which notes that between 
2003 and 2004 six large scale exercises, and thirty-two table top exercises 
were carried out; in 2005 exercise Atlantic Blue, carried out together with 
Canada and the US, and Common Ground together with the EU. Exercise 
Magpie in 2004, for example, was a ‘live’ exercise with 14 simulated fatalities 
and 30 simulated serious injuries, following a sarin gas release.  
Between 2005 and 2007 four national pandemic flu exercises have been 
staged to inform and test the contingency plans, three human infection 
scenarios – ‘Aurora’, ‘Shared Goal’, ‘Winter Willow’ – and one zoonotic 
infection scenario, exercise ‘Hawthorn’. Hawthorn involved a number of table 
top exercises and a two-day live exercise involving 500 people from 40 
organizations.557  Exercise ‘Winter Willow’ involved two stages, a national-level 
table top exercise involving international representatives from the WHO and 
ECDC, and stage two a full national exercise held over several days involving 
around 5000 participants were involved during the exercise, from nine 
Regional Civil Contingencies Committees in England and their equivalents in 
the devolved administrations, fifty one local Strategic Co-ordination Groups 
covering the whole of the UK, all Strategic Health Authorities and a local 
Health Community Group for each Authority’s area.558 
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Published information on the exercises reveals little in terms of planning 
assumptions. Information on the terrorism exercises is sparse, and planning 
assumptions on pandemic influenza are published in the literature as cited 
above, the scenario exercises are designed to test the response plans and 
national and international communication channels, and exercises have 
occurred shortly before the publication of each updated version of the 
national pandemic influenza contingency plan. Little can be deduced from 
these scenario exercises, other than that their frequency is indicative that the 
threat from deliberate disease is substantial enough to warrant costly and 
repeated exercises. 
    
  
                                                                                                                                                           
Workshop on transmission risks of avian influenza from birds to humans; Avonmouth 
House, London, 6 July 2006 
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7 Discussion & Conclusions  
Introduction 
The emergence of bioterrorism as a policy issue is the subject of chapter 
4. It outlined that between the late 1980s and the middle of the first decade in 
the new millennium the policy response to bioterrorism has drifted as well as 
shifted. Chapter 5 outlined the policy response and its institutional 
arrangement. Chapter 6 looked at the conceptualisation of threats through 
threat assessments. This chapter brings together these themes with the 
conceptual framework outlined in chapter 3.  
A basic understanding of bioterrorism threat is that it is a compound of 
terrorism and biological weapons – both of these are complicated and 
diffuse.559  They are represented in a simplified manner in the policy discourse. 
These simplifications are consistent with conceptualising the understandings 
of terrorism and biological weapons as narratives. These narratives represent 
terrorism, more often than not, as a homogenous or monolithic entity; within 
which followers of extremist ideologies are organised in international 
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networks, efficiently exchanging information worldwide, and seeking wanton 
destruction of civilisation. The narrative of the biological weapon holds that 
biological weapons are technologically sophisticated weapons systems with 
massive destructive power, which can be easily and cheaply produced by 
anyone with a basic understanding of science and access to the internet.  
“What has changed in the 21st century is that, in the 
hands of terrorists, weapons of mass destruction would 
be a first resort – the preferred means to further their 
ideology of suicide and random murder. These terrible 
weapons are becoming easier to acquire, build, hide, and 
transport. Armed with a single vial of a biological agent 
or a single nuclear weapon, small groups of fanatics, or 
failing states, could gain the power to threaten great 
nations, threaten the world peace.”
560
 
Although the above description of the terrorism threat with biological 
weapons is an extreme one it was, and still is, a prevalent position following 
September 11, not just in the US, but in the UK as well. In 2006, Prime Minister 
Gordon Brown made following statement on the changed global context of 
terrorism: 
“While the last thirty years have seen Britain having to 
cope with terrorism in Northern Ireland, recent terrorist 
plots are of a different scale: global conspiracies driven 
by extremist ideology to cause mass casualties with no 
warning – often involving suicide bombings and with the 
potential threat of chemical biological radiological and 
nuclear weapons. […] Let us be clear: we face enemies 
that not only have a hatred of the policies we pursue, 
but a hatred of our very existence.”
561
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The focus on threat narratives places the process by which policy actors 
arrive at a particular perception at the centre. The way threat is assessed and 
the parameters, assumptions and sources that inform threat assessments is of 
central importance to understanding the policy formation process.  
Three significant events have affected a shift in the perception of threat 
from bioterrorism. The first event is the fall of the Berlin Wall. There appears 
to be a marked change in thinking about bioterrorism which came about at the 
end of the Cold War, when a number of different strands of events were 
brought together. The disintegration USSR and with it the end of the relatively 
stable, albeit precarious, strategic balance based on deterrence within the 
bipolar bloc system is a marked point in the transition of world affairs.562  
Institutions which had grown-up over decades in the state-centric industrial-
military paradigm of the Cold War were still locked into the mindset which 
prevailed during this period. During the 1980s fears grew over state sponsored 
terrorism, on the one hand Saddam Hussein’s Iraq which used chemical 
weapons against Iran and in Iraqi Kurdistan; and on the other hand the Libyan 
sponsored bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie and Gaddafi’s long 
suspected biological and chemical weapons programme. Both regimes were 
thought capable of passing biological or chemical weapons on to terrorist 
groups. In addition to the possibility that Iraq and Libya may pass on 
unconventional weapons systems was the collapse of the Soviet Union, where 
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a substantial biological warfare programme had been uncovered and fears 
were growing that ‘weapons scientists’ might not only defect to other 
countries, but also offer their expertise on the ‘black market’ to other 
interested parties. 
The second event, in 1995, was the use of sarin in the Tokyo subway 
system being the first significant use of unconventional weaponry by non-state 
actors;563  the third event were the attacks on, and following, 11 September 
2001, which caused a jolt to the response system, precipitating institutional 
re-configurations in the UK; subsequent terrorist attacks and plots augmented 
a prevailing perception of threat.  
Technological change, most notably in the life sciences; re-emerging and 
emerging infectious diseases; and overall escalating trends in terrorism – have 
provided an undercurrent, causing a drift in perceptions, slowly escalating 
from the mid 1990s onwards. 
New Security Challenges 
Before delving into a discussion on the construction of policy narratives it 
is worth citing a group of former military chiefs, diplomats, analysts and 
academics who convened at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) between 
2006 and 2008. They raised concerns about the entanglement of security and 
defence with party politics.564  Their key message was that successive 
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governments have failed to address novel security demands, by making 
security and defence a token in short term party politics. In their view damage 
had been done to the security of the United Kingdom via a “piecemeal and 
erratic response”565  to the new security challenge of the new terrorism. This 
erratic response is engendered, they say, fundamentally, by “flabby and bogus 
strategic thinking” and in “many institutional disturbances”.566  The group 
explains the failure to respond in a coherent manner and in the following way: 
“The stiff geometry of the Cold War world has given way 
to a less predictable (although actually older and 
familiar) flow of forces in world affairs; but the mindset 
of Cold War planners and analysts and the institutions 
shaped by them still linger. This mismatch leaves us 
open to ambush. We maintain a posture to meet threats 
of a certain type for which we have defences of a certain 
type. What we actually face are risks that could grow 
into threats that are significantly different in origin and 
in nature. We lack the certainty of the old rigid 
geometry”
567
 
What the ‘RUSI group’ described is a feature commented on by a number 
of observers and commentators encountered throughout the research; 
especially in the case of bioterrorism policy. To put the RUSI group’s point into 
different words: the response to the new security challenge of terrorism, of 
which bioterrorism is a subset, has been locked-in to a state centric approach 
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– a consequence of institutional configuration adopted, and narratives 
established, during the Cold War.  
However, there is not necessarily a lock-in to Cold War thinking in terms 
of counter-terrorism in general, just in relation to CBRN terrorism through its 
historical linkage to arms control and thus state centricity. Counter terrorism, 
especially in relation to the domestic response has a long history in the UK, 
institutional knowledge and experience accumulated during the Troubles – a 
history, and with it the institutional memory, has been more and more 
relegated with the increasing and escalating threat of Islamic extremism or 
international terrorism. 
“What has become increasingly clear is that, now, nine 
years in the wake of 9/11, there were plenty of 
otherwise decent right-minded people who temporarily 
lost sight of what most fundamentally needs protecting 
in Western society: its values and democratic principles. 
This myopia was most acute in the Bush Administration, 
but it afflicted many in the UK too. Our Prime Minister 
announced that everything had changed, our 
Government temporarily signed up to the impossible 
concept of a ‘War on Terror’ and our Parliament gave its 
assent to a raft of poorly-conceived legislation.”
568
 
This raft of poorly conceived terrorism legislation569  has meant that some 
civil liberties have been sacrificed for increased security.570  
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The Intelligence Security Committee stated: 
“If we seek greater assurance against the possibility of 
attacks, some increase in intrusive activity by the UK’s 
intelligence and security Agencies is the inevitable 
consequence. Even then it seems highly unlikely that it 
will be possible to stop all attacks.”
571
 
What motivated these pieces of legislation and subsequent erosion of 
civil liberties was the insecurity felt following September 11. The hitherto 
existing structures were seen as inadequate, although this view had been 
adopted prior to the attacks and cross governmental integration, joined up 
thinking was on the political agenda, the attacks jolted the system and forced 
or enabled institutional responses, although the responses were not 
substantially structural – the establishment of JTAC being the only direct 
institution resulting from the terrorist attacks572 – they were pervasive in that 
most departments adopted a terrorism portfolio. The ‘old structures’, which 
grew out of the “stiff geometry of the Cold War” are embedded in “the 
mindset of Cold War planners and analysts and the institutions shaped by 
them”.573  Using the concepts of this dissertation: the framing of the new 
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security challenge are influenced by prevailing narratives which have been 
established in different circumstances and changed in response to events. 
Policy Narratives 
Policy narratives are understood here as specific, shared understandings; 
they are necessarily abstractions and simplifications of complex phenomena. 
Policy narratives are simple, unifying, easily expressed explanations that 
organise experiences and provide a framework for understanding events. 
Information which suits the narrative is privileged and information which does 
not suit the narrative is discarded.574  
Distinct and Separate Narratives 
I posit that there are three distinct and separate narratives. These 
narratives have been identified and distilled from documentary sources and 
interviews as presented in the preceding chapters. These distinct and separate 
narratives came together in the late 1980s, resulting in the threat of 
bioterrorism being framed in a specific way. The narratives have been 
reinforced by a number of events which have caused institutional responses. 
These institutional responses in turn have augmented the threat narrative. The 
now prevailing conceptualisation of the bioterrorism threat, which has been 
created or evolved in this way, has become embedded. Moreover, it stands to 
become further entrenched and embedded when viewed in the light of an 
intractable terrorism threat. However, a shift in priorities as well as a diffuse 
and fragmented institutional arrangement could lead to the bioterrorism 
threat subsiding over time, by being overtaken by a more dominant narrative. 
                                                     
574
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In this section I will first look at the narratives separately and then turn to the 
merging into the bioterrorism threat narrative. 
The first is a narrative of WMD; the second is a Terrorism narrative; the 
third is one of Technological Progress.  
WMD Narrative 
The ‘WMD’ narrative posits biological weapons as weapon of mass 
destruction, together with chemical and nuclear weapons. The focus is on 
state run programmes, sophisticated and industrial scale technology, 
exclusively positioned at the massively destructive end of the threat spectrum. 
Policy responses to this narrative are found in international conventions, such 
as the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, and international agreements and 
initiatives, such as export controls. 
Terrorism Narrative 
The ‘Terrorism’ narrative holds that: The terrorism threat is real and 
imminent. The narrative conflates all types of terrorism into one monolithic 
threat, from single plotters to sophisticated international networks. Terrorists 
will attempt to kill as many people as possible and are free of moral 
constraints which might prevent them from doing so. The willingness to 
sacrifice themselves in attacks compounds the danger – they can not be 
negotiated with and are not only actively seeking biological, chemical, 
radiological, and nuclear weapons but they would use them given the 
opportunity to cause maximum harm and destruction of ‘our way of life’. The 
terrorism narrative, in its modern form, has its origin in what has been termed 
the new terrorism – indiscriminate mass casualty events perpetrated by 
transnationally acting groups. The policy response to the terrorism narrative is 
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law enforcement, although internationally this has also involved military 
action.  
Technological Progress Narrative 
The ‘Technological Progress’ narrative states that with the progress of 
technology, technological barriers are lowered allowing easy and cheap access 
to sophisticated technologies for anyone: the hostile exploitation of biology is 
feasible and achievable – and over time the risk of hostile exploitation of 
sciences can, according to this narrative, only increase. Policy responses to the 
technological progress narrative fall under governance of science or research 
dealing with the ‘dual-use’ problem. 
The three distinct narratives are not necessarily caricatures of extreme 
positions. The WMD narrative, for example, is based on the theoretical 
potential of biological weapons systems together with historical evidence from 
state programmes.  
The narrative frames the threat – the framing of the threat shapes and 
influences the policy debate with fundamental consequences for notions of 
what constitutes the best strategy for governance of, or policies, against 
bioterrorism. Although the narratives overlap they suggest different solutions, 
each in their own right – law enforcement for ‘terrorism’, multilateral 
international instruments for ‘WMD’, and a diverse array of measures for the 
governance of scientific research for the ‘technological progress’ narrative. 
Events 
The events thesis has been posited a number of times in this dissertation: 
in short, it states that a number of successive events have led to a change in 
perception (sarin, 1995); then jolted political and institutional structures 
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(September 11, 2001); further bombings and plots have augmented the threat 
(Madrid & London).  
The end of the Cold War caused a shift in global power relations; the 
crumbling Soviet Union revealed its biological warfare programme raising 
concerns over a potential nefarious ‘brain drain’.  
The release of sarin gas in Tokyo which killed 11 and injured almost 4000 
people broke the “state monopoly”575  on most powerful means of destruction. 
The event caused a fundamental shift in threat perception, moving the threat 
of terrorists from a hypothetical to reality, a threshold had been broken.576 
The attacks on Washington and New York on September 11, 2001 took 
the US as well as the western world by surprise – the largest single terrorist 
attack hitherto known. The ensuing anthrax letters combined the massive 
destruction with a “weapon of mass destruction”, creating a lasting political 
impact. In the UK numerous institutions were shaken up and re-configured, 
legislation was hastily enacted, and with the launch of military action against 
Afghanistan in October 2001, and Iraq in April 2003 the UK became involved in 
the War on Terror. Despite retaliatory strikes against Al-Qaeda the network 
was able to mount further high profile attacks:  
“The view that al-Qaida has lost much of its leadership 
and been thoroughly disrupted is assiduously cultivated; 
yet the movement and its wider associates have been 
extraordinarily active, with numerous attacks across the 
world since 9/11: including Djerba, Bali, Mombasa and 
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Karachi (2002), Riyadh, Casablanca, and Istanbul (2003), 
Madrid, Khobar, Taba and Jeddah (2004), London, Sharm 
al-Sheikh, Aqaba and Amman (2005).”
577
 
The bombings following September 11 augmented the elevated threat 
perception, especially the bombs in Madrid and London (including the failed 
plot two weeks after the London attacks) reinforced the prevailing threat 
narrative of terrorism – terrorism is real and imminent.  
The conceptualisation of bioterrorism as consisting of the combination of 
three distinct narratives – ‘technological progress’, ‘terrorism’, and ‘WMD’ – 
which overlap means that events which have nothing, or little, to do with the 
deliberate spread of disease still have an impact on the bioterrorism narrative 
further reinforcing and augmenting the overall bioterrorism narrative. So that 
conventional terrorist attacks, unrelated to bioterrorism, further entrench the 
narrative. Bioterrorism conceptualised as a combination of the terrorism 
narrative and the technological progress narrative can thus, in part, explain 
the rise of bioterrorism as a policy issue over time.  
The three narratives have emerged from separate origins, but have 
subsequently merged over time. In the late 1980s all three narratives had 
already been established in their own right, but were still relatively separate. 
The technological progress narrative had been closely linked to the WMD 
narrative through arms control. The terrorism narrative remained within the 
conventional area, but started to get entangled with the WMD narrative 
through concerns over state sponsorship of terrorism combined with their 
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unconventional weapon programmes, followed by concerns over Russian BW 
‘brain drain’.   
Narratives and Policy Responses 
Chapter 6 argued that the threat assessment model is inverted, based on 
the ‘not if but when’ notion, and that ‘intent’ is turned from a variable (an 
unknown) into a constant (known). Chapter 5 posited that, within the 
institutional arrangement, intelligence occupies a prominent position 
informing the policy process by feeding into models and exercises, which in 
turn form a basis for policy decisions. A central role of intelligence as a basis 
for policy decision can be problematic: 
“In developing policy on the basis of intelligence, it 
needs to be recognized throughout that intelligence 
analysts are expected to draw worst-case interpretations 
from the available wisps of information. Furthermore, 
because intelligence analysts are making their 
assessment against a background of knowledge of their 
own national programs in this area, an element of 
mirror-imaging is liable to enter the intelligence 
assessment. Although intelligence analysts are generally 
aware of the strengths and weaknesses of their 
assessments, it is by no means clear that the 
policymakers who make decisions based on those 
intelligence assessments are equally aware. Similarly, 
policymakers may err on the side of caution so that they 
cannot be accused of having failed to take steps to 
protect the security of their country.”
578
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The Butler review, for example, found that limitations of intelligence 
were not adequately acknowledged when the Government was considering 
military action against Iraq.579   
The interaction of the bioterrorism narrative with institutions is 
important. Once a narrative is taken up by institutions and becomes embedded 
in their structures, or gives rise to a new institution as is the case with JTAC, 
then the institution and the narrative mutually reinforce one another, thus 
becoming further entrenched. The diffuse and difficult to assess nature of 
terrorism (terrorism narrative) coupled with the potential for high impact 
when combined with unconventional weapons (WMD narrative) creates an 
intractable threat and the theoretical possibility of something happening 
(intent as a constant) prevents analysts from ever giving an ‘all clear’ – the 
threat is irreducible. It is an intractable problem. Moreover, the threat 
narrative is kept in a hyperbole, augmented by events580  and “worst-case 
interpretations from the available wisps of intelligence.”581 
However, the reliance on intelligence poses another problem – a need, or 
desire, for secrecy effectively excludes informed scrutiny.582  Democratic 
accountability is difficult to attain in any area of security related policy, this 
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becomes problematic if “we seek greater assurance against the possibility of 
attacks, some increase in intrusive activity by the UK’s intelligence and 
security agencies is the inevitable consequence. Even then it seems highly 
unlikely that it will be possible to stop all attacks”583 
‘Evidence based’ Policy making 
The 1999 Modernising Government white paper noted that Government 
“must produce policies that really deal with problems, that are forward-
looking and shaped by evidence rather than a response to short-term 
pressures; that tackle causes not symptoms”584  The Government assured that 
it has a “commitment to ‘what works’ over ideologically driven policy” and 
that it is engaged in evidence-based policy making585 and “has recognised that 
a proportionate response to terrorism must be based on a thorough 
assessment of the terrorist threat and the best scientific advice”586 
Invoking the authority of ‘science-’ or ‘evidence-based’ policy decision 
rules implies that ‘sound science’ can determine decisions with rigour and 
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objectivity delivering robust outcomes in complex, uncertain and contested 
policy areas.587   
An ‘objective’ and ‘scientifically sound’ singular risk picture is derived 
from the threat assessment equation588  in the following way; first:   
“reduce the multiple, complex, and indeterminate 
dimensions of knowledge to just two readily quantifiable 
kinds of parameter: outcomes and probabilities. Second, 
these parameters are then ‘re-aggregated’ in careful 
disciplined ways to yield an ostensibly simple scalar 
representation of ‘risk’ […] Even if the underlying 
calculative procedures are performed only symbolically 
or informally, the associated quantitative idiom is 
routinely held to confer a high degree of authority and 
stochastic reliability.”
589
  
  ‘Values’ for the components of the threat assessment equation – 
likelihood, impact, capability, vulnerability, and intent – are derived from the 
three threat narratives, as described in this chapter. The singular risk picture 
derived from this ‘science based’ risk assessment approach reduces and 
conflates the inherent complexity and obscures underlying framing 
assumptions into a single value.   
To characterise this “reductive aggregative” approach as an evidence-
based policy approach is problematic as “evidence-based” implies objectivity. 
Which evidence is used? Who interprets this evidence? What are its 
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limitations? By selecting particular frames through which the evidence is 
interpreted narrows the scope of the threat assessment, and consequently 
forecloses alternative policy options. 
Policy obstacles through framing 
The biological weapon threat spectrum ranges from rudimentary home 
brewing to sophisticated state programmes: “[the] threat posed by chemical 
and biological weapons covers the basics of kitchen chemistry and bathtub 
biology through to the sophisticated chemical and biological weapons 
developed in state-led programmes”590  
The ‘WMD’ narrative inflates the threat by invoking mass destruction. It 
is thus responsible for locating the bioterrorism threat at the high impact end 
of the threat spectrum. This threat spectrum is asymmetric, in that the 
probability of acquisition of a useable ‘weapon’ is skewed heavily towards 
kitchen sink operations, but the bioterrorism threat narrative is skewed 
towards the massively destructive end of the spectrum.  
The ‘Terrorism’ narrative frames bioterrorism as an emergency and crisis 
– an “immediate and real threat”. The urgency causes political buy-in at high 
levels, appropriation of funds, and institutional responses. Investments into 
responses to terrorism have been sustained for a considerable time, however 
they are tied to rapid responses and timeframes. There is an emphasis on 
emergency response, including training, decontamination, real time detection 
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and identification of agents, and personal protective equipment for first 
responders.591   
The monolithic view of terrorism, as pointed to above, has been criticised 
by several commentators, for example:  
“Context is all in the analysis of political violence. In the 
view of the enormous diversity of groups and aims 
involved, generalisations and evaluations covering the 
whole field of modern terrorism should be treated with 
considerable reserve. Over-simplified analysis of 
phenomena tends to induce simplistic and dangerous 
proposals for panaceas.”
592
 
And, 
“entangling disparate phenomena under the ‘terrorism’ 
label implies a preference for a homogenized policy, 
although it would be better to differentiate threats and 
respond specifically to each variant”
593
  
These commentators urge to disaggregate terrorism into categories 
according to motivational parameters, objectives, and so on (for example, 
national-separatist, social revolutionary, etc).594  A disaggregation, they argue, 
                                                     
591
 Scoones and Forster point out similar findings in their analysis of policy narratives framing 
the international Avian Influenza ‘crisis’, see: Scoones, I. & P. Forster (2008) The 
International Response to Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza: Science, Policy and Politics 
(STEPS Working Paper 10). Brighton: STEPS Centre, p.34 
592
 Wilkinson, P. (2005) International Terrorism: the changing threat and the EU's response. 
Chaillot Paper, 84 (October 2005), p.12 
593
 Kellman, B. & R. Bilder (2000) Review Essay: Clashing Perspectives on Terrorism. The 
American Journal of International Law, 94(2), 434-438, p. 435 
594
 This type of disaggregation or differentiation of groups who engage in political violence 
can produce interesting insights into, for example, the propensity to use unconventional 
weapons. See for example: Post, J. M. (2005) The psychology of WMD terrorism. 
International Studies Review, 7(1), 148-51, & Piazza, J. A. (2009) Is Islamist Terrorism 
More Dangerous?: An Empirical Study of Group Ideology, Organization, and Goal 
Structure. Terrorism and Political Violence, (21), 68-88 
253 
would enable differentiated and targeted responses. Comprehensively 
integrated approaches to diverse policy challenges can only make sense where 
there is a common causal mechanism – thus, integrated approaches to counter 
radicalisation595, for example, or the process of terrorist recruitment596  may 
make sense because there are common causal mechanisms.597    
The ‘WMD’ narrative is problematic because it associates biological 
weapons with chemical, radiological and nuclear weapons. However, these 
systems are categorically different in consequences and impact. The causal 
mechanism with which they cause harm and the type of harm they can cause is 
fundamentally different.  
“biological weapons give the good guys opportunities 
that nuclear weapons don’t: a biological weapon can be 
prevented from causing mass lethality after an 
attack.”
598
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Combining these different systems in one integrated CBRN approach may 
foreclose other policy options.599   
The ‘technological progress’ narrative is the most complicated of the 
three narratives to unpick. It holds that through advancing science access to 
biological weapons becomes easier. The narrative adopts a simplified and 
reductive view of technology, the life sciences and biological weapons in 
particular. Biological weapons are depicted as artefacts, which deliver desired 
effects ‘off the shelf’.600  Likewise, attempts to govern and regulate advances 
in the life sciences to prevent ‘dangerous’ research being conducted whilst 
promoting, or at least not inhibiting, ‘beneficial’ outcomes are based on a 
simplified understanding of technology and innovative processes in the life 
sciences.601 
“Since neither technologies’ function nor how well they 
perform them, are solely determined by their intrinsic 
properties, innovation cannot be an event where the 
artefact/function is discovered. Instead innovation is a 
process […] technology should not be understood as only 
                                                                                                                                                           
Terrorism. The conclusions of this article are sound. However, the commission is the 
product and apex of what Leitenberg called an influential “group of vociferous 
proponents of the bioterrorism threat” who have been setting the US policy agenda by 
“systematically and deliberately” exaggerating the threat which led the US government 
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artefacts as it includes and can be defined as ‘all the 
knowledge, concepts, experimental processes, tangible 
and intangible artefacts and wider socio-technical 
systems that are required to recognise technical 
problems and to conceptualise, formulate, research, 
develop, test, apply, diffuse and maintain effective 
solutions to those problems.”
602
 
Adopting a wider framing of technology as a combination of artefacts, 
knowledge and learning embedded in a socio-political system may offer an 
explanation as to why there have been so few actual incidences of 
bioterrorism: a simplified conception of technology leads to an over-
estimation of “the ease with which it is possible to move from a pathogen to a 
weapon with the potential to harm more than a few people, and the even 
larger technical problems associated with developing biological weapons of 
mass destruction.”603  It should be noted that even the acquisition of a 
pathogen can present a significant barrier. Aum Shinrikyo’s efforts to produce 
a biological weapon failed at this stage; as did the ‘ricin plotter’, and despite 
Al-Qaeda’s ‘interest’ there is no evidence that they have be able to acquire any 
biological agents.604  
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Policy Implications 
The possibilities of biological warfare are chilling. This apparent potential 
for harm should, however, not invoke simplified and reductive risk 
characterisations to frame the response to a complex and dynamic threat 
which consists of a broad and asymmetric threat spectrum, with a raft of 
possible agents and modes of use, on the side of the weapon, as well as 
complicated social factors such as motivations and group composition, on the 
side of the perpetrator.  
“The lack of CBRN attacks should lead policy-makers, 
politicians, scholars, and governments to ask penetrating 
questions. Why have so few CBRN attacks occurred? 
What is the actual threat posed by CBRN? What is the 
perceived threat posed by these weapons? And, aside 
from what is real, what is supposition, and what is the 
evidence concerning CBRN weapons, what does all this 
mean for the future policy towards the domestic 
management of terrorist attacks?”
605
 
Narratives are powerful cognitive shortcuts (heuristics) which prejudice 
policy formation processes by narrowing interpretation. The study and 
identification of dominant narratives in specific policy settings can aid the 
understanding of the emergence of policy issues. Moreover, not just the 
understanding of their emergence but the study of narratives may also enable 
a critical assessment of the underlying assumptions. Unpicking the narratives 
allows a re-evaluation of the threat posed by bioterrorism; not in order to 
choose one interpretation over another but to complement and enhance the 
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narrow interpretation which has evolved out of ‘historical accident’.606  Risk 
based precautionary and participatory approaches607  can offer a way into this 
opening up of policy options which have thus far been restricted by the narrow 
interpretation that has become entrenched through the processes described 
above. 
Further Research 
This research has looked at the rise of bioterrorism threat in the UK over 
a period of time which has been characterised by significant changes in the 
international environment. The processes described are complex, multi-causal, 
and the policy network and processes involved are in many cases not open for 
inquiry. Many questions remain unanswered. This research has provided a 
framework, a way to conceptualise the threat from bioterrorism, and further 
inquiry is needed on a variety of aspects of its construction and application. 
Many of these research areas are not accessible to academic scrutiny, or only 
allow a limited view of what is going on. As Littlewood pointed out: “Difficult 
as it may be to admit, those outside of the intelligence and counter-terrorism 
community or without access to such information are in many cases simply 
guessing at the CBRN threat”608   
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This research has concentrated on a conceptual level of the threat 
narrative which is held by policy makers and shapers, and embedded in 
institutions. This narrative is contested – how do these contests play out, is 
the dominant narrative challenged and amended as a consequence, over time? 
Is it a passive or an active process? What may trigger re-evaluation of the 
threat narrative? The manner in which bioterrorism has been characterised 
here suggests that it is passive, and now that it is tacitly and structurally 
entrenched in national strategy,609  it here to stay, maintained for as long as 
there is technological progress and any type of terrorist activity. Should the 
threat narrative be counteracted? Or even reinforced to stimulate 
preparations? Or is it going to fizzle out over time when sidelined and 
overtaken by a different narrative? 
Furthermore, there are a number of questions about processes of 
interaction between actors on different levels of engagement: how do other 
countries relate to the shaping of the narrative, what is their role and impact 
on the UK, in particular in this case the US, but also other international actors, 
such as the EU, G8, UN, WHO? Do supranational organizations have a 
harmonising effect on the threat narrative? For example, is a similar 
bioterrorism threat narrative operating in EU countries and spreading to new 
member states? How can differences in threat perception between countries 
be explained? 
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There are many more angles and perspectives on the linkages between 
the bioterrorism threat, terrorism in general and the policy process that 
require academic attention, in order to understand further aspects of their 
interactions.  
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